dissenting.
Four years ago, a defendant subject to the death penalty asked us to reverse his conviction because the trial court had admitted evidence of his prior convictions for armed robbery, burglary, and murder. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 585-87, 575 A.2d 816 (1990). On other grounds, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for retrial. In reversing, the Court declined the defendant’s request to adopt a rule requiring the “sanitization” of his prior convictions, the very rule that the Court adopts today. We wrote in Pennington:
The well-established rule in this jurisdiction is that admission of a prior conviction “into evidence against a criminal defendant rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge * * *. Ordinarily evidence of prior convictions should be admitted and the burden of proof to justify exclusion rests on the defendant.” State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144, 386 A.2d 378 (1978). Further, “[t]he key to exclusion is remoteness.” Ibid. Remoteness involves both the passage of time and the nature of the offense. Ibid. “The trial court must balance the lapse of time and the nature of the crime to determine whether the relevance with respect to credibility outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant.” Id. at 144-45, 386 A.2d 378.
“Sanitization” would mark a pronounced departure from the Sands rule, which has served well for twelve years. We are not persuaded to depart from Sands or to establish an exception for a prior murder conviction in a capital case. In so holding, we recognize the potential prejudicial effect in such a case of a prior murder conviction. That potential prejudice must be weighed against the countervailing consideration, however, that serious crimes should be given weighty effect. Moreover, even greater prejudice might ensue from jury speculation about the nature of a conviction for an unspecified crime.
[119 N.J. at 586, 575 A.2d 816 (alterations in original).]
Both in Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 132-33, 138, 147, 386 A. 2d 378, and in its opinion today, ante at 383-384, 625 A2d at 1088-1089, the Court has acknowledged that the admissibility of convictions is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:81-12, which provides that “[f]or the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness ... his conviction of any crime may be shown by examination or otherwise____” Sands recognized that when *409applying the statute, courts should be guided by Evidence Rule 4 and “exclude remotely relevant evidence, the probative value of which is offset by the possible confusion of issues and danger of undue prejudice.” 76 N.J. at 144, 386 A. 2d 378. I believe that the “sanitization” rule adopted by the Court today is inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:81-12 and with Sands's holding on the use of prior convictions. Accordingly, I would defer to the Legislature on the adoption of any such rule. See State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 375-77, 537 A.2d 667 (1988).
Moreover, since our decision in Pennington, our Committee on the Rules of Evidence has proposed Evidence Rule 609, which follows N.J.S.A. 2A:81-12 as interpreted by Sands. See 129 N.J.L.J. 1, 25-27 (Supp. Oct. 10, 1991). The proposed Rule provides:
For the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness, the witness’ conviction of a crime shall be admitted unless excluded by the judge as remote or for other causes. Such conviction may be proved by examination, production of the record thereof, or by other competent evidence.
The Rule “makes no admissibility distinction in terms of the crime of which the witness has been convicted” and “draws no distinction between crimes of dishonesty or false statement and other crimes.” Comment on Proposed Evid.R. 609, 129 N.J.L.J. 26 (Supp. Oct. 10, 1991). In proposing Rule 609, the Committee declined to include “restrictive provisions on the use of criminal convictions to impair credibility.” Ibid. From this, I conclude that proposed Rule 609, which is scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1993, favors the existing rule admitting any prior conviction for impeachment. The Committee did not suggest “sanitization” or any other changes in N.J.S.A. 2A:81-12.
In sum, I thought Pennington was correctly decided four years ago. Nothing has happened in the interim that would change my mind. I would affirm.
CLIFFORD and GARIBALDI, JJ., join in this dissent.
*410For Affirmance — Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI — 3.
For Reversal and Remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, O’HERN and STEIN — 4.