State v. Foss

OPINION

HUSPENI, Judge.

This appeal is from a stay of adjudication with imposition of court costs, for fifth-degree assault. Minn.Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1 (1994). This court stayed the appeal pending the supreme court’s decision in State v. Krot-zer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.1996), then vacated the stay after that decision was released, We affirm.

FACTS

A motorist reported to police that a pickup truck had tried to force him off the road. The driver of the truck got out of his vehicle, walked over, reached into the motorist’s car, grabbed the man by the hair and swore at him.

The motorist gave police a license plate number matching that of respondent Douglas Foss’s pickup truck. Foss decided to plead guilty, while claiming he was provoked by the motorist’s obscene gesture. The victim gave a statement at the guilty plea hearing, admitting making an obscene gesture at Foss. Foss requested a stay of adjudication. The trial court, noting that there was wrongdoing on both sides and that both parties were angry over a traffic incident, ordered a stay of adjudication for six months on the condition that Foss have no similar conduct, and ordered him to pay $100 in court costs.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in staying adjudication of appellant’s conviction?

ANALYSIS

The state argues that the trial court erred in staying adjudication and violated the separation of powers doctrine. The supreme court, however, has held that the trial courts have inherent judicial authority to stay adjudication of a criminal conviction. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.1996).

The state argues that the “special circumstances” present in Krotzer are not present here. The Krotzer court stated:

The district court’s determination that Krotzer’s situation warranted unusual judicial measures is well-supported by the special circumstances of Krotzer’s case. It appears that the court strongly disagreed with the prosecutor’s decision to file charges against Krotzer, and felt that jus*84tice would not be served by giving Krotzer a criminal record as a predatory sex offender. Although the court did not act pursuant to any express Minnesota rule or statute, its decision to stay adjudication of Krotzer’s charge instead of accepting his guilty plea fell within the “inherent judicial power” we have repeatedly recognized, and was necessary to the furtherance of justice in Krotzer’s case.

Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

The supreme court in Krotzer did not attempt to define what “special circumstances” would justify a stay of adjudication. Krotzer involved what the trial court viewed as a less serious offense, a statutory rape in the course of a romantic relationship, with no history of aggressiveness in which the parties had amicably resolved the situation, ending the sexual relationship. Id. at 253.

The trial court here viewed the roadside assault by one motorist on another, limited to hair pulling and provoked by an obscene gesture, to be a less serious offense warranting a stay of adjudication. We find no language in Krotzer so restricting the court’s inherent judicial authority that the trial court could be found to have erred in exercising it in this case. Whatever is included in the term “special circumstances,” a narrow definition of that term would be inherently inconsistent with the broad nature of the “inherent judicial power” that the Krotzer court recognizes., See id. at 255.

DECISION

The trial court’s decision to stay adjudication of appellant’s conviction was justified by the “special circumstances” of the case.

Affirmed.

HARTEN, J., files dissenting opinion.