Dissenting Opinion by
Price, J.:I must disagree with the conclusion of the majority concerning the purpose of the Act of Jan. 14, 1952, P.L. (1951) 2016, §1 (58 P.S. §731) et seq., and the extent of the powers conveyed therein. I believe the Act was intended to be used as a means of appointing part-time police officers who may be called into active duty by the chief of police in non-emergency situations, and by the mayor during emergencies.
The historical note following Section 731 states:
“Title of Act [Police Force and Firemen]: An Act providing for supplementing the police forces of cities, boroughs, towns and townships, for the appointment, powers and control of auxiliary police therein, and for the transfer during disasters and emergencies of such auxiliary police, members of the regular police forces, and police equipment thereof. 1952, Jan. 14, P.L. (1951) 2016.” (emphasis added)
The interpretation placed upon this Act by the majority eliminates the supplementation of the police force by considering only the second and third state’d purposes of the Act. However, the purposes are written conjunctively, and I would read the Act so as to give effect to all three clauses quoted supra.
*558Moreover, the Borough Code, Act of Feb. 1, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1656, No. 581, §1121 (58 P.S. §46121), contains the following cross-reference, which indicates that the Acts are not mutually exclusive: “Police force, see section 731 et seq. of this title.”
I do not believe that the Act of Jan. 14, 1952, is at odds with the Borough Code. That part of Section 46121 of the Borough Code which discusses civil service requirements states:
“The borough may, by ordinance establish a police department consisting of chief, captain, lieutenant, sergeants, or any other classification desired by the council, and council may, subject to the civil service provisions of this act, if they be in effect at the time, designate the individuals assigned to each office, but the mayor shall continue to direct the manner in which the persons assigned to the office shall perform their duties. The mayor may, however, delegate to the chief of police or other officers supervision over and instruction to subordinate officers in the manner of performing their duties. The mayor may appoint special policemen during an emergency in which the safety and welfare of the borough and the public is endangered and auxiliary policemen may be appointed as provided by general law.” (emphasis added)
The last sentence of Section 46121 specifically permits the appointment of auxiliary policemen without regard to the civil service requirements detailed in Section 46121.
Furthermore, I do not believe that this appellee has standing to attack the statutory authority of auxiliary policemen who make arrests. “The general rule, however, is that only the person whose rights have been violated has standing to attack the validity of the action resulting in the violation. This is so with respect to personal rights under the Fourth Amendment, (citations omitted)' as well as under the Fifth, (citation omitted).” Commonwealth v. Russell, 225 Pa. Superior Ct. 183, 136-37, 310 A.2d 296, 298 (1973).
*559The stated purpose of the Act of 1952 is to supplement the police force, and consequently, to oifer increased police protection to the citizens of the Commonwealth. Appellee has not proven that Ms arrest was improper. He merely contends that the arresting officer was improperly commissioned through a ministerial act which did not conform to appellant’s interpretation of the Act of 1952.
This distinction is most significant. Appellee recognizes that the Act of 1952 establishes a ministerial function of a governmental body; i.e., to appoint auxiliary policemen in the manner set forth in the Act. To my view, persons who can be aggrieved by an improper appointment to the auxiliary police force are those who prove a direct injury as a result of the manner in which the Act is effectuated.
If a regular police officer, for example, believes that an auxiliary officer is employed, during a state of non-emergency, by a borough which would otherwise be subjected to the civil service act, he may have standing to contest the appointment. This is not to suggest that a decision on the merits would, necessarily, be found in his favor, but rather to indicate the type of situation which might indicate an injury sufficient to create a cause of action based on the Act of 1952.
However, I do not believe that the validity of the Act of 1952, or the manner in which it is put into effect, is subject to a collateral attack by a non-aggrieved person. Ap-pellee created the circumstances which led to his arrest and does not dispute his criminal liability. Whether he was arrested by a full-time police officer or by an auxiliary police officer, appellee was not “aggrieved” as that word is used to create standing.
The appointment of an auxiliary officer rather than a regular officer in no way affects the rights of the citizens at large. The function of public protection is as adequately served by auxiliary officers as by regular policemen. *560Therefore, I do not believe a suspect has standing to contest, nor do I believe it sound policy to enable a suspect to look behind the badge of the arresting officer and contest the validity of his appointment to the force. That suspect is not aggrieved by the label attached to the arresting officer.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that appellant committed the offense with which he is charged. There is also no doubt that his arrest was properly performed, and that he was afforded every right to due process of law. He has not shown that his rights have been violated. To hold this arrest '‘illegal” does not further the purpose of the Act of 1952, and is not a proper remedy for a person who has shown no injury caused by the arrest.
I would reverse the order of the lower court granting the arrest of judgment and remand for sentencing.
Watkins, P.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.