dissenting.
Despite the majority’s comprehensive statutory history of state and federal wildlife statutes, I believe that the appellant’s conviction should have been dismissed, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Our court has held that “a citation must include a specific section of the statute violated.” Commonwealth v. Cohen, 413 *15Pa.Super. 460, 463, 605 A.2d 814, 816 (1992) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Stahl, 296 Pa.Super. 507, 442 A.2d 1166 (1982). The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure also state:
(A) Every citation shall contain:
(6) a citation of the specific section and subsection of the statue or ordinance allegedly violated, together with a summary of the facts sufficient to advise the defendant of the nature of the offense charged.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 53 (emphasis added). Cf. Commonwealth v. Alston, 539 Pa. 202, 651 A.2d 1092 (1994) (an indictment or information is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the offense intended to be charged).
The majority recounts that “[t]he Commonwealth filed two Philadelphia Municipal Court citations ... charging that appellant had not complied with game tag regulations required under 34 Pa.C.S. § 2103 with regard to his possession of a Merganser hen and a Wood Duck hen.”' Majority at p. 5. “The citations clearly identified the gravamen of the complaint, ie., the fact that appellant possessed untagged migratory game birds in violation of sections 20.36 and 20.37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” Majority at p. 11. The important fact omitted from these statements, however, is that this citation only cited Neitzel for possessing another’s game birds. In actuality, however, Neitzel was convicted of possessing a game bird belonging to himself. As the trial court opinion notes, the category of the offender differs in regard to the statutory subsection cited in Neitzel’s citation and the subsection under which he was actually convicted. Unlike the majority, I cannot regard such an elemental distinction as minor.
Relying on this court’s proposition in Commonwealth v. Frye, 357 Pa.Super. 395, 401-02, 516 A.2d 38, 43-44 (1986) (en banc), that “a citation is adequate if its factual summary alerts a defendant to the nature of the offense charged and notifies him of the pending prosecution,” the majority finds that Neitzel was on notice of the charge for which he was *16convicted. A close reading of the Frye case, however, renders this proposition inapplicable to and improper under the facts of this case.
In Frye, the appellant alleged that his citation was defective because it failed to specify both an element of the cited offense as well as a factual detail of the events leading up to his arrest. The Frye court determined that the allegedly omitted element was not an essential element of the offense and affirmed appellant’s conviction. In the present case, Neitzel does not advance either of the arguments found in Frye. Rather, Neitzel complains of the citation’s omission of the specific subsection of the statute for which he was convicted.
Because Neitzel was not put on notice of an important element of the crimes for which he was convicted, specifically the category of the offender, I find that the present citation contained a substantial defect, one so prejudicial that the charges should have been dismissed against the appellant. Pa.R.Crim.P. 90. Cf. Frye, 357 Pa.Super. 395, 516 A.2d 38 (1986) (en banc) (allegation of a mere defect in the summary of the facts or description of the offense in a citation will not require that charges be dismissed or conviction reversed); Stahl, supra (same).
I would reverse the judgment of sentence.