dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree with the following conclusions reached by the majority: (1) section 14 — 104(4)(b) of the Philadelphia Code (Code) precluded the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia (Zoning Board) from considering whether the cabaret operated by 8131 Roosevelt Corp., t/a “Pinups” (Pinups) is a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use; (2) Pinups failed to present substantial evidence to show that its cabaret is a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use; (3) Pinups is not entitled to estoppel relief because it failed to act in good faith throughout the proceedings; and (4) the City of Philadelphia (City) is not guilty of laches because it did not acquiesce to Pinups’ operation of a cabaret. Thus, unlike the majority, I would reverse.
*971I. Non-Conforming Use
The majority concludes that the Zoning Board did not err by failing to address whether Pinups’ cabaret is a lawful preexisting non-conforming use because, under section 14 — 104(4)(b) of the Code, Pinups ceased to be considered a lawful preexisting non-conforming use after the Zoning Board granted a temporary variance. (Majority op. at 968.) However, I believe that this holding ignores the plain language of section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code and, moreover, renders section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code unconstitutional.
A. Plain Language
Section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code states that “[a] non-conforming structure or use shall cease to be considered as such whenever it becomes the subject of a variance, granted by the Zoning Board of Adjustment or ordered by a Court, and its nonconforming status shall not be reinstated thereafter.” The word “variance” and the phrase “non-conforming use” are technical terms, and we must construe technical words and phrases according to their peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.1
A variance is “[pjermission to depart from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance by virtue of unique hardship due to special circumstances regarding [a] person’s property. It is in the nature of a waiver.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1553 (6th ed.1990). A temporary variance is not the same as a variance because a temporary variance only applies in transitional situations and does not provide the same remedy as a variance. See Robert S. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice § 6.2.15 (2001).
A non-conforming use is a “use which does not comply with present zoning provisions but which existed lawfully ... prior to the enactment of the zoning provision.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1051 (6th ed.1990). “A lawful nonconforming use establishes in the property owner a vested property right which cannot be abrogated or destroyed, unless it is a nuisance, it is abandoned, or it is extinguished by eminent domain.” PA Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Township of Moon, 526 Pa. 186, 192, 584 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1991) (Moon).
Because a lawful non-conforming use cannot be destroyed unless it is a nuisance, it is abandoned or it is extinguished by eminent domain, we cannot interpret section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code so that the mere grant of a variance destroys a lawful non-conforming use. Of course, if the City grants a permanent variance for a particular non-conforming use, that use continues and is not destroyed. The same cannot be said of a temporary variance because, when a temporary variance expires, it might not be renewed. Thus, section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code must be construed to mean that a non-conforming use ceases to be considered as such whenever it becomes the subject of a permanent variance. Because the Zoning Board granted Pinups a temporary variance, section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code does not apply.
B. Constitutional Considerations
If the word “variance” in section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code were to include a temporary variance, as the majority holds, then section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code would be unconstitutional.2
*972In Moon, a township attempted to regulate adult commercial enterprises by enacting a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of such businesses. For example, the ordinance banned adult commercial enterprises within 1,000 feet of a residential zone. The ordinance gave nonconforming entities a ninety-day grace period to come into compliance with the ordinance; those failing to comply within ninety days were required to close* One entity, an adult bookstore that was a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use, challenged the validity of the ordinance. Our supreme court held that any zoning ordinance that requires the amortization and discontinuance of a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use is confiscatory and vi-olative of the constitution as a taking of property without just compensation. The court stated that no governmental body has the right to substantially destroy the lawful use of property without paying just compensation for it. Thus, the court found the ordinance unconstitutional. Moon.
Like the township in Moon, the City here has attempted to regulate adult businesses. Similar to the provision mentioned above in Moon, section 14-1605(4)(b) of the Code bans adult businesses within 500 feet of a residential zone. Pinups cannot meet this requirement. Instead of a ninety-day grace period, the City gave Pinups a two-year grace period through the issuance of a temporary variance in 1993. Although the City gave Pinups a second two-year grace period in 1996,3 the City ultimately ignored Pinups’ claim of a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use and ordered Pinups to cease operations. The City believed, like the majority, that, under section 14 — 104(4)(b), the temporary variances destroyed any lawful pre-existing non-conforming use. However, as our supreme court ruled in Moon, a governmental body may not use a zoning ordinance to destroy a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use of property without just compensation. Moon. Thus, if the City and the majority have properly construed section 14 — 104(4)(b) of the Code to allow for the destruction of Pinups’ property right to continue its lawful pre-existing non-conforming use, then that Code provision is unconstitutional.
Because I presume, as I must, that the City did not intend to violate the Constitution in enacting the Code, I conclude that the City’s issuance of a temporary variance does not destroy a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use under section 14-104(4)(b) of the Code.
II. Substantial Evidence
The majority states that, even if the preexisting non-conforming use issue was available for determination, the “record is devoid of evidence that the entertainment provided by the go-go dancers in 1969 would have rendered it a cabaret under Section 14-1605 [of the Code].” (Majority op. at 968.) I disagree.
Section 14-1605 of the Code was enacted in 1977. Under section 14 — 1605(2)(d) of the Code, a restaurant that features go-go *973dancers exhibiting specified anatomical areas is a “cabaret.” The specified anatomical areas include less than completely covered buttocks. See Section 14-1605(2)(e) of the Code. The record in this case indicates that, prior to enactment of the Code in 1977, the property was used as a restaurant that featured go-go dancers wearing bathing suits. (R.R. at 21a-22a.) Certainly, a reasonable mind could conclude based on ordinary experience and common sense that the bathing suits of the 1960’s and 1970’s did not completely cover the buttocks of go-go dancers, especially while they were dancing. Therefore, I conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support a finding that there was a lawful pre-existing “cabaret” on the property before enactment of the Code in 1977.
III. Estoppel
The majority states that Pinups is not entitled to a variance by estoppel because Pinups did not act in good faith throughout the proceedings. In support of this statement, the majority asserts that Pinups operated its cabaret illegally after the second two-year temporary variance expired. (Majority op. at 969.) However, if the cabaret was a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use, which the temporary variance could not destroy, then Pinups was not operating the cabaret illegally when the second temporary variance expired.
IV. Laches
The majority states that the City is not guilty of laches because the City did not acquiesce in Pinups’ use of the property after 1982. (Majority op. at 969.) I disagree.
In In re Heidorn, 412 Pa. 570, 195 A.2d 349 (1963), our supreme court held that a township is guilty of laches where (1) an ordinance violation is not concealed from public view, (2) the township does not object to the violation for ten years and (3) the township has no valid excuse for its indifference. Here, Pinups began operating as a cabaret in 1982. The fact that the cabaret was within 500 feet of a residential zone was not concealed from public view. Yet, the City did nothing about the location of Pinups until 1993, when it issued the first temporary variance.4 For eleven years, then, the City did not object to the fact that Pinups was within 500 feet of a residential zone, and the City has offered no excuse for its indifference to the violation. Under Heidom, the City is guilty of laches.
. Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a); Heck v. Zoning Hearing Board for Harvey’s Lake Borough, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 570, 397 A.2d 15 (1979) (stating that the rules of statutory construction apply to both statutes and ordinances).
. In ascertaining the meaning of a zoning ordinance, we presume that the local authori*972ties did not intend to violate the Constitution. Section 1922(3) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3); Heck.
. I note that "a zoning board is not a regulatory agency and [the] use of temporary variances as a device to achieve continuing supervision [of a use] is an unwarranted extension of the board’s function.” Robert S. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice § 6.2.15 (2001). Here, the Zoning Board issued temporary variances to determine a use’s compatibility with the surrounding neighborhood. (R.R. at 151a.) Thus, it appears to me that the Zoning Board used temporary variances improperly to achieve continuing supervision over adult businesses.
. Thus, even when the City finally took action against the cabaret in 1993, the City allowed Pinups to continue to operate within 500 feet of a residential area pursuant to a temporary variance.