Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with this Court’s construction of the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA), Maryland Code (1984, 1992 Cum.Supp.), State Government Article, §§ 10-611 through 10-628, and with its holding that, if the requested information is protected by the lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality under Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 (Rule 1.6), it should not be disclosed under the MPIA. I dissent, however, from the majority’s construction of Rule 1.6. All *612information relating to the representation of Thanos by the Public Defender ought to be confidential under Rule 1.6.
In pursuing the worthy purpose of securing the broadest possible media access to public information, the majority damages one of the most fundamental aspects of the attorney-client relationship, the attorney’s duty of confidentiality to a client, and has all but repealed Rule 1.6. Ignoring the clear and explicit language of the Rule, as well as the “Comment” adopted by this Court, the majority holds that a lawyer may freely reveal any information relating to representation of a client unless “there is a risk or potential for harm to the client’s interests____” 330 Md. 595, 608-09, 625 A.2d 941, 947. That construction not only contradicts the language of the Rule — it renders the Rule superfluous. Other rules clearly preclude a lawyer from doing anything that exposes the client to “a risk or potential for harm.” Id. For example, Rule 1.8(b) says, “[a] lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation.” The confidentiality rule, Rule 1.6, was meant to impose a far broader prohibition against free disclosure of information relating to a client than the majority imposes. Rule 1.6 is quite simple, straightforward, and direct. It is a guarantee of confidentiality that clients can readily understand. The Rule provides in relevant part:
“(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act ...;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act ...;
*613(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client ...;
(4) to comply with these Rules, a court order or other law.”
The Rule provides an almost absolute prohibition against revealing information “relating to representation of a client,” with a few expressly enumerated exceptions, ie., where the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, to prevent or rectify the client’s criminal or fraudulent act, in an adversarial proceeding between the attorney and client, and to comply with a rule, statute or court order.
If there is any doubt about the meaning of Rule 1.6, the “Comment” adopted by this Court clarifies any possible ambiguity. That “Comment” provides in pertinent part:
“The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance.
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A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.” (Emphasis added).
The “Comment” goes on to compare the present Rules of Professional Conduct with the prior, perhaps less restrictive, Code of Professional Conduct. The “Comment” states:
“Code Comparison. — The principle of confidentiality is enlarged in several respects and narrowed in a few respects compared with the corresponding provisions of the Code.
*614The general principle is enlarged in the following respects: First, the confidentiality requirement applies to all information about a client ‘relating to the representation.’ Under the Code, DR 4-101, the requirement applies only to information governed by the attorney-client privilege and to information ‘gained in’ the professional relationship that ‘the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.’ Rule 1.6 thus imposes confidentiality on information relating to the representation even if it is acquired before or after the relationship existed. It does not require the client to indicate information that is to be confidential, or permit the lawyer to speculate whether particular information might be embarrassing or detrimental. Furthermore, this definition avoids the constricted definition of ‘confidence’ that appears in some decisions.” (Emphasis added).
Further, the Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2d ed. 1992), published by the Center for Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, also seem to directly contradict the majority’s construction that, under Rule 1.6, a lawyer may disclose information relating to a client as long as the disclosure does not impose a risk or potential for harm to the client’s interests. The “Comment” states:
“Rule 1.6 encompasses the duty of loyalty required of a fiduciary and serves to protect the principal’s privacy interests. The obligation extends to all information about a client acquired in the course of the representation, whether or not disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental.” (Emphasis added).
Id. at 91 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 395-96, at 219-22 (1957)).
The lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 is not absolute or unduly burdensome. For example, the attorney does not breach the Rule when discussing aspects *615of a client’s case as long as the client’s anonymity is protected. As Professors Hazard and Hodes note:
“In functional terms, the line between permissible and impermissible disclosure should probably be drawn at the point of anonymity: a lawyer may talk shop if she is virtually certain that the listeners could not ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved. This approach can be harmonized with the strict language of Rule 1.6(a), for it may plausibly be said that when a lawyer discusses a case in strictly hypothetical or abstract terms, she is not disclosing ‘information’ relating to a real ‘client.’ To honor the rule of confidentiality, however, and to maintain its strength, lawyers should exercise self-restraint and resolve marginal cases in favor of non-disclosure. If there is danger that the listeners may know any of the characters in the anecdote, the lawyer should maintain silence.”
G. Hazard, Jr. & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.6:202, at 160 (2d ed. 1992).
The existing exceptions to the rule of confidentiality are adequate. Rule 1.6(b)(1) & (2) permits disclosures to prevent or rectify the client’s criminal acts or fraud. Rule 1.6(b)(3) allows disclosure to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client. When an attorney is summoned as a witness to give relevant information, then pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(4) the broad rule of confidentiality yields to the right of the tribunal to obtain relevant information, subject only to the narrower attorney-client and work product privileges. Similarly, when a statute or rule compels a disclosure, only the narrow attorney-client privilege is applicable. In addition to Rule 1.6’s explicit exceptions, if a lawyer feels the need to disclose additional information which may be confidential under the Rule, the lawyer can always consult with the client and secure a waiver of confidentiality. In light of these existing exceptions, I see no basis for, and no reason for, the majority’s holding, which effectively creates a new *616exception to Rule 1.6 and authorizes free disclosure of all information relating to a client which does not have a risk or potential for harm to a client’s interests.
The majority uses Professor Charles W. Wolfram’s treatise, Modem Legal Ethics § 6.7.3, at 301 (1986), as the source for its interpretation of Rule 1.6, stating that “we find Wolfram’s analysis to be sound.” 330 Md. at 608, 625 A.2d at 947. Even Professor Wolfram acknowledges, however, that Rule 1.6(a) “if read literally, goes much farther and prohibits a lawyer from revealing all client information, ...” subject only to the exceptions provided in the rule. Wolfram, § 6.7.3, at 301. Yet Professor Wolfram advocates not reading Rule 1.6 literally, thus ignoring the simple and straightforward language of the Rule. He states:
“The only imaginable reason for such a universal prohibition is to provide prophylactic protection against lawyer misjudgments about which revelations are potentially harmful to a client’s interests. Yet it is hardly imaginable that MR 1.6 should be read literally to prohibit a lawyer from revealing absolutely any information about a client except in the limited exceptions explicitly provided in the rule.” (Footnote omitted)
Id.
In acknowledging that it is not going to follow the literal language of Rule 1.6, the Court damages not only a fundamental aspect of lawyer-client confidentiality, but also a fundamental view about the nature of this Court’s rules. This Court has often described the rules of procedure it adopts as “precise rubrics.” Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597, 606 (1987); King v. State Roads Comm’n, 284 Md. 368, 371-72, 396 A.2d 267, 269 (1979); Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346, 278 A.2d 71, 73 (1971); Brown v. Fraley, 222 Md. 480, 483, 161 A.2d 128, 130 (1960). Under the Court's holding, that is certainly not an apt description of its ethical rules. If the Court is not going to follow the literal language of Rule 1.6, that rule cannot be very precise. If the Court is going to *617imply an unwritten exception to the seemingly absolute rule of confidentiality, that rule is not a rubric. I am troubled by a dichotomy where our procedural rules are precise rubrics to be complied with literally, but our ethical rules need not always be followed literally because they may contain broad unwritten exceptions to seemingly absolute prohibitions. All of this Court’s rules ought to be read and applied literally. When construing any rule, we should give deference to the literal language of the rule.
Even if the Court was not obligated to apply its unambiguous rules literally, there is no good reason why the Court should ignore the literal language of Rule 1.6. Certainly, there is nothing in the “legislative history,” as evidenced by the previously discussed “Comment,” that would justify the Court implying an exception to the literal language of the rule. Professor Wolfram’s analysis, which the Court cites and finds to be “sound,” is an inadequate basis for ignoring the literal language of the “precise rubric” known as Rule 1.6. The crux of Wolfram’s rationale for rejecting a strict reading of the Rule is that
“to prohibit innocuous talk about a client would be senseless, would create morbid secretiveness among overscrupulous lawyers, and, by trivializing it, would detract from the soundness of the confidentiality principle.”
330 Md. at 607-08, 625 A.2d at 947 (quoting Wolfram, § 6.7.3, at 301). In my opinion, prohibiting innocuous talk would not be senseless, would not create morbid secretiveness, and would not trivialize or detract from the soundness of the confidentiality of attorneys, psychiatrists, clergy, or any other professionals with obligations of confidentiality.
For these reasons, I do not believe this Court should ignore the literal terms of Rule 1.6 and create a new exception that does not exist in the language of, or the policy behind, the rule of lawyer-client confidentiality. The strict rule of confidentiality with its enumerated exceptions is appropriate and not at all unreasonable. If the lawyer feels a need to make additional disclosures beyond those *618provided for in the Rule, it is not too burdensome to require the lawyer to consult the client and obtain the client’s consent.
The majority’s new test for lawyer-client confidentiality is that “[tjhere must be the potential for some harm to the client’s interest before an attorney will be considered to have violated the prohibition of MR 1.6(a) and to be subject to discipline, for having revealed ‘information relating to representation of a client.’ ” Id. at 608, 625 A.2d at 947. This new confidentiality standard adopted by the majority may look disarmingly simple on the surface, but it portends interpretive problems. Let me suggest just a few. First, how much of a possible risk or potential for harm to the client must there be? I assume there must be less than a reasonable probability, but how much less? The Court must realize that the disclosure to the media sought in the instant case, like virtually any disclosure, presents at least a remote degree of risk or potential for harm to Thanos’s interests. Is a slight speculative risk enough? Second, is the confidentiality test to be applied subjectively, based on the belief of the disclosing attorney, or objectively, based on what a reasonable attorney would believe to represent a risk or potential for harm to the client? Third, is “risk or potential for harm to the client’s interests” an absolute standard or is it relative and weighed against the reason for disclosure or the recipient of the disclosure? This is of particular concern in the instant case because under the MPIA, the media, any citizen, the crime victim, and the prosecutor, all are “persons” equally entitled to inspect any public record, yet the majority seems to indicate that the identity of the person seeking the information has a bearing on its confidentiality. The majority states whether there is disclosure under the MPIA depends on whether “there is a risk or potential for harm to the client’s interests,” which “turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 330 Md. at 609, 625 A.2d at 947. Should the identity of the member of the public seeking public information under the MPIA be a factor in applying the MPIA? Cer*619tainly it is a factor in determining the risk or potential for harm to the client’s interests. Is the media less entitled to public information because it will broadly disseminate that information, and, thus, conceivably pose a greater risk of harm to Thanos’s interests than would disclosure to some other members of the public? These are just some of the problems raised by the majority’s new construction of Rule 1.6 and its holding that confidentiality only exists if the Public Defender can show some risk or potential for harm to Thanos’s interests.
The ramifications of this Court’s holding could well be that lawyers may now freely gossip about their clients at cocktail parties and entertain dinner companions with amusing stories about their clients, identifying the clients by name, as long as they believe their anecdotes have no risk or potential for harm to their clients’ interests. Also, in covering high-publicity cases, newspapers may now be able to get non-privileged information from public defender files (but not from private attorneys who are not subject to the MPIA) unless the public defenders can demonstrate the information will have a risk or potential for harm to their clients’ interests. As a result of this Court’s decision, public defenders will find themselves caught in a real predicament. They might readily accede to MPIA requests for information about clients, a policy that no doubt runs counter to any attorney’s healthy reluctance to freely furnish information about clients. They would thereby at least avoid the paradox, as in the instant case, of having the Attorney General represent the Public Defender in a civil proceeding where the Public Defender is attempting to safeguard the confidentiality interests of a criminal defendant. Alternatively, the Public Defender can err on the side of caution and deny all requests unless they are sure there is no risk or potential for harm to the client. The latter course of conduct imposes some additional financial risks, since the Public Defender may be liable for attorney’s fees under the MPIA for improperly withholding information.
*620The “Comment” to Rule 1.6 in the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by this Court, provides that “[a] fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation.” I fear the consequence of the majority’s weakening of the attorney’s obligation of confidentiality may be a substantial undermining of the attorney-client relationship, as well as the further erosion of the respect and esteem accorded attorneys by their clients and the public.
ELDRIDGE and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ., have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.