concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with the Majority that trial may proceed in absentia when a defendant voluntarily absents himself after the start of trial, I believe an on-the record inquiry is required to first determine whether appellant’s absence was, in fact, “without cause.” Because this was not done in this case, I dissent.
A waiver of a defendant’s right to be present at trial is embodied in Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a), which states:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant’s absence without cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including return of the verdict, (emphasis added)
The “without cause” language in this rule places discretion with the trial court to determine whether to proceed in absentia. Before a decision can be made as to whether a defendant’s absence is “without cause,” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a) requires the trial court to conduct an inquiry to determine *604why the defendant is absent, and then balance that absence against the inconvenience or prejudice resulting from a short postponement or rescheduling.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1117(a) is consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 which permits the trial of a defendant in absentia where the defendant absents himself after trial has begun. Federal cases which have upheld a trial in absentia have recognized that it is an extraordinary proceeding that should not be permitted to occur frequently. See United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 554, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972). In determining whether to proceed in absentia, the federal courts have required a record inquiry to ascertain an explanation for the absence of the accused and balance the likelihood that the trial could take place with the defendant’s presence against the undue convenience or prejudice occasioned by a slight delay or a rescheduling of the trial. United States v. Krout, 56 F.3d 643 at 646 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1076, 116 S.Ct. 782, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 citing United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir.1983).
I cannot agree that on this record the trial court conducted a hearing prior to proceeding to trial in absentia. Despite defense counsel’s request for a continuance to allow an inquiry into the reason for Appellant’s disappearance, the trial court refused to continue the case, electing instead to proceed with trial in Appellant’s absence.1 The waiver provision of Pa. R.Crim.P. 1117(a) requires an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s departure to determine whether a *605defendant’s departure is, in fact, without cause. Thus, I suggest that should a defendant disappear after the commencement of trial, the judge shall allow defense counsel twenty-four (24) hours to either produce his client or offer a legitimate reason for his client’s absence. Such a procedure acknowledges the defendant’s affirmative duty to advise the court of a valid reason for failing to appear and gives counsel, the defendant, or a family member an opportunity to do so. This short adjournment ensures that a defendant’s absence is compelling without permitting him to benefit from deliberate flight. At the same time, it causes little inconvenience to the Commonwealth as the jury and any witnesses may be recessed for 24 hours. Should the defendant not appear within this 24 hour period, following an on-the record inquiry, and in the judge’s discretion, trial may continue. I do not see this recess being utilized by the defendant as a tactical advantage, rather, mistrial is avoided and judicial economy best served.
Because the trial court in the present case failed to conduct an inquiry to determine whether Appellant was absent without cause, I dissent.
. In addition to the dialogue recited by the Majority, the record reveals the following exchange between the trial judge and counsel:
MR. TINARI [Defense counsel]: On the other hand, Your Honor, perhaps the Court would consider continuing the matter until there is an attempt to find the defendant.
THE COURT: No.
MR. TINARI: To give an explanation as to why he did leave the courthouse.
THE COURT: No, I will not continue the matter. I have issued a bench warrant and I’m also going to say to the jury once they have been sworn and once he has been arraigned, you’ll enter a plea of not guilty.
N.T. April 17, 1991, pp. 5-6.