dissenting:
I most respectfully dissent. The majority affirms Appellant’s judgment of sentence on convictions for eleven counts of forgery1 and one count of criminal conspiracy.2 Although I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of evidence of other criminal activity, I disagree with their determination on the issue of the statute of limitations for conspiracy.
The majority disposes of Appellant’s first issue by determining that the statute of limitations for criminal conspiracy is not two years, but that criminal conspiracy carries with it the limitations period of the most serious crime for which Appellant could be properly convicted, in this case forgery.
The record indicates that a complaint, pursuant to a grand jury presentment, was filed on February 6, 1980. The information filed pursuant to the count of criminal conspiracy states the crimes were committed “.. . on or about July 21,1975 and on divers dates up to and including June 3,1976 ...” It is clear from these facts that the charges were not brought within two years.
*536The limitations statute on criminal prosecutions, 18 Pa.C. S.A. § 108,3 states in part:
(b) Other Offenses.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation:
(1) A prosecution for any of the following offenses under this code must be commenced within five years after it is committed:
Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse)
Section 3301 (relating to arson and related offenses) Section 3502 (relating to burglary)
Section 3701 (relating to robbery)
Section 4101 (relating to forgery)
Section 4902 (relating to perjury)
(2) A prosecution for any other offense under this code must be commenced within two years after it is committed.
Clearly, as criminal conspiracy is not enumerated in the list of crimes having a five year limitations period, subsection (b)(2) must apply. Also, although it is clear that where conspiracy is the crime charged, it is considered to be a continuing offense, Commonwealth v. Volk, 298 Pa.Super. 294, 444 A.2d 1182 (1982), it is also clear that conspiracy must be prosecuted within two years after the commission of the last offense, Commonwealth v. Volk, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 346, 17 A.2d 195 (1941); Commonwealth v. Fabrizio, 197 Pa.Super. 45, 176 A.2d 142 (1961).
The majority cites two recent cases for support of their determination. In neither Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 294 Pa.Super. 57, 439 A.2d 748 (1982), nor Commonwealth v. Eackles, 286 Pa.Super. 146, 428 A.2d 614 (1981) was this court presented with the issue raised in the instant case. Therefore, I must disagree with the majority that these *537cases make clear that conspiracy does not carry with it a two-year statute of limitations. In fact, as stated in Commonwealth v. Hawkins, id., 294 Pa.Superior Ct. at 61, 439 A.2d at 749; “[t]he general statute of limitations applicable to the charges upon which Appellant was convicted is two years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 108(b)(2).”
I further disagree that the grading provisions of 18 Pa.C. S.A. § 905(a) provide any legislative intent concerning the statute of limitations. Section 905(a) merely states, in part, that conspiracy is a crime of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is an object of the conspiracy.
Finally, because neither fraud nor breach of fiduciary obligation is a material element of the offense of conspiracy, the exceptions to the two year limitations period, as found in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 108(c)4 do not apply, as proof of fraud is not essential to a conviction for conspiracy.5 See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, supra.
Appellant further alleges that since the conspiracy conviction is invalid, the convictions for forgery based on invoices signed by Appellant’s co-defendant must also be discharged. Appellant argues that without a valid conspiracy bill, the Commonwealth cannot sustain a forgery conviction based on *538items signed by someone other than Appellant only by alleging and proving accomplice liability. The information for forgery charges Appellant with all subsections of section 4101:
(a) Offense defined:—A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor:
(1) alters any writing of another without his authority;
(2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or
(3) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection.
I find Appellant’s argument meritless for two reasons. First, as Appellant was charged with subsection (3), he can be found guilty of forgery if, with intent or the requisite knowledge, he utters a writing which he knows to be forged. Therefore, the actor need not actually sign a writing to be guilty under this statute. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 495 Pa. 461, 434 A.2d 1182 (1981). Also, in Commonwealth v. Perkins, 485 Pa. 286, 401 A.2d 1320 (1979) (3-3 decision), now Chief Justice O’BRIEN stated in his OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE that one can be convicted as an accessory though only charged as a principal under the Crimes Code, as well as under the old Penal Code. I therefore find no merit to the argument that the forgery convictions based on invoices not signed by Appellant must also be reversed.
In summary, I would reverse Appellant’s judgment of sentence on the conspiracy conviction and affirm the judgment of sentence on the forgery conviction.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101.
. Id., § 903.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 108 was reenacted in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552, effective June 27, 1978.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 108(c) states:
(c) Exceptions.—If the period prescribed in subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:
(1) Any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this paragraph extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years.
(2) Any offense committed by a public officer or employee in the course of or in connection with his office or employment at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment or within two years thereafter, but in no case shall this paragraph extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years.
. The information did allege, as required for the exception to be valid, that fraud was a material element of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Eackles, supra.