concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am wholly in agreement with the majority opinion with respect to its analysis of the issues of standing and subject-matter jurisdiction. As these issues are dis-positive of the plaintiffs’ complaint, I concur with the opinion’s holding to dismiss the case in its entirety.
Although an argument can be made that, in light of the significant public interest in having the ultimate matter resolved, this Court should overlook the procedural and jurisdictional deficiencies of the complaint and allow plaintiffs to proceed, I do not share this view. As the majority aptly points out, the right at issue here, ie., the right to contest a public officer’s title to office, is a public right, the contours of which have been clearly delineated by pri- or case law in this and other jurisdictions. Moreover, principles long established by this Court have carefully circumscribed the exercise of the Court’s discretion to allow private parties to maintain such suits. As this Court expounded in State ex rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193 (R.I.1991):
“These early decisions demonstrate that we have continuously exercised our discretion to hold that an information in the nature of quo warranto that seeks to vindicate a public right cannot be brought in this jurisdiction without the intervention of the Attorney General. * *■ * The purpose of this rule is to protect public officials from numerous private challenges to their titles as public officers.” Id. at 1197.
This Court has also said that “title to public office should not be put in question any time an individual sees fit to cast a cloud. Proceedings by way of quo warran-to or informations in the nature of quo warranto must be placed in public and responsible hands. The moving party on such occasions is • the attorney general.” Fargnoli v. Cianci, 121 R.I. 153, 164 n. 6, 397 A.2d 68, 74 n. 6 (1979).
In his dissenting opinion in Webb, Chief Justice Fay lamented that the Court’s holding “effectively abolished the discretionary ability this court has possessed for over a century to grant standing in such circumstances.” ' State ex. rel. Webb, 591 A.2d at 1208. While I do not believe that this Court can ever “abolish” its inherent or prerogative authority, there can be no question that prior case law has attempted to sharply curtail the Court’s discretion in this area. Nor do I believe that the present case presents such a rare occasion that warrants a deviation from this time-honored rule.
Here, the Attorney General, a constitutional officer sworn to “support the Constitution of this state,” R.I. Const. art. 3, sec. 3, has represented to this Court that he has “carefully examined the matters that form the basis of this complaint” and that “[a]fter a due and diligent review of this matter and this Court’s decisions the At*240torney General determined there was no basis to bring a quo warranto action against the lawfully appointed and lawfully sitting Chief Justice at this time or any other time for the acts asserted herein.”
Moreover, the Governor is a defendant in this case and, through counsel, has appeared in these proceedings. Pursuant to article 10, section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the Governor is entrusted with the constitutional authority to “fill any vacancy of any justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court,” and the statutory obligation to “immediately notify the commission of any vacancy or prospective vacancy of a justice of the Rhode Island [S]upreme [C]ourt.” G.L.1956 § 8-16.1-5(a). Thus, if the Governor concluded that, as plaintiffs argue, the office of Chief Justice had already been vacated, he would have the obligation to initiate the judicial selection process. Not only has he declined to do so, he has joined in the petition seeking the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.
While neither the Attorney General nor the Governor are final arbiters of our Constitution, we need not abandon well-settled principles of justiciability even though plaintiffs have raised a constitutional challenge. Here, at least two constitutional officers, after reviewing the allegations, assert that there is no constitutional infirmity with Chief Justice Williams’ title to the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Under the circumstances, I believe that the public right at issue here has been adequately safeguarded, and that this is not an occasion when this Court should, in contravention of its long-established jurisprudence, allow a private citizen to vindicate a public right.
In light of the foregoing reasons, I am in accord with the majority’s judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. In the circumstances of this case, therefore, the Court need proceed no further. As the majority has addressed the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, however, I write separately to comment briefly on the underlying issues. I also join in that portion of the majority opinion that discusses the interrelationship of the Constitutions of the United States and Rhode Island, and the transcendency of the Supremacy Clause. Further, it is not at all clear to me that military service in general, or service on the Military Review Panel at issue here, violates the Rhode Island Constitution’s prohibition against accepting an “appointment under any other government.” I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the provisions of article 3, section 6 no longer apply to judges. Rather, I believe that, consistent with well-established principles of statutory construction, the provisions of article 10, section 4 and article 3, section 6 may be read harmoniously, such that the intended purpose of both may be fairly secured.
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 10 L.Ed. 1060 (1842), when faced with interpreting two constitutional provisions which stood in “juxtaposition with each other,” id. at 611, Mr. Justice Story, writing for the Court, stated:
“How, then, are we to interpret the language of the clause? The true answer is, in such a manner, as, consistently with the words, shall fully and completely effectuate the whole objects of it. If by one mode of interpretation the right must become shadowy and unsubstantial, and without any remedial power adequate to the end; and by another mode it will attain its just end and secure its manifest purpose; it would seem, upon principles of reasoning, absolutely irresistible, that the latter ought to prevail. No Court of justice can be authorized so to construe any clause of the Constitution as to defeat its obvious *241ends, when another construction, equally accordant with the words and sense thereof, will enforce and protect them.” Id. at 612.
Article 3, section 6, provides that if “any general officer, senator, representative, or judge shall, after election and engagement, accept any appointment under any other government, the office under this shall be immediately vacated.” From the time the state constitution was ratified in 1843, until November 8, 1994, when article 10, section 4 was amended by a majority of the electorate voting in a statewide election, the justices of the Supreme Court were “elected by the two houses in grand committee.” On November 8, 1994, the Rhode Island electorate amended the state constitution to provide that the Governor would select individuals for judicial positions from a list compiled by a judicial nominating commission. As approved by the voters, article 10, section 4 directs that:
“The governor shall fill any vacancy of any justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court by nominating, on the basis of merit, a person from a list submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commission, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and by and with the separate advice and consent of the house of representatives, shall appoint said person as a justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. * * * The powers, duties, and composition of the judicial nominating commission shall be defined by statute.”
This Court has said that “under the 1994 amendment, the selection process has been formally altered to reduce the role of the Legislature, to expand the role of the Governor, and to require that the judicial nominating] commission specify three to five candidates ‘on the basis of merit.’ ” In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Commission), 668 A.2d 1246, 1249 (R.I.1996).
There is a fundamental and structural difference between a system whereby “[t]he judges of the supreme court shall be elected by the two houses in grand committee,” article 10, section 4 prior to the 1994 Amendment, and the merit-based selection process that now obtains. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the 1994 Amendment did more than “only change! ] the sequence by which the General Assembly elected judges.” The role of the Senate and House of Representatives in giving advice and consent simply cannot be equated with electing judges in Grand Committee. Did the 1994 amendment, however, also place judges beyond the scope of the article 3, section 6 prohibitions against accepting “any appointment under any other government”?
It is clear that the 1994 amendment to article 10, section 4 makes no reference whatsoever to article 3, section 6. Therefore, any effect upon the latter provision must be by necessary implication. It is also a well-established rule of statutory, or constitutional, construction that
“repeals by implication are not favored by the law. When the repealing effect of a statute is doubtful, the statute will be strictly construed to effectuate its consistent operation with previous legislation. * * * Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23.10, at 230-31 (C. Sands 4th ed.1972). Only when the two statutory provisions are irreconcilably repugnant will a repeal be implied and the last-enacted statute be preferred. * * * We have also stated that if two statutes are found not to be inconsistent with one another and relate to the same subject matter, they are deemed ‘in pari materia and should be considered together so that they will harmonize with each other and be con*242sistent with their general object and scope, even though they contain no reference to one another and were passed at different times.’ ” Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 248-49, 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979). (Emphasis added.)
Moreover,
“courts should attempt to construe two statutes that are in apparent conflict so that, if at all reasonably possible, both * * * may stand and be operative.” Shelter Harbor Fire District v. Vacca, 835 A.2d 446, 449 (R.I.2003) (quoting Providence Electric Co. v. Donatelli Building Co., 116 R.I. 340, 344, 356 A.2d 483, 486 (1976)).
Our touchstone throughout this task is to “give effect to the intent of the framers.” City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I.1995). We have previously elucidated on the intent of both of these provisions. In In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Commission), 668 A.2d at 1249, four justices of this Court opined that based on the “reason and spirit underlying” the provision, the “clear intent” of the electorate in enacting article 10, section 4, was “to promote a broad and merit-based process for the selection of judicial nominees.” And in Opinion to the Governor, 83 R.I. 370, 116 A.2d 474 (1955), all four participating justices construed the purpose of article 9, section 6 (now article 3, section 6) as follows:
“In this connection it is unnecessary to restate the history of our constitution and to establish the fact that from the beginning Rhode Island has been exceptionally jealous of its independence and sovereignty as a state. For the present problem it is sufficient to point to the explicit provisions * * * of our constitution which are as strong, if not stronger, than similar prohibitions found in the constitutions of the other states.
“The intent of that language is clear. It was designed to secure the undivided loyalty and service of such officers to this state. The framers of the constitution deemed it prudent to prevent even the possibility of a conflict between loyalties. Therefore they dealt with the problem in two ways. In the first clause of sec. 6 they provided that no person while holding an office under any other government, state or country could act as a general officer or as a member of the general assembly. Apparently not content with this exclusion they then provided in the second clause that if any such officer or judge, after his election and engagement, accepted any appointment under any other government then his said office shall be immediately vacated.” Opinion to the Governor, 83 R.I. at 372-73, 116 A.2d at 474-75.
Notwithstanding the use of the word “election,” I believe that article 3, section 6 can coexist in harmony with article 10, section 4 without diluting the purpose of either provision. This Court has recognized that we must not be hasty in our interpretation of the Constitution because an instrument like the Constitution “must of necessity deal in generalities.” In re Opinion of the Court to the Governor in the Matter of the Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56, 86, 178 A. 433, 447 (1935). “[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary sense as distinguished from technical meaning.” In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1323 (R.I.1986) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931)).
When we are called upon to construe the provisions of coexisting statutes, we at*243tempt to follow the rule of construction that provides that provisions “relating to the same or similar subject matter should be construed such that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope.” Blanchette v. Stone, 591 A.2d 785, 786 (R.I.1991). “This rule of construction applies even though the [provisions] in question [may] contain no reference to each other and aré passed at different times.” Id. (quoting State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I.1981)). In light of Mr. Justice Story’s admonition against construing “any clause of the Constitution as to defeat its obvious ends, when another construction, equally accordant with the words and sense thereof, will enforce and protect them,” Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612, I believe that the word “election”19 should be interpreted broadly to effectuate the purpose of article 8, section 6, viz., securing the “undivided loyalty and service of such officers to this state.” Thus, the word “election” in article 3, section 6 may be viewed as encompassing the “selection” or “appointment” of the officers explicitly enumerated therein.20 Whether these individuals are elected through popular elections, elected through Grand Committee elections, or appointed through the joint efforts of the executive and legislative branch is extraneous to the intent and function of article 3, section 6.
Consistent with these principles, I believe that article 3, section 6 should be interpreted so as to give vitality to its purpose — “to secure the undivided loyalty and service” of a discreet class of public officers.- Although the adoption of the 1994 amendment to article 3, section 4 formally altered the selection process by which judges are chosen, it does not compel the conclusion that such judges are thereby excised from the operation of article 3, section 6. In my opinion, the word “election” as it appears in that section should be viewed in its broader, more gen*244eral sense that encompasses the “selection” or “appointment” of the explicitly enumerated officers.
In summary, I do not believe that the 1994 amendment to article 10, section 4 is irreconcilably repugnant to article 3, section 6. Rather, I believe that the rules applicable to the construction of constitutional provisions suggest an interpretation that favors giving effect to both provisions. In my opinion, the 1994 amendment to article 10, section 4 does not render the phrase “judge * * *, after election and engagement” in article 8, section 6 a legal nullity. On the contrary, both provisions may stand in harmony to effectuate the intent of the people: the selection of judges on the basis of merit, and the assurance of the undivided loyalty and service of such judges. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding on this issue.
Finally, I think it important to note the extraordinary circumstances occasioned by this case, in which we have been called upon to consider a complaint, the subject of which is a colleague with whom we all enjoy a close working relationship. The fact that we have read the same constitutional provisions, and applied well-established rules of statutory construction, yet come to differing conclusions should not obscure the fact that we agree on what I consider to be the dispositive issues of this case, ie., that the plaintiffs have no standing and that the action may only be brought by the Attorney General. For the reasons I have set forth herein, however, I believe that the provisions of article 3, section 6 continue to have vitality for judges, as well as for general officers, senators, and representatives. The Chief Justice is as much subject to the law as any other public officer or, indeed, any other citizen. By the same token, the Chief Justice is as much entitled to the protections of our well-settled jurisprudence as any other public officer or citizen. Accordingly, I concur with the judgment of the majority to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.
. "In construing a constitutional provision, this court properly consults extrinsic sources ⅜ ⅞ *. * * ⅞ In our examination of the constitution, we must look to the history of the times and examine the state of affairs as they existed when the constitution was framed and adopted.” In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Commission—Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 91 (R.I.1999) (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A,2d 40, 45 (R.1.1995)). A dictionary relevant to the time of the adoption of article 3, section 6 gives a definition of the word "election”: "The act of choosing a person to fill an office or employment, by any manifestation of preference, as by ballot, uplifted hands or viva voce[.]” American Dictionary of the English Language (Noah Webster 1828). Other state's supreme courts have examined the words "elect” and "appoint” and determined that they are interchangeable. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Bronner, 547 So.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Ala.1989) (holding that whether an officer is a public officer under that state's constitution "must be determined by examining the duties of the office, the 'being there,' rather than the method by which the officer is selected, i.e., appointment or election, the 'getting there.’ ” The court noted in dicta that " '[e]tymologi-cally speaking, election denotes choice, selection out of the number of those choosing.’ In common use, however, it has come to denote such a selection made by a distinctly defined body, as by 'the voters of an entire class,’ and while the words 'appointment’ and 'election' are not synonymous, yet they are sometimes used interchangeably in statutes. * * i! 'In its broadest sense, * * * the word "elected” means merely "selected".' ”).
. "The words 'elect' and ‘appoint’ are not legally synonymous; the term 'election' carries with it the idea of a choice in which all who are to be affected by the choice participate, whereas an appointment is generally made by one person or by a limited number acting with delegated powers. The words, however, are sometimes indiscriminately employed in constitutional and statutory provisions, and for the purpose of ascertaining the correct interpretation, the courts must give to the word used a meaning according to the connection in which it is found.” 25 Am.Jur.2d Elections § 1 at 799 (1996).