dissenting.
I concur with the majority with respect to all issues raised except as to issue I. Since I believe this case should have been removed from Frederick County for trial, I respectfully dissent.
To appreciate fully the necessity for removal in order to ensure a fair and impartial trial, a brief recitation of some facts is helpful. The decedent, Clater W. Smith, Jr., was Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court for Frederick County. Judge Smith had practiced law in Frederick County for twenty-one years prior to his appointment to the bench in 1985. Frederick had a population of 150,208 at the time of the hearing on the motion. Appellant1 argued that due to Judge Smith’s prominence in the community, his activity in civic affairs, his membership in the country club, and his involvement in the church, he was very well known in the county. The appellees are part of a small medical community, are prominent physicians and are also extremely well known. Appellant averred that due to these factors, removal was essential in order to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
At the outset of the litigation, both parties agreed that removal was essential. The Health Claims Arbitration was, therefore, removed to Harford County. After waiver of Health Claims Arbitration, suit was filed. Appellees decided that they wanted the case tried in Frederick County, while *398appellant persisted in trying to obtain removal from Frederick County.
Apparently, because a circuit court judge was a party to this action, this case was handled in a somewhat unusual fashion. Appellees wrote to Chief Judge Murphy on March 7, 1991 and requested that a judge outside of Frederick County be assigned to the case and that the trial be held in Frederick County. In response, Chief Judge Murphy, on April 15, 1991, assigned Judge Francis M. Arnold to hear the removal motion filed by appellant. According to the appellant,2 Judge Arnold’s secretary telephoned one of her attorneys, attempted to arrange a hearing date, and stated that the purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the case would be tried in Frederick County or Carroll County. Since appellant’s desire was that the case be tried in a noncontiguous county and since Carroll County borders Frederick County, appellant withdrew her motion on July 12, 1991.
Subsequently, on March 10, 1992, appellant filed with Chief Judge Murphy and with Judge Arnold a petition requesting Judge Arnold’s recusal. The petition averred that appellant could not receive a fair trial in Frederick County and claimed that Judge Arnold had prejudged the initial removal petition. Before Chief Judge Murphy addressed the petition, however, appellant withdrew her motion seeking Judge Arnold’s recusal.
Approximately one month prior to the trial date, appellant filed a new petition for removal. Among the allegations of the petition were that Judges Dwyer and Stepler, the remaining judges in Frederick County, were to testify at the trial and that it would be virtually impossible to impanel in Frederick County persons who did not have contact with the parties involved. The court denied the motion by written order dated April 8, 1992.
*399On April 13, 1992, appellant renewed her motion for removal, and, in addition to the prior grounds, cited an article that had appeared in a local newspaper, the Frederick News, on April 11, 1992. It is alleged by appellant that the circulation of the News approximates the population of Frederick County. Appellant’s principal objection to the article was that it incorrectly reported that the complaint stated that an early diagnosis might have saved Judge Smith’s life when, in reality, the contention was that an early diagnosis probably would have saved his life. Judge Arnold denied this renewed motion, and the case proceeded to trial in Frederick County.
Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975), citizens of this State enjoyed an absolute Constitutional right of removal of a civil case by filing a suggestion in writing under oath that a fair and impartial trial could not be obtained in the jurisdiction. Section 8 of Art. IV, Constitution of Maryland. In view of the fact that the exercise of the right of removal brought different results in Baltimore City than the exercise in the various counties, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated.3 The Court of Appeals solved the Constitutional problem by abolishing the automatic right of removal. Davidson, 276 Md. at 82, 344 A.2d 422.
The Court in Davidson realized, of course, that it made a far reaching change in the Maryland law, and in reassuring the Maryland Bar stated at 83, 344 A.2d 422:
The effect of this ruling, we hasten to point out, will in no way deprive or otherwise curtail the circuit courts of the counties or the circuit-level civil law Courts of Baltimore City from exercising their common law discretionary power *400(which is subject to appellate review for abuse) to remove an action to another jurisdiction, within or without the circuit, in order to rid the case of any prejudicial barnacles which, because of local prejudice, passion or interest, may have attached; thus as near as is reasonably possible, an action’s consideration by a fair and impartial jury can be insured. (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals has consistently held that removal provisions are to be liberally construed. In Bullock v. State, 230 Md. 280, 283, 186 A.2d 888 (1962), the Court stated, “[I]t has invariably been held that the removal clauses are to be liberally construed in favor of the right.”
The majority is satisfied that appellant’s concerns over impaneling an impartial jury were resolved by the use of voir dire. I am not so easily assured. It is my experience that voir dire is a helpful tool, not a panacea. If voir dire were a total remedy, removal would never be necessary. Even removal cannot totally eliminate the possibility of a prejudiced juror, but it certainly improves the odds and is the best solution available.
While it is apparent that appellant unduly complicated the trial judge’s decision by insisting on removal to a noncontiguous county, it is clear that appellant was not given the option of removal from Frederick County to any other county, contiguous or noncontiguous, and that appellant at no time refused any offer of removal from Frederick County.
It appears to me that the instant case is one of those rare matters that may present itself every ten to fifteen years that fairly cries out for removal. To refuse removal under circumstances such as these is, in my opinion, an abuse of discretion. If a refusal to remove a case of this compelling nature can be viewed a valid exercise of discretion, as the majority holds, then we have moved from an absolute Constitutional right of removal to an almost nonexistent right of removal subject to the unbridled discretion of the trial judge.
. Originally, Judge Smith filed the complaint along with his wife, Margaret C. Smith. Judge Smith died shortly thereafter, and Mrs. Smith proceeded with the action in her individual capacity and as personal representative of her husband's estate. For convenience, we refer to Mrs. Smith, in her multiple roles, as appellant.
. Appellant insisted at oral argument that the circumstances as related were correct, and the judge did not dispute her version. Additionally, appellees do not take issue with appellant as to these facts.
. Since there existed three law courts in Baltimore City, the Superior Court, the Baltimore City Court, and the Court of Common Pleas, cases were removed from one law court to another but still remained in Baltimore City. In the counties, meanwhile, only one law court existed, so cases were removed from one jurisdiction to another. It was this disparate practice that resulted in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.