dissenting:
Rule 15 of this court provides that “[rjeview of orders and decisions of an agency shall be obtained by filing with the clerk of this court a petition for review within thirty days after notice is given, in conformance with the rules or regulations of the agency_” D.C.App.R. 15(a) (emphasis added). The regulations of the Rental Housing Commission provide that a motion for reconsideration is automatically denied if not acted upon within fifteen (15) days. 14 DCMR § 3320.5 (1985). Today the majority holds that notice is given upon *1006the “expiration” of a fifteen (15) day period.
In my view, this holding represents an overly restrictive application of our own rule, and a simplistic embrace of agency language, language that is ambiguous at best. At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring “formal notice,” (see Jackson v. Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C.1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)),1 as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. Askin, supra, 521 A.2d at 675.
Without belaboring the point, “notice” is “notice”; in the legal sense, it may be “actual,” “constructive,” or “implied.” I do not think we would argue, nor would it be desirable for us, jurisdictionally speaking, to suggest that the notice required by our rule is other than actual. Moreover, even if we could accept as a fact that the regulation in question puts a party on notice and that this is the notice contemplated by our rule (which it is not), the “complex procedural history” of which the majority speaks (or more aptly the confusion and ambiguity in this record) would, and does, present a poor vehicle for refusing jurisdiction.
There is nothing wrong with automatic denial of motions as an administrative procedure. However, where appeal before this court is at issue, our rules should be, indeed must be, read so as to eliminate ambiguity — not only for our purposes of administrative ease in fixing finality, but also to avoid denying to a party adversely affected by an agency decision, his day in court. Before our jurisdictional clock begins to run, notice should be given. Jackson, supra.
I respectfully dissent.
. The majority holding would appear to pose a direct conflict with our holding in Jackson. There is no indication, whatsoever, in rulemak-ing history that the omission of the word "for-mar in the 1985 language was anything but stylistic. To hold, as does the majority, that our decision earlier lilis year (Jackson, supra) and our decision last year (Askin, supra) are irrelevant, is to say that we intended to make a substantive change in the rule.