This is an action which was commenced by Jackson Miller, plaintiff, against Benjamin Coal Company, defendant, to recover damages caused to a truck when defendant’s loader backed into it. The case was initially referred to compulsory arbitration, which resulted in an award for plaintiff in the amount of $8,798.50. The defendant appealed, and a trial de *318novo was held before the Honorable John K. Reilly, Jr. The jury which heard the case found that plaintiffs damages were in the amount of $8,798.50, but that plaintiff had been guilty of causal negligence to the extent of thirty (30%) percent. The amount of damages was therefore reduced, and a verdict was entered accordingly. Post-trial motions were denied, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The defendant appealed. It contends that it is entitled to judgment n.o.v.
In the complaint, Miller alleged that he was the owner of the damaged truck. This averment was denied by the defendant, who, in its answer, demanded proof. At trial, after an appeal from arbitration had been filed, Miller was asked who owned the truck at the time of the accident and responded, “I owned it. My wife and I own it.” After plaintiff had rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict on grounds that Miller’s wife was an indispensable party who had not been joined. The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict, and the complaint was not amended. The issue was preserved in defendant’s post-trial motions.
Pa.R.C.P. 2227(a) provides as follows:
Persons having only a joint interest in the subject matter of an action must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
Pa.R.C.P. 1032 provides that a party waives defenses and objections which he does not present either by preliminary objection, answer or reply, but specifically excepts the defense of failure to join an indispensable party. Was Miller’s wife an indispensable party?
In DeCoatsworth v. Jones, 414 Pa.Super. 589, 607 A.2d 1094 (1992), allocatur granted, — Pa.-, 619 A.2d 700 (1993), the Superior Court held that both tenants by the entireties were indispensable parties to a claim for fraud in a transaction which allegedly deprived an estranged husband of his interest in real estate owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. Also, in Brandt v. Hershey, 198 Pa.Super. 539,182 A.2d 219 (1962), the Court held that both spouses were indispensable parties and had to join as plaintiffs in an action to preserve or recover entireties property. See also: Mitchell *319v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 346 Pa.Super. 327, 499 A.2d 632 (1985), where the Court, in dictum, suggested that indispensable parties “are inter alia joint tenants, tenants in common and tenants by the entireties.” Id. at 335, 499 A.2d at 636; Moorehead v. Lopatin, 300 Pa.Super. 81, 445 A.2d 1308 (1982) (in action for personal injuries caused by negligent maintenance of entireties property, both spouses must be joined as defendants).
Our research, however, has disclosed neither Superi- or Court nor Supreme Court decision which holds that an action for money damages to entireties property cannot be maintained by one of the spouses acting as agent for both tenants by the entireties. Indeed, the Supreme Court announced in J.R. Christ Construction Co. v. Olevsky, 426 Pa. 343, 232 A.2d 196 (1967), the rule to be as follows:
“There is, ... with respect to entireties property, a well established presumption that during the term of a marriage either spouse has the power to act for both, without specific authorization, so long as the benefits of such action inure to both: Schweitzer v. Evans, supra [360 Pa. 552, 63 A.2d 39 (1949) ]; Madden et al. v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Company, 331 Pa. 476 (1938), 200 A.2d 624. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the spouse acting was not in fact authorized by the other spouse----”
Id. 426 Pa. at 348-349, 232 A.2d at 199, quoting Kennedy v. Erkman, 389 Pa. 651, 658, 133 A.2d 550, 553 (1957). Thus, either spouse has authority to contract for improvements to entireties property so long as the contract inures to the benefit of both spouses. J.R. Christ Construction Co. v. Olevsky, supra. So, too, authority of one spouse to give notice of termination of a lease of property held by the entireties is presumed so long as it benefits both spouses. Kennedy v. Erkman, supra. See also: Bradney v. Sakelson, 325 Pa.Super. 519, 473 A.2d 189 (1984); Sgro v. Sgro, 259 Pa.Super. 425, 393 A.2d 900 (1978). Why, then, shouldn’t a spouse with appropriate authority be allowed to maintain an action for damage to entireties property, where such recovery will benefit both spouses?
*320A party was said to be indispensable, in Hartley v. Langkamp & Elder, 243 Pa. 550, 90 A. 402 (1914), “when he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be made without affecting it, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.... Thus where the object of a bill is to divest a title to property, the presence of those holding or claiming such title is indispensable.” Id. at 555-556, 90 A. at 403^04.
It must be conceded, surely, that in actions intended to affect the title to property which is either held or claimed by tenants by the entireties, both spouses are indispensable parties and must be joined. Where a marriage continues to exist, however, we perceive no reason for holding that one spouse cannot act as agent for the entireties estate in bringing an action to recover damages for injury to the entireties property so long as the action benefits both spouses and there is no evidence rebutting the presumption of authority to act. A final judgment for damages in such an action does not affect the title to or possession of entireties property. Neither does it leave the controversy in such a condition that the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
We conclude, therefore, that in this cáse, Miller’s wife was not an indispensable party; the action could be maintained by one of the spouses to recover damages on behalf of both for injury to their entireties property. Any defect in the form of the complaint was waived when the defendant failed to raise it pre-trial. To set aside the judgment at this late date, in the absence of evidence that Miller lacked authority to maintain an action on behalf of both spouses, would be an unconscionable exaltation of form over substance.
The trial court determined that Miller had presumptive authority to act on behalf of both spouses to maintain an action for damages to a truck owned by husband and wife. *321Therefore, it denied the defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. We affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
CERCONE, J., files a dissenting opinion.