Dissenting.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Thomas H. Crews, appeals from an order of the trial court that granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings of Appellee, Seven Springs Mountain Resort. The majority would reverse the order of the trial court and I would affirm. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 I start with the appropriate standard and scope of review. The standard of review of an order granting judgment on the pleadings is as follows:
We must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact of the party against whom the motion is granted and consider against him only those facts that he specifically admits. We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.
Weik v. Estate of Brown, 794 A.2d 907, 908 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 709, 813 A.2d 844 (Pa.2002). In conducting this inquiry, our scope of review confines our consideration to the pleadings and documents attached thereto. Jones v. Travelers Insurance Company, 356 Pa.Super. 213, 514 A.2d 576, 578 (1986).
¶ 3 I note that judgment on the pleadings is proper when there are no disputed issues of material fact. Vetter v. Fun *106Footwear, 447 Pa.Super. 84, 668 A.2d 529 (1995). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must examine the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Bensalem Township School District v. Commonwealth, 518 Pa. 581, 544 A.2d 1318 (1988).
¶ 4 In my opinion, Appellant’s case is governed by Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 563 Pa. 501, 762 A.2d 339 (2000), where our Supreme Court addressed the Pennsylvania Skiers Responsibility Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(c). The majority correctly describes Hughes as follows:
In Hughes,5 the plaintiff was struck from behind at the bottom of a hill while skiing towards the lift.
5 563 Pa. at 502, 762 A.2d at 340.
A split panel of this court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding, inter alia, that it could not determine as a matter of law that the plaintiffs injury was caused by an occurrence inherent in the sport of skiing. Id. at 503, 762 A.2d at 340. In reversing the panel, our Supreme Court examined the Skier’s Responsibility Act amendment to the Comparative Negligence Statute. The Act states:
(c) Downhill skiing. — ■
(1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the economy-of this Commonwealth. It is recognized that as in some other sports, there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing.
(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (b.l).
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(c). The Court noted that the doctrine of assumption of the risk has been problematic in other areas, but that in occurrences involving injuries to plaintiffs who were participating in sporting events, the cases “have tended to speak in terms of whether the injury suffered resulted from a risk ‘inherent’ in the activity in question; if it did, then the defendant was under no duty to the plaintiff, and the suit could not go forward.” Hughes at 508, 762 A.2d at 344.
In reversing the panel’s decision, the high court established a two-part inquiry for this type of case:
First, this Court must determine whether appellee was engaged in the sport of downhill siding at the time of her injury. If that answer is affirmative, we must then determine whether the risk of being hit from behind by another skier while skiing towards the ski lift at the base of the slope is one of the “ inherent risks” of downhill skiing, ' which appellee must be deemed to have assumed under the Act. If so, then summary judgment was appropriate because, as a matter of law, appellee cannot recover for her injuries.
Id. at 510, 762 A.2d at 344.
The Hughes Court reiterated its opinion that the “no-duty” rule “in no way affect[s] the duty of ... sports facilities to protect patrons from foreseeably dangerous conditions not inherent in the amusement activity.” Id. at 509, 762 A.2d at 343-344 (quoting Jones, supra). Acknowledging that the possibility that one skier may collide with another at the base of a ski slope is a common risk of downhill skiing, the Court held that the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff from that inherent risk. Id.
Majority Opinion, at 6-8.
¶ 5 I also note that the Hughes Court observed that plaintiff “collided not with *107some alien or unexpected object in the sport, but with another downhill skier coming down the very same hill after her.” Id. at 344. The Court further equated such a risk as being “as much a part of the risk in downhill skiing, if not more so, than the snow and ice, elevation, contour, speed and weather conditions.” Id. In addition, I observe that, by voluntarily proceeding to encounter a known or obvious danger of collision with another skier, a person is deemed to have agreed to accept the risk and to undertake to look out for himself. Romeo v. Pittsburgh Assocs., 787 A.2d 1027 (Pa.Super.2001).
¶ 6 In Appellant’s case, the trial court stated the relevant procedural and factual history in its opinion as follows:
On January 10, 2002 Thomas H. Crews, the Plaintiff, was on the premises owned, operated, controlled and maintained by Defendant Seven Springs as a business invitee. Counsel for the Plaintiff admitted Mr. Crews was an experienced skier and knew that collisions are a part of the sport of downhill skiing. At approximately 6:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. on January 10, 2002 the Plaintiff was skiing down “Tyrol Slope”, a trail marked for skiers, when he was “violently, abruptly and without warning struck from behind and the side by John Doe I, who was using a snowboard.” At the time of the collision Plaintiff and unidentified other nearby witnesses smelled alcohol on the breath of Defendant John Doe I. As a result of the collision between John Doe I and Mr. Crews, the Plaintiff suffered various injuries which are or may be permanent and various financial losses and damages.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/03, at 2-3. The trial court granted Seven Springs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as follows:
We do not find there are any disputed issues of material facts. We have examined with care the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. We find the Plaintiff Thomas H. Crews entered into an exculpatory agreement with the Defendant Seven Springs that the risks of injuries are not the responsibility of Seven Springs Farm, Inc. and he voluntarily assumed the risk of those injuries. Therefore, we will grant the Motion of Seven .Springs for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/03, at 11.
¶ 7 Upon my review of the record, I would conclude that the trial court did not err in so ruling. In his complaint, Appellant alleges that on January 10, 2002, “Plaintiff and unidentified other nearby witnesses smelled alcohol on the breath of Defendant John Doe I.” Appellant’s Complaint at Paragraph 13. Appellant also alleges that there were beer bottles and other liquor bottles strewn on the slope and parking lot where the high school students congregated. Id. On the basis of these allegations, Appellant concludes that the snowboarder was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision.
¶ 8 My review of the record reflects that Appellant does not establish in the pleadings the identity of the snowboarder (ie., John Doe I). Thus, even assuming the truth of the allegations that underage high school students were drinking at the ski resort, Appellant failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to identify the snowboarder he collided with as being an underage high school consumer of alcoholic beverages. Thus, we are left with the fact that a collision occurred between two skiers (or a skier with a snowboarder 11) on a *108ski slope. By voluntarily proceeding to encounter a known or obvious danger of collision with a snowboarder, Appellant is deemed to have agreed to accept the risk and to undertake to look out for himself. Romeo; Hughes. I would conclude, therefore, that the risk of a collision between a skier and a snowboarder is subsumed within the Skier’s Responsibility Act and affords no relief to Appellant. Hughes, supra.
¶ 9 Even assuming the pleadings and inferences to mean that John Doe I was underage and-had been seen drinking, I would still conclude that Appellant assumed the risk. The risk at issue here is the risk of a collision with another person on the slopes. This is an inherent risk of skiing. Thus, I would conclude that Hughes controls.
¶ 10 Given our limited scope of review, I would conclude that the trial court properly determined that Seven Springs is entitled to judgment on the pleadings and would affirm the order of the trial court.12 Bensalem. For these reasons, I, thus, dissent.
. The majority perceives no significant difference between skiing and snowboarding for purposes of this analysis. Id. at n. 6. I agree.
. I also note that Appellant’s allegations concerning the consumption of beer would not be admissible in evidence and do not undermine his assumption of the risk because, in most cases, mere consumption of alcohol is inadmissible unless it reasonably establishes intoxication. To be admissible, courts first must address whether evidence of intoxication is sufficient enough to be considered in determining whether plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the defense of assumption of the risk. This Court has stated, "when recklessness or carelessness is at issue, proof of intoxication is relevant, but the mere fact of consuming alcohol is not admissible, being unfairly prejudicial, unless it reasonably establishes intoxication.” Cusatis v. Reichert, 267 Pa.Super. 247, 406 A.2d 787 (1979). In Billow v. Farmers Trust Co., 438 Pa. 514, 266 A.2d 92 (1970), the Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of proffered testimony of a doctor "who apparently would have stated that, in his opinion, a man with a blood alcohol content of .14 would be affected in his driving” because such testimony, by itself, "falls short of the requirement that the evidence show ‘a degree of intoxication which proves unfitness to drive.’ ” Id. at 93.
• Pennsylvania courts have indicated that something more than a "suggestion of intoxication” is necessary in order for evidence to be admissible. In Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa.Super. 569, 486 A.2d 410 (1984), there was corroborated testimony that a party had been drinking heavily' in the late afternoon and evening before an accident. Id. at 413. Furthermore, there was corroborated testimony that the party had a "strong odor of alcohol and slurred speech” after the accident. Id. The court‘stated that the evidence established “much more than a suggestion of intoxication.” Id. The court, therefore, concluded that the evidence of the party’s intoxication was properly admitted, and was not prejudicial. Id. See also, Burke v. Buck Hotel Inc., 742 A.2d 239 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). Here, the legal sufficiency of the pleadings is inadequate to support the cause of action. Whether this precedent is equally applicable when underage drinking is at issue need not be addressed herein.