In the instant case Samuel Bowden brought suit against his employer Caldor, Inc. (Caldor) and three Caldor employees alleging false imprisonment, wrongful discharge, malicious prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bowden succeeded on the merits of his case and the jury awarded compensatory damages separate*636ly for each of the five counts. In addition, the jury found that punitive damages were warranted. After a separate hearing, the jury granted a punitive damages award apparently based on all five tort counts, but it did not allocate the portion of the punitive damages award attributable to each count. At a post-trial hearing, the circuit court granted a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict (J.N.W.V.) setting aside the judgment on two of the counts but leaving the entire punitive damages award intact. We granted certiorari to consider the circuit court’s rulings on the motion for J.N.W.Y., as well as whether a new trial on the issue of punitive damages is required when a trial court grants a J.N.W.V. for some of the compensatory counts that form the basis for a general punitive damages award in a multiple count suit. We hold that in this case a new trial to recalculate punitive damages is necessary.
I.
In reviewing the circuit court’s decision to both grant in part and deny in part the defendant’s motion for J.N.W.V., we must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all conflicts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663, 666, 607 A.2d 8, 9 (1992); Lehman v. Baltimore Transit Co., 227 Md. 537, 540, 177 A.2d 855, 857 (1962). Therefore, we present the facts of this case from Bowden’s point of view.
In March 1988, the respondent Samuel Bowden was sixteen years old when he applied for a position with Caldor, Inc., a national retail store. Caldor hired Bowden as a customer service representative and assigned him to its hardware department. In the early evening of June 15, 1988, Bowden arrived at Caldor to report for his 5:45 p.m. shift. Bowden went to punch in his time card and discovered that his time card was missing. He went to the acting store manager, Ms. Baldwin, to inquire about its absence. Baldwin, without further explanation, simply instructed *637Bowden to report to his normal post in the hardware department.
At approximately 6:45 p.m., Baldwin paged Bowden and instructed him to meet her at the upstairs customer service desk. Bowden ascended the escalator and met Baldwin at the customer service desk as instructed. Baldwin told Bowden that she needed his assistance and then led Bowden to a 10’ X 10’ windowless office on the upper level of the store.
Once inside, Bowden found Mr. Hedrick and Mr. Hodum, two of Caldor’s loss prevention personnel, standing in the room. Bowden had not met either man before. The small office contained only a desk, two chairs, and a telephone. Hedrick greeted Bowden, instructed Bowden to sit down, and then closed the door, leaving Bowden alone with the two strangers.
Bowden was unaware why he was summoned to the upper-office. He asked Hedrick how long he would be there. According to Bowden, Hedrick replied “I don’t think you’ll be leaving anytime soon.” Hedrick then sat down behind the desk and Hodum stood behind Bowden, blocking Bowden’s potential egress from the small room. Hedrick asked Bowden a few casual questions about his personal life. Growing tired of the small talk and feeling the pressure of his surroundings, Bowden “bluntly” asked “what was my purpose for being in this room?” Hedrick replied that there had been some missing money and merchandise which had been traced back to Bowden.
Bowden denied this accusation and attempted to leave, but found Hodum blocking the door. Hedrick then stated “sit down or we’ll help you sit down.” Fearing reprisal, Bowden sat back down. When Bowden attempted to use the phone to contact his parents, his attempt was met by a similar, more emphatic, warning — Hedrick ordered Bowden “to put the damn phone down or [I’ll] help [you] do it.” On several occasions, Bowden could hear himself paged over the store’s PA system. Bowden explained that his mother *638might be trying to contact him at the store and would be worried if she could not find him. Hedrick did not permit Bowden to respond and told Bowden that, if his mother called, they would tell her that Bowden was not in the store. This further disturbed Bowden.
Hedrick began interrogating Bowden. According to Bow-den, Hedrick “kept drilling” him about the missing money. The series of accusations and denials went back and forth. The men forced Bowden to empty his pockets and reveal the contents of his wallet. Hedrick told Bowden that they had videotapes showing him stealing money from the registers and that he would not be permitted to leave until he cooperated.1
The interrogation continued until approximately 8:00 p.m., when Hedrick placed a blank “voluntary statement” form in front of Bowden. Hedrick then told Bowden that he wanted a written statement from him admitting that he had taken amounts of money on a number of occasions. He told Bowden that if he signed the form, made restitution, and did not involve his parents that Caldor would not contact the police. Out of fear, Bowden gave in to Hedrick’s demand. On the first side of the form, Hedrick dictated the terms of Bowden’s “admission,” specifying the dates and amounts of money. Bowden finally signed the first side at 9:35 p.m. After Bowden completed the first side of the page, Hedrick left the room for thirty or forty minutes. Upon Hedrick’s return, Bowden realized that the store was closed and all of the store lights were off. Hedrick then dictated the terms of the second side of the form, which Bowden signed. Hedrick told Bowden to return the next day and repay the money. Around 11:00 p.m., over four hours after Bowden was first summoned to the upstairs office, Hedrick allowed Bowden to leave the store.
*639Bowden arrived home at 11:30 p.m., an hour later than usual. Bowden’s mother met him at the door and demanded an explanation for his tardiness. Bowden told his mother what had happened and denied stealing any money.
Bowden and his mother returned to Caldor the next afternoon. They went to the upstairs manager’s office and asked to talk with Hedrick. Mrs. Bowden was informed that Hedrick had left the store. Instead, Mrs. Bowden spoke with Mr. Mehan, the store’s security manager, and Mr. Forrester, another store manager, to inquire about the prior night’s activities and to attempt “to get to the bottom of things.” An argument ensued and, according to Bow-den, Forrester barked “You people — you nigger boys make me sick, but you’re going to burn for this, you sucker.” Bowden further testified that Mehan’s only response to the exchange was “sort of a smirk” indicating his agreement with the remark.
Bowden and his mother left the store and returned to their car. Mehan followed them into the parking lot, approached them, and told Bowden that he could not leave. Mehan then seized Bowden’s arm and forced him to return to the store through the rear employee entrance. Mehan led Bowden back to his office on the ground floor.
Mrs. Bowden followed Mehan and her son back to Mehan’s office, where she called her husband, Reverend Horace Bowden. Rev. Bowden and Mehan discussed the events on the telephone, and Mehan demanded restitution. When Rev. Bowden asked to see the videotapes before making restitution, Mehan refused and stated that he had no other choice but to arrest Bowden and then hung up. Mehan handcuffed Bowden and called the Baltimore County Police. Mehan then escorted the handcuffed Bowden across the lower level of the store, up the escalators, and led him from the back of the upper level to the front door. Bowden remained in handcuffs in public view until the police arrived.
*640On December 16, 1988, a juvenile proceeding was held before Master Richard J. Gilbert. Bowdeh had filed a motion to suppress his written statement, but after hearing the testimony of Hedrick, Hodum, and Bowden on the circumstances surrounding Bowden’s written statement, Master Gilbert denied Bowden’s motion to suppress. Following the denial of Bowden’s motion, a juvenile adjudicatory hearing was held. The State called Hedrick and Mehan and introduced Bowden’s written statement. At the close of the State’s case, Bowden moved to dismiss the charges. Master Gilbert denied the motion. When defense counsel indicated he was prepared to call witnesses, Master Gilbert responded “that’s up to you.” Apparently taking this as a favorable sign, defense counsel indicated that, although he was prepared to call Bowden and his mother, he now decided to submit and waive argument. The State also waived argument and submitted, whereupon, Master Gilbert found that there was insufficient evidence to convince him beyond a reasonable doubt that Bowden committed a theft.
Bowden then filed a civil suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, naming Caldor, Hedrick, Hodum, and Mehan as defendants. The complaint alleged counts of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case was tried before a jury, and on August 20, 1991, the jury rendered a decision in favor of Bowden. The jury awarded a total of $110,000 in compensatory damages. The verdict sheet asked the jury to itemize the damages attributable to each tort count. They awarded $10,000 for false imprisonment, $25,000 for defamation, $25,000 for malicious prosecution, $25,000 for wrongful discharge, and $25,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In addition to the compensatory awards, the jury found that Bowden had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was entitled to punitive damages. Thereafter, Bowden presented evidence of the defendants’ financial means, the court instructed the jury, and both sides gave *641closing arguments on the issue of punitive damages. On August 21, 1991, the jury awarded Bowden a total of $357,500 in punitive damages against the defendants: $350,-000 against Caldor, $3,000 against Hedrick, $3,000 against Hodum, and $1,500 against Mehan. The punitive damages award against the defendants did not indicate how the award was to be allocated among the five causes of action presented.
The defendants filed a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict/remittitur and/or for a new trial. The circuit court granted the motion for J.N.W.V. on the wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress counts, but denied the motion for J.N.W.V. on the other three counts and denied the motion for remittitur and for a new trial. The circuit court left the punitive damages award intact, despite the grant of J.N.W.V. on two of the underlying causes of action. Bowden and the defendants appealed and we granted certiorari prior to the appeal being argued in the intermediate appellate court.
II.
The parties have raised several issues on appeal. We first review the circuit court’s partial grant and partial denial of J.N.W.V. on the tort claims, and we affirm the decision. Next, we review the circuit court’s refusal to grant a new hearing on punitive damages, and we reverse that decision.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In 1977, this Court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). In Harris, we identified the “four elements which must coalesce to impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614. We stated:
“(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless;
(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
*642(3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress;
(4) The emotional distress must be severe.”
Id. Harris cautioned that courts must assure that each of the four elements of the tort are established by legally adequate proof. Harris and our subsequent cases have also noted “two problems which are inherent in recognizing a tort of this character ... (1) distinguishing the true from the false claim, and (2) distinguishing the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong.” Id.; Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 653, 584 A.2d 69, 75 (1991); Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 303 Md. 182, 197, 492 A.2d 1270, 1277 (1985). In addition, we have made it clear that liability for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be imposed sparingly, and “ ‘its balm reserved for those wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves.’ ” Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 653, 584 A.2d at 75 (quoting Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md.App. 46, 61, 502 A.2d 1057, 1065, cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986)).
At the trial, Bowden testified about the mental and psychological effects he experienced after the incident. According to Bowden’s testimony, he was distraught and worried; he “was hurt a lot” and felt ashamed because his peers saw him being removed from Caldor in handcuffs. Bowden also testified that he tended not to socialize as much as before, kept to himself, and did not trust others very readily. He stated that he was able, however, to continue his normal activities. He further testified that the incident did not affect his schoolwork; he continued playing baseball for his high school team and obtained other employment soon thereafter. In short, Bowden continued doing the same things that he did prior to the incident but just had “a different outlook.” Bowden’s “sadness” and insecurity continued for more than a year and as a result he paid one visit to a psychologist in the winter of 1990. At trial Bowden only introduced the psychologist’s intake form and did not call the psychologist as a witness. In the intake *643form Bowden complained of weight loss over the past four months and reported that he felt “sad,” “confused,” and “bad about himself.” The intake form did not contain any of the psychologist’s conclusions; it only reported Bowden’s own complaints. Bowden testified that he visited the psychologist only once because of his time commitments to both school and extracurricular activities. Bowden presented no expert testimony about his emotional distress.
At the hearing on the defendants’ motion for J.N.W.V., the defendants argued that Bowden failed to establish the four elements of the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Specifically, the defendants focused on the severity of distress element and asserted that “the Plaintiff failed to establish the type of severe emotional distress necessary to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction____” Bowden’s only response was that “I
can’t think of anything that ... could [be] ... as severe as the basic personality of a person being changed.” The circuit court disagreed with Bowden and granted the defendants’ motion for J.N.W.V. on this count. The circuit court found that “from the circumstances here ... the emotional distress that was suffered, ... was not the kind that the Court of Appeals contemplates to meet the standards of this tort.” We agree.2
Harris focused on the same issue as the case at bar. There we said that the fourth element of the tort “requires the plaintiff to show that he suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. The severity of the emotional distress is not only relevant to the amount of recovery, but is a necessary element to any recovery.” Harris, 281 Md. at 570, 380 A.2d at 616 (emphasis in original). For emotional distress to be severe, it must be so acute that “ ‘no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ ” Id. at 571, 380 A.2d at 616 (quoting Restate-*644merit (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965)). We measure such severity by the intensity of the response as well as its duration. Id.
Although there is no clearly defined bright-line test for severe emotional distress, the trial judge did not err in concluding that there was legally insufficient evidence at trial from which a jury could properly have concluded that Bowden suffered the sort of emotional harm required in Harris and our subsequent line of cases. Bowden may have been “upset,” “embarrassed,” and “confused,” and may have “felt bad about himself”; and this type of emotional distress may have been uncomfortable. None of these effects, however, indicate that Bowden had the severely disabling emotional response that hindered his ability to carry out his daily activities or the severe emotional distress this cause of action requires. Compare Harris, 281 Md. at 572, 380 A.2d at 617 (holding that evidence of aggravation of plaintiffs pre-existing nervous and speech condition was vague and did not establish severity element) and Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md.App. 1, 15-16, 494 A.2d 212, 219, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985) (plaintiffs’ testimony that they were upset, increased smoking, lost sleep, and experienced hives failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish severe emotional distress) with Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 656, 584 A.2d at 76 (allegations in complaint that plaintiff experienced systemic hypertension, loss of visual acuity, and required psychiatric hospitalization were sufficient to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment) and B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 144-45, 538 A.2d 1175,1180 (1988) (finding that the emotional distress caused by the transmission of herpes, including the fact that the plaintiff felt extremely distressed by the limitations on her normal sexual activity, marriage prospects, and childbearing, fulfilled requirement of severe emotional injury). As we noted in Harris, the phrase “emotional distress” might conceivably include
“ ‘all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, *645chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises____’ ” (Emphasis added).
Harris, 281 Md. at 570-71, 380 A.2d at 616 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965)). The evidence may have shown that Bowden was distressed, but it failed to establish the level of severe or extreme emotional injury that is needed to trigger liability for this tort. Not only did Bowden continue his normal activities, but he did not seek psychological assistance until his single visit on the eve of litigation. Bowden presented no expert testimony as to any emotional distress and his own description of his discomfort was insufficient to establish severe emotional distress. As a result, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of J.N.W.V. on the count of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Wrongful Discharge
The parties also dispute whether the circuit court was correct in granting J.N.W.V. with respect to Bowden’s wrongful discharge claim. Maryland follows the common law rule that generally an at-will employment relationship can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981); State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Amecon Div., 278 Md. 120, 126, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976); see generally Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 (1982). The common law rule may be abrogated, however, by express legislative enactments regulating the terms of employment or by judicial exception. Adler, 291 Md. at 35, 42-43, 432 A.2d at 467, 471; see Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 609-10, 561 A.2d 179, 182 (1989). In instances where neither legislative nor judicial exceptions apply, the common law rule controls.
In response to the defendants’ motion for J.N.W.V., the circuit court stated that Bowden failed to provide a “specific *646public policy here other than what’s covered by other torts such as false imprisonment and defamation.” On appeal Bowden asserted that a clear public policy existed in this case to support his cause of action for wrongful discharge. According to Bowden an employee has a fundamental right to be free from coercion; Bowden therefore reasons it is contrary to public policy for an employer to coerce a statement from an employee and then use that statement, together with the belief that the employee stole money and property, as a grounds for discharge. In response, the defendants argue that Bowden was terminated for security reasons, and that Bowden failed to reveal any improper motive underlying his discharge.
In Adler v. American Standard Corp., this Court for the first time recognized a judicial exception to the common law at-will employee rule. There we adopted “a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy____” Adler, 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473 (emphasis added). Implicit in our recognition of this cause of action is a reservation of an employer’s right to discharge an at-will employee where the motivation for the discharge is not impermissibly tainted.3
The evidence in this case shows the defendants treated Bowden in a harsh and reprehensible manner. The evidence, even in a light most favorable to Bowden, however, does not show the defendants were driven by an improper *647motive when they discharged Bowden. At most, the evidence indicates that Bowden was discharged because he was suspected of store theft. The fact that the defendants used improper means to attempt to confirm their suspicions of Bowden’s theft of money and property does not mean they are liable for wrongful discharge because they discharged him based on those mere suspicions. In fact, when faced with a motion for judgment at the end of his case-in-chief, Bowden did not identify any facts that indicated the existence of an improper motive for his termination. Bow-den merely stated that the defendants’ act of taking the coerced statement and using it as a basis for his discharge was a violation of public policy. That act may have been improper but, nevertheless, it is clear from the record that the reason for Bowden’s discharge was the defendants’ suspicion that Bowden stole money and merchandise. While such a suspicion may have been misplaced and Bow-den’s termination based on a factually incorrect premise, the defendants’ mere suspicion of theft can serve as the basis for discharging an at-will employee. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s grant of J.N.W.Y. for the count of wrongful discharge.
C. Defamation
The defendants also contend that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant J.N.W.V. on the defamation count. They argue that the verdict must have been based on their communications with the Baltimore County police and that their communications were entitled to an absolute privilege and thus could not be a basis for a defamation suit. According to Bowden, the accusation of theft made to law enforcement officers was only entitled to a conditional privilege, a privilege that was negated upon the jury’s finding that the defendants acted with malice. See Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 139, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978) (describing standard of malice necessary to defeat conditional privilege). Further, Bowden contends that the defendants committed defamatory acts other than their *648statements to the police. Addressing first the defamatory statements made to the police, we decline to extend an absolute privilege to defamatory communications volunteered to police prior to the commencement of any official investigation.
Maryland has long recognized the existence of an absolute privilege for defamatory utterances made during the course of judicial proceedings or contained in documents directly related to such proceedings. Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 526-27, 588 A.2d 786, 789 (1991); Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 403-04, 494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985) (citing Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 14 A. 500 (1888) and Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888)). This privilege protects the judge, the witnesses, the parties, and, to a more limited degree, the attorneys involved in the judicial proceeding in which the defamatory statement occurs. Keys, 303 Md. at 404, 494 A.2d at 203; Odyniec, 322 Md. at 526, 588 A.2d at 789. Where the absolute privilege applies, it protects persons publishing the defamatory statement from liability even where their motives are malicious and made with the knowledge of the statement’s falsity. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 527, 588 A.2d at 789.
In Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980), we extended the scope of the absolute privilege for judicial proceedings to include documents related to pending judicial proceedings regardless of whether they had actually been filed in those proceedings. In Adams, two parents were involved in a contested divorce proceeding. The parents entered into a separation agreement which granted the mother custody and the father visitation rights. Several months later, while the divorce litigation was pending, the mother sought to have the father’s visitation rights modified. In connection with this attempt, the mother’s attorney referred the mother and children to a psychiatrist for an evaluation. The psychiatrist sent a written report to the mother’s attorney which accused the father of abusing one of the children. On the basis of the report, the mother filed *649a Petition for Modification of Visitation Rights. Although the mother did not file the report in the pending divorce proceedings, the father apparently obtained a copy and sued the psychiatrist for defaming him in the report. We held that the report was entitled to an absolute privilege despite the fact that it was not actually filed in the proceedings. Id. at 8-9, 415 A.2d at 296. We said:
“[t]he question whether a defamatory statement should be absolutely privileged involves a matter of public policy in which the public interest in free disclosure must be weighed against the harm to individuals who may be defamed. See Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 253 (1880). The underlying rationale for according an absolute privilege to the defamatory statements made in court by participants in judicial proceedings or to such statements published in documents which have been filed is that such a privilege is necessary to the proper administration of justice. The ultimate purpose of the judicial process is to determine the truth. The investigation, evaluation, presentation and determination of facts are inherent and essential parts of this process. If this process is to function effectively, those who participate must be able to do so without being hampered by the fear of private suits for defamation.
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These public policy reasons are equally applicable to defamatory statements published in documents which are prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding but which have not been filed.
The people who engage in these activities and who generate such documents must be able to do so without being hampered by the fear of private suits for defamation.”
Id. at 5-6, 8, 415 A.2d at 294-95. In Adams, the report was requested by an attorney representing a client in an active domestic case and was therefore absolutely privileged be*650cause it “was published during the course of that judicial proceeding.” Id. at 8, 415 A.2d at 296 (emphasis added).
Adams did not address in any detail the question of what constitutes a “judicial proceeding” for purposes of the absolute privilege, probably because in that case the answer was an easy one — there was divorce litigation pending in the courts. The defendants in this case ask us to extend the judicial proceedings privilege to cover their communications with Baltimore County police. We do not believe, however, that the privilege should be extended so far.
In addressing the meaning of “judicial proceedings” for purposes of granting an absolute privilege we have, for example, refused to extend the privilege to statements made at some administrative hearings. In Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, while testifying at a public hearing before the Baltimore City Community Relations Commission, had slanderously accused him of having committed certain criminal offenses. The defendant claimed he was entitled to absolute immunity as a witness called to testify before the Commission. We refused to grant an absolute privilege for his testimony, noting that
“[m]ost American courts which have extended absolute immunity to witnesses testifying in other than strictly judicial, in-court settings have first assured themselves that in such settings there are sufficient judicial safeguards so as to minimize the likelihood of harm to potentially defamed (or otherwise injured) individuals who would have no legal remedy.”
Id. at 192, 434 A.2d at 549. Applying this principle to the facts in Gersh, we observed that the Commission’s hearing, really no more than an “open public meeting,” lacked the procedural safeguards traditionally provided in judicial proceedings. We found that “[t]he public benefit to be derived from testimony at Commission hearings of this type is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the possible damages to individual reputations to warrant absolute witness immuni*651ty.” Id. at 196, 434 A.2d at 551; see also McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, 26, 561 A.2d 1038, 1045 (1989) (“administrative investigation” was not sufficiently protective to warrant absolute privilege).
Distinguishing judicial proceedings from some administrative hearings because of procedural safeguards in the former is one basis for drawing a line between granting and denying the absolute privilege. Another way of drawing the same line is by examining at what stage of the legal process the defamatory communication is made. The communications in the instant case were made to the police and not, for example, to a prosecuting attorney or magistrate. Although we have never addressed the issue directly, in Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985), we noted that Professors Prosser and Keeton have suggested that
“ ‘an informal complaint to a prosecuting attorney or a magistrate is to be regarded as an initial step in a judicial proceeding, and so entitled to an absolute, rather than a qualified immunity.’ ”
Id. at 171, 498 A.2d at 272 (quoting W.P. Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 114, at 819-20 (5th ed. 1984)). This Court has also extended the absolute privilege to complaints to police in one very distinct situation. In Miner, 304 Md. at 177, 498 A.2d at 275, we extended an absolute privilege to citizen complaints of police brutality made under oath, which initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings. In weighing the need for extending the absolute judicial proceedings privilege to this limited area we said:
“Our society vests its law-enforcement officers with formidable power, the abuse of which is often extremely detrimental to the public interest. Citizen complaints of such abuses, and the administrative disciplinary procedure which has been developed to investigate these complaints, serve a public function of vital importance by providing a mechanism through which abuses may be *652reported to the proper authorities, and the abusers held accountable.”
Id. at 176, 498 A.2d at 274-75. We recognized the potential harm a false brutality complaint may cause to a law enforcement officer’s reputation, but concluded that it is “outweighed by the public’s interest in encouraging the filing and investigation of valid complaints.” Id. at 176, 498 A.2d at 275.
Miner is easily distinguishable from the instant case. Miner conferred an absolute privilege for a sworn complaint which initiated law enforcement disciplinary proceedings. Those proceedings had sufficient procedural safeguards to make the judicial proceeding privilege applicable. The complaint in Miner was the formal means of initiating the proceedings and was analogous to the complaint which initiates a judicial proceeding. Further, law enforcement officers have some protections because the complaint must be under oath, and if the officer is exonerated, any record of the complaint may be expunged. Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 728(b)(12)(ii). The public policy reasons for extending the absolute judicial proceedings privilege to the sworn complaint in Miner are far less compelling when applied to the oral accusation volunteered to the police by the defendants in the instant case. As we said in Adams, “[t]he question whether a defamatory statement should be absolutely privileged involves a matter of public policy in which the public interest in free disclosure must be weighed against the harm to individuals who may be defamed.” Adams, 288 Md. at 5, 415 A.2d at 294. We do not believe public policy is violated by requiring that citizens who report criminal activities to the police do so in good faith. Those who maliciously volunteer false accusations of criminal activity to the police should not be granted absolute immunity. Although we do not wish to discourage the reporting of criminal activity, we also do not wish to encourage harassment, or wasting of law enforcement resources, by investigations of false, maliciously made complaints. As the Supreme Court of Florida recently stated
*653“a qualified privilege ‘is sufficiently protective of [those] wishing to report events concerning crime and balances society’s interest in detecting and prosecuting crime with a defendant’s interest not to be falsely accused.’ There is no benefit to society or the administration of justice in protecting those who make intentionally false and malicious defamatory statements to the police. The countervailing harm caused by the malicious destruction of another’s reputation by false accusation can have irreparable consequences. We believe the law should provide a remedy in situations such as this.”
Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 69 (Fla.1992) (quoting Fridovich v. Fridovich, 573 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.App. 4th Dist.1990)). Accordingly, we see no compelling public policy reason to extend to these defendants the absolute judicial proceedings privilege which, for good reason, protects even “the evil disposed and malignant slanderer.” Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 226, 14 A. 518, 520 (1888).
We note that a number of other courts apply only a qualified privilege to communications made to police for the purpose of reporting criminal activity. See Fridovich, 598 So.2d at 67-69 (citing states that have adopted qualified privilege and holding that defamatory statements voluntarily made by private individuals to the police are qualifiedly privileged); Packard v. Central Maine Power Co., 477 A.2d 264, 268 (Me.1984) (finding trial court properly instructed jury that statements made to sheriff’s department “for purpose of aiding in the detection of crime” were entitled to qualified privilege); Davenport v. Armstead, 255 S.W.2d 132, 134-36 (Mo.App.1952) (court applied qualified privilege, and not absolute privilege, to reports of criminal activity made to police officers); Dijkstra v. Westerink, 168 N.J.Super. 128, 401 A.2d 1118, 1121, cert. denied, 81 N.J. 329, 407 A.2d 1203 (1979) (refusing to apply absolute privilege, and instead applying conditional privilege to accusations to police of criminal activity); Bergman v. Hupy, 64 Wis.2d 747, 221 N.W.2d 898, 900-01 (1974) (distinguishing between qualified privilege for statements to police and absolute privi*654lege for statements to grand jury or prosecutor); see also Hardaway v. Sherman Enter., Inc., 133 Ga.App. 181, 210 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 2405, 44 L.Ed.2d 672 (1975) (applying conditional privilege for statements to police); Indiana Nat’l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 479-80 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (recognizing that qualified privilege applies to statements made to police); Toker v. Pollak, 44 N.Y.2d 211, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1, 376 N.E.2d 163, 167 (1978) (“a policeman is not a judicial officer” for purposes of absolute judicial privilege); Sylvester v. D’Ambra, 73 R.I. 203, 54 A.2d 418, 420 (1947). We recognize that other courts have held that some defamatory statements to police are absolutely privileged. See McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 408 A.2d 121, 127-28 (1979) (statements made during course of criminal investigation to police, city attorney, and prosecutor before criminal case began were sufficiently connected with subsequent judicial proceeding to be absolutely privileged); Starnes v. International Harvester Co., 184 Ill.App.3d 199, 132 Ill.Dec. 566, 568-69, 539 N.E.2d 1372, 1374-75, appeal denied, 127 Ill.2d 642, 136 Ill.Dec. 607, 545 N.E.2d 131 (1989) (applying absolute immunity to statements made before beginning of trial when made to police or prosecutors); Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 572 N.E.2d 7, 11 (1991) (statements made to police during investigation of crime were absolutely privileged where the police investigation was not initiated by the defendant). In light of our discussion above, we hold that communications made to the police, at least those made prior to any official investigation, are not entitled to the judicial proceedings privilege and therefore do not receive absolute immunity.
We need not even address whether these statements to the police are entitled to a qualified privilege, but we will assume they are. The jury determined that the defendants defamed Bowden and that they acted with malice in doing so, thereby negating any qualified privilege that might have existed. See Marchesi, 283 Md. at 139, 387 A.2d at 1133. Likewise, the jury’s finding of malice also negated any *655conditional privilege that Caldor could claim as arising out of the employer-employee relationship. See McDermott, 317 Md. at 28, 561 A.2d at 1046 (“communications arising out of the employer-employee relationship clearly enjoy a conditional privilege”); Kairys v. Douglas Stereo Inc., 83 Md.App. 667, 679-80, 577 A.2d 386, 391 (1990) (communications arising out of employer-employee relationship, including statements accusing employees of theft, are subject to qualified privilege); see also General Motors v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 172-74, 352 A.2d 810, 816 (1976), appealed after remand, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
We also agree with Bowden that there was clear evidence on which the jury could have based its finding of defamation in addition to the statements made by the defendants to the police. As Bowden noted in his brief, “leading Samuel Bowden throughout the entire store in handcuffs would lead any reasonable observer to conclude that Samuel had in fact committed an unlawful act.” Bowden testified that the defendants paraded him in handcuffs through the store in full view of customers and other employees with whom he worked. This conduct alone constituted actionable defamation, and could have been “found by the jury to contain an imputation of theft.” See Piskor, 277 Md. at 174, 352 A.2d at 816 (confronting employee in glass-enclosed office, in full view of many other employees, could have been found an abuse of qualified privilege if confrontation contained an “imputation of theft”). We have long recognized that defamatory statements may be published through actions as well as through written or spoken word. M & S Furniture Sales Co. v. DeBartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540, 544, 241 A.2d 126, 128 (1968).
D. Malicious Prosecution
The defendants’ next assignment of error focuses on the circuit court’s denial of their J.N.W.V. motion on the malicious prosecution count. “[T]he principles governing a suit for malicious prosecution ... are generally well-settled.” Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 693, 381 A.2d *6561146, 1149 (1978). To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that there was:
“(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) ‘malice,’ or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.”
Id. (quoting Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688, 284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971) quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173, 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1956)).
The defendants allege that the circuit court erred in several ways. They first argue that the circuit court impermissibly allowed Bowden to re-litigate the issue of probable cause, which they claim Master Gilbert decided in the juvenile proceeding. According to the defendants, Master Gilbert implicitly decided that there was probable cause for the proceeding when he denied Bowden’s motion for judgment at the end of the State’s case-in-chief. The defendants assert that Master Gilbert’s implicit finding of probable cause should be given effect through the doctrine of collateral estoppel, precluding any further litigation of the issue of probable cause. Accordingly, the defendants assert Bowden was collaterally estopped from proving the third element of the malicious prosecution claim — lack of probable cause.
This Court has adopted a four-part test which must be satisfied in order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be applicable:
“1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
*6574. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?”
Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18-19, 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977) (citing Pat Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 45, 238 A.2d 100, 107 (1968)).
In finding that collateral estoppel was inapplicable, the trial court explained that
“[bjasically, there [are] three unities that must be met in order for collateral estoppel to occur: the unities of the parties, the unities of the issues, and a final judgment. In this particular case, there is not a unity of the parties. The other party was State of Maryland in re [Bowden] ... [wjhereas, here it’s Bowden versus Caldor and three individuals, and ... I guess the issue is the same. So due to the lack of unity of the parties, I don’t think that collateral estoppel is an issue here.”
The defendants assert that the trial court erred by requiring the “unities of the parties” before invoking collateral estoppel. The defendants are correct in this respect. This Court long ago discarded the traditional requirement of strict mutuality of parties in the context of res judicata and collateral estoppel in civil cases. MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 34-35, 367 A.2d 486, 490-91 (1977); Pat Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 45, 238 A.2d 100, 107 (1968). The appropriate focus is whether the parties against whom collateral estoppel is asserted “have been afforded their day in court on those facts and issues.” Kenny, 279 Md. at 35, 367 A.2d at 490; Pat Perusse Realty, 249 Md. at 45, 238 A.2d at 107. Thus, it is irrelevant that the party seeking to assert collateral estoppel was not a party to the prior proceeding. Only the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted need be a party or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication. Kenny, 279 Md. at 35-36, 367 A.2d at 491; Pat Perusse Realty, 249 Md. at 45, 238 A.2d at 107. The trial court thus erred in *658applying the “unity of the parties” standard to the defendants’ collateral estoppel defense.
Although the circuit court misapplied the mutuality of parties requirement, in this instance it was harmless because the defendants still have not established all the required elements of collateral estoppel. We first note, without deciding the issue, that the findings of fact and rulings of law made by the master in the juvenile proceeding may not be entitled to the preclusive effects of collateral estoppel since the juvenile proceedings before Master Gilbert did not result in a final judgment on the merits. Maryland Rule 911 governs the use of judicial masters in juvenile cases and specifically provides that “[t]he findings, conclusions and recommendations of a master do not constitute orders or final action of the court.” Maryland Rule 911 a.2. In addition, although Rule 911 d allows a court to adopt a master’s proposed findings if the parties do not take exception to those findings, a court’s adoption of the proposed findings is not mandated. Instead, Rule 911 d simply states that under the appropriate circumstances “the master’s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted____” (Emphasis added). Although Master Gilbert’s findings may have been adequate to end the juvenile proceedings against Bowden, absent proof of the court’s decision to adopt these recommended findings of law and fact as its final judgment, the Master’s recommendations under Rule 911 might not constitute a “final judgment on the merits” for purposes of collateral estoppel.
Even if Master Gilbert’s decision had constituted a final judgment, there was no final judgment which specifically established that the defendants had probable cause to initiate the juvenile court action against Bowden. The defendants rely on the fact that Master Gilbert denied Bowden’s motion for judgment at the end of the State’s case-in-chief. Mere denial of a motion for judgment at the end of the State’s case is not necessarily a finding that the defendants had probable cause to initiate the proceedings. Denial of *659Bowden’s motion for judgment simply meant that assuming Bowden’s “confession” was true, and assuming Caldor’s employees who testified at the juvenile proceeding testified truthfully and accurately, then the State had made out a prima facie case of theft. When Master Gilbert made his ruling, Bowden had been afforded no opportunity to present his own evidence or to dispute the State’s allegations and the accuracy of the confession. The juvenile Master’s denial of the motion for judgment did not collaterally estop Bowden from later proving defendants lacked probable cause. Cf. Davis v. Quille, 248 Md. 631, 634-35, 237 A.2d 745, 747 (1968) (holding that municipal court judge’s decision at preliminary hearing holding accused for action of grand jury may constitute some evidence, but not conclusive proof, of probable cause in a subsequent malicious prosecution suit).
The defendants also claim that the master’s refusal to grant Bowden’s motion to suppress his confession conclusively established that the confession was voluntary and collaterally estopped Bowden from denying probable cause. The short answer to this contention is that denial of a motion to suppress is a prima facie determination, but does not conclusively establish that a confession is voluntary. That decision must be made by the trier of fact at the end of the entire case. See Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 665-66, 511 A.2d 45, 50-51 (1986).
Finally, with respect to the malicious prosecution count, the defendants offer an alternative to their collateral estoppel argument. They assert that a juvenile proceeding arising out of a criminal charge of theft does not constitute a “criminal proceeding” under the first element of the malicious prosecution cause of action. The defendants reason that, since a juvenile proceeding under the Maryland Code does not constitute a criminal conviction, Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-824(a)(1), such a proceeding cannot constitute a “criminal prosecution.” Accordingly, the defendants assert that Bow-*660den failed to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution. We need not decide whether this contention has any merit. As the defendants conceded at oral argument, they failed to raise this issue at the circuit court and, thereby, failed to preserve it for our review.
E. False Imprisonment
Finally, the defendants challenge the circuit court’s denial of J.N.W.V. on the count of false imprisonment. The defendants argue that probable cause is an affirmative defense to an action for false imprisonment and that this issue was previously decided in the juvenile proceedings before Master Gilbert. See Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-307 (creating statutory defense of probable cause for merchants in false arrest, slander, and malicious prosecution actions). As we have already noted, Master Gilbert’s findings were not a final determination that the defendants had probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of J.N.W.V. on the false imprisonment count.
III.
The final issue the defendants have raised is whether the circuit court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for new trial on the issue of punitive damages after granting J.N.W.V. on two of the five underlying tort actions. We believe the judge erred in this ruling.
In the instant case, the jury awarded Bowden compensatory damages against all defendants on all five tort theories. At a separate proceeding, the same jury heard arguments concerning the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. The jury then determined the amount of punitive damages that should be assessed against each of the individual defendants, although the punitive damages award did not allocate the punitive damages among the tort counts. Later, the circuit court granted J.N.W.V. on the counts of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but left intact the punitive damages *661award, despite indications on the jury verdict sheet that the jury may have based the punitive damages award, in part, on the two stricken counts.
Punitive or exemplary damages operate to punish the wrongdoer and to deter such conduct by the wrongdoer or others in the future. See Dan B. Dobbs, Remedies § 3.9, at 205 (1973). There are two threshold conditions that parties must meet before being entitled to receive an award of punitive damages. See Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 298 Md. 611, 626-27, 471 A.2d 735, 743 (1984). The first condition is that there be a compensatory damages award underlying an award of punitive damages. Id. at 626, 471 A.2d at 743; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 446, 340 A.2d 705, 708 (1975); Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644, 291 A.2d 64, 71 (1972). The second condition required to support punitive damages is that the tort be committed with malice. Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 450-63, 601 A.2d 633, 647-54, reh’g denied, 325 Md. 665, 602 A.2d 1182 (1992); Rite Aid, 298 Md. at 627, 471 A.2d at 743. The question before us concerns only the first condition.
The issue in the instant case involves the nature of the compensatory damages foundation required to support a consolidated award of punitive damages. The defendants contend that an award of punitive damages must rest upon a foundation of compensatory damages for each count that the jury may have relied upon in awarding punitive damages. Bowden disagrees and asserts that any award of compensatory damages for a given course of conduct is a sufficient foundation for a punitive damages award. He asserts that it is the existence of the conduct alone and not the categories of legal wrong that is significant. Because punitive damages punish conduct, Bowden argues, they should not be tied to particular theories of recovery. Bow-den proposes that the proper focus is on the defendants’ course of conduct, and thus an award of compensatory damages on even one of the counts in a multiple count *662judgment provides an adequate foundation for punitive damages. We reject this argument.
Our prior decisions indicate that there must be a compensatory damages award foundation for each count of a complaint that provides a basis for punitive damages. This issue was before the Court in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975). In Keulemans, the plaintiff Keulemans sued Montgomery Ward and several individual defendants for false imprisonment, defamation, and malicious prosecution. The jury had awarded Keulemans compensatory damages for false arrest and punitive damages for malicious prosecution without a compensatory damages award for malicious prosecution. The issue before the Court was whether the award of punitive damages should be stricken. We noted that “the rule of our cases is clear that there must be an award of compensatory damages ... for an award of punitive damages to be allowed to stand.” Id. at 446, 340 A.2d at 708 (citations omitted). There, however, we declined to strike the punitive damages award. Instead, we were able to remand with instructions to reform the jury’s verdict because the record from the trial clearly indicated an error on the verdict sheet. We determined that the jury actually intended that a portion of compensatory damages in the amount of $350.00 in attorneys fees in defending the criminal charges were awarded for malicious prosecution and not for false imprisonment. Id. at 447, 340 A.2d at 708-09. Thus, after the reformation of the verdict there was an actual compensatory award for the count of malicious prosecution to support an award of punitive damages on that same count.
Several of our more recent cases also indicate that there must be an award of compensatory damages for each count which forms the foundation for an award of punitive damages. In fact, we need only refer to Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 602 A.2d 1191 (1992), which this Court decided last term. In Batson, the plaintiff Shiflett sued the defendant Batson under two distinct torts, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At the close of the trial, the *663jury awarded Shiflett $610,000 in compensatory damages and a total of $120,000 in punitive damages, but did not apportion the award between the defendants’ liabilities for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 698, 602 A.2d at 1198. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. We then remanded the case to the circuit court to recalculate both punitive and compensatory damages. We held that because the award did not itself apportion the damages between the distinct torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and since it was impossible for us to determine what part of the damages award was attributable to each tort, the damages award had to be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial on both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 737-38, 602 A.2d at 1218.
Batson is consistent with our case of Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984). In Palmer Ford, the jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages, but did not allocate them between the two counts alleged. Id. at 493, 471 A.2d at 301. The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for J.N.W.V. on both counts. On appeal, we held that the trial judge should have granted J.N.W.V. on one count, and we remanded for a redetermination of damages on the remaining count. Id. at 514, 471 A.2d at 312.
As noted above, one of the purposes of punitive damages is to punish the wrongs of the defendant. The requirement of a compensatory damages foundation protects defendants from being punished for acts that the trial court determines the defendant did not commit. In assessing punitive damages, a jury might have been influenced by the number of distinct civil wrongs the defendants committed. In light of this concern and the clear weight of authority cited above, the award of punitive damages must be vacated and a new trial ordered for the sole purpose of calculating punitive damages based on the three remaining torts of false imprisonment, defamation, and malicious prosecution.
*664Caldor also contends that the amount of punitive damages that the jury awarded in the instant case has no understandable ratio to the compensatory damages awarded, citing Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). As we are remanding the case for a new determination of punitive damages, we need not reach this issue.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID ONE-HALF BY THE APPELLANT AND ONE-HALF BY THE APPELLEE.
. The defendants never produced any videotape showing Bowden stealing money from the registers at either Bowden’s juvenile adjudicatory proceeding or at the civil trial from which this appeal arises.
. We only address the requirement of severe emotional distress. We do not address whether Bowden adequately proved the other three requirements of this tort.
. To date this Court has recognized several important public policies whose violation may give rise to a cause of action for wrongful discharge. See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 480-81, 588 A.2d 760, 766 (1991) ("[I]t is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy to discharge an employee for seeking legal redress against a co-worker for workplace sexual harassment culminating in assault and battery.”); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 50, 537A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988) (“Discharging an employee solely because that employee filed a worker’s compensation claim contravenes the clear mandate of Maryland public policy.’’); cf. Makovi v. SherwinWilliams Co., 316 Md. 603, 610-11, 561 A.2d 179, 182 (1989) (listing three categories where other states’ courts have typically applied wrongful discharge cause of action).