Appellant Holt was charged in a two count indictment with armed robbery (D.C. Code §§ 22-2901, -3202 (1981)), and felony threats (D.C.Code § 22-2307 (1981)). After a jury trial, he was acquitted of armed robbery (and the lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon) but convicted of felony threats. He was sentenced pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act (18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (repealed 1984), to a term of imprisonment for up to six years. In this court he challenges his conviction for felony threats on the ground that an essential element of the offense, specific intent to extort, was not proven at trial. The government contends that under United States v. Young, 376 A.2d 809 (D.C. 1977), the statute — which carries a maximum twenty-year prison sentence — may be applied to anyone who threatens another with bodily injury, regardless of the existence of intent to extort. Appellant contends that this reading of the statute is in contravention to what has been called “compelling” legislative history.1 Further, it is also argued that such a reading not only produces absurd results but renders the statute unconstitutional as applied.2
Two discrete incidents formed the basis for the crimes charged in the indictment. The first incident occurred when the complainant was grabbed from behind by a man as she was locking her door to leave for work in the morning. A gun was placed to her head, and her assailant tried to take her pocketbook. After a brief scuffle the man ran away, dropping the pocketbook. These facts were developed as proof of the armed robbery and assault charges of which appellant was acquitted.
The second incident occurred later the same day. Complainant was retrieving some items from her car when she saw a man, who physically resembled her morning assailant, walking towards her. Without stopping, the man walked past her and said “I’m gonna get you, bitch.” These *159facts form the basis for appellant’s conviction under § 22-2307 — a conviction which appellant now challenges on the ground that the government failed to prove specific intent to extort.
The government responds by merely citing United States v. Young, supra, noting that the decision precludes consideration of the question of whether D.C.Code § 22-2307 only proscribes threats made with specific intent to extort. In that case, this court held that the “plain language” of § 22-23073 contained no such limitation and concluded therefore that the court could not consider legislative history and other indications of legislative intent to the contrary in interpreting the provision.
At the outset, we note that in Young, the question of whether § 22-2307 requires specific intent to extort was presented in a different context from that of the instant case. The issue in Young was whether the trial court had properly dismissed an indictment on insufficiency grounds. The defendant in Young claimed the indictment was ambiguous and insufficiently detailed, as it contained neither the actual words of the alleged threat nor charged that the threats were made knowingly and intentionally. He also pointed to the existence of a second statute (D.C.Code § 22-507) prohibiting supposedly identical conduct but providing vastly disparate punishment, arguing that this rendered the statute under which he was charged ambiguous. The trial court agreed, and after consideration of the legislative history and other indications that the statute was intended to prohibit threats to extort, dismissed the indictment. This court reversed, basing its holding on the “plain language” of § 22-2307.
In contrast, no question as to the sufficiency of the indictment is presented in the instant case. Instead, the question is whether § 22-2307, with its provision for up to twenty years in prison and a fine of up to five thousand dollars, was intended to punish the kind of threatening conduct that occurred here. Context, notwithstanding however, we are constrained by our holding in Young to affirm both conviction and sentencing. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971) (only en banc court may overrule a prior decision).
SO ORDERED.
. See United States v. Young, supra, 376 A.2d at 815 (Mack, J., dissenting).
. Appellant also contends that two remarks made by government witnesses during trial should have resulted in a mistrial. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial, especially in light of the cautionary instructions given to the jury.
. Section 22-2307 provides:
Whoever threatens within the District of Columbia to kidnap any person or to injure the person of another or physically damage the property of any person or of another person, in whole or in part, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.