As the sole remaining Justice on the Court to have joined the lead Opinion in Commonwealth v. Chiappini, 566 Pa. 507, 782 A.2d 490 (2001), I must respectfully dissent from the decision reached by the Majority. Today, the Majority has discarded the case-by-case test outlined in Chiappini, and instead adopted a bright-line rule unconditionally stating that a defendant is not in “custody” for purposes of awarding sentencing credit for time spent subject to home confinement with electronic monitoring. However, I truly believe that the case-by-case approach adopted by the lead Opinion in Chiappini, which carefully analyzes a specific home confinement program before rendering judgment, is the proper analysis to be applied in determining whether a defendant is in “custody” and entitled to sentencing credit pursuant to Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760.1
In Chiappini, a plurality of this Court expressly concluded, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that a defendant who has participated in home confinement with electronic monitoring has spent time in “custody” for purposes of sentencing *644credit pursuant to Section 9760. As the lead Opinion in Chiappini explained, the decisions of this Court in Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90, 588 A.2d 898 (1991), and Commonwealth v. Conahan, 527 Pa. 199, 589 A.2d 1107 (1991), concerned only the statutory interpretation of the term “imprisonment” for purposes of sentencing credit pursuant to Section 3731 of the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731.2 However, here, as in Chiappini, we are presented with the statutory meaning of the term “custody” as used in Section 9760. As the lead Opinion in Chiappini stressed, the term “custody,” while encompassing “imprisonment,” is much broader and should not be limited to time spent in prison or a similar institutional setting. In drafting Section 9760, the legislature opted for the broader term “custody,” instead of the more restrictive term “imprisonment.” Thus, because the words “custody” and “imprisonment” are not identical, this Court should not simply ignore the divergent terms used in Sections 9760 and 3731, as the Majority is attempting to do here, and as the Superior Court did in Commonwealth v. Shartle, 438 Pa.Super. 403, 652 A.2d 874, 877 (1995), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 541 Pa. 637, 663 A.2d 690 (1995).
Nevertheless, as the lead Opinion in Chiappini noted, not every home confinement program with electronic monitoring will fall within the meaning of the term “custody” as used in Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code. Therefore, in order to determine whether a defendant has spent time in “custody” for purposes of sentencing credit pursuant to Section 9760, it is necessary to examine the extent of control exercised by those in authority managing and administering the home confinement program. As we explained in Chiappini, this determination should be made on a case-by-case basis after a *645full and complete review of the individual home confinement program. Otherwise, pursuant to the bright-line rule approach that the Majority adopts today, a defendant will be forever foreclosed from receiving credit for time served under even the most restrictive and limiting home confinement program.
Because of the varying home confinement programs in place throughout the counties of the Commonwealth, the necessity of a case-by-case approach as delineated in Chiappini, which carefully examines the particulars and nuances of each electronic monitoring program, is readily apparent. In Chiappini, a plurality of this Court determined that the technology employed by the Lackawanna County Home Confinement/Electronic Monitoring Program had sufficiently restrained and limited Chiappini’s freedom so as to constitute “custody” pursuant to Section 9760. Specifically, participants in the Lackawanna County program were closely monitored by Lackawanna County prison authorities throughout the course of the day via a non-detachable ankle or wrist bracelet, which each participant was required to wear at all times. Moreover, an additional monitoring device was attached to each participant’s home telephone. Lackawanna County prison authorities also ensured strict compliance with the restrictions of the program through random telephone calls and occasional visits from detention personnel. In addition, the program permitted county detention staff members, whether corrections or maintenance personnel, to enter a participant’s residence upon request at any time. Essentially, a participant in the Lackawanna County home confinement program was an inmate of the county prison system and his or her residence was “considered a jail without bars.” Chiappini, 782 A.2d at 497.
However, unlike Chiappini, in the matter sub judice, it is unclear whether the extent of control exercised by the Lycoming County Intensive Supervised Bail Program Utilizing Electronic Monitoring would entail “custody” pursuant to Section 9760. The evidentiary record detailing the Lycoming County home confinement program is insufficient to conclude that *646Appellee’s residence was, ultimately, a “jail without bars.” Hence, the Superior Court did not specifically hold that Appellee was entitled to credit for time served in this particular home confinement program. Instead, the court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing to investigate the nature and extent of control exercised by the Lycoming County authorities in administering and enforcing its home confinement program.
Absent a full and complete evidentiary record detailing the particulars of the Lycoming County home confinement program, I believe that such a remand is necessary before categorically deciding that Appellee was not in “custody” and not entitled to sentencing credit. Accordingly, pursuant to the case-by-case approach outlined in Chiappini, I would affirm the Order of the Superior Court remanding this matter for an evidentiary hearing to scrutinize the nature and enforcement protocol of the Lycoming County home confinement program before reaching a final determination.
. Section 9760 provides, in pertinent part:
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1) (emphasis added).
. Section 3731 of the Drunk Driving Act, which has since been repealed by Act of 2003, Sept. 30, P.L. 120, No. 24, § 14, effective Feb. 1, 2004, and recodified at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, provided, in relevant part:
(1) Any person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree and the sentencing court shall order the person to pay a fine of not less than $300 and serve a minimum term of imprisonment of ... [.]
75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(e) (emphasis added).