Defendant Judy Welch appeals orders of the district court denying two motions to suppress evidence and two motions to dismiss. She was charged with concealing material facts in obtaining prescriptions for regulated drugs. 18 V.S.A. § 4223(a)(3) & (h). Defendant argues that her right to privacy was violated by a warrantless inspection of her prescription records at Rutland area pharmacies, that the investigation of her prescriptions for “doctor shopping” was tainted by confessions she made after signing an immunity agreement, and that she lacked the requisite mens rea for the alleged violations. We affirm.
I.
On October 5,1988, Judy Welch was working as a nurse at the Rutland Correctional Center (RCC). She was relieved at 2:30 p.m. by nurse Nancy McDonald, but before leaving for the day Welch went to a neighborhood pharmacy to pick up a prescription of Vicodan for an inmate. This was unusual because the pharmacy routinely delivered prescriptions. Later that after*74noon, McDonald discovered that the prescription contained ten Vicodan tablets instead of the twelve tablets indicated on the label, and that defendant’s prescription-log entry showed that “10-12” tablets had been ordered. This, too, was unusual because prescriptions are normally ordered in a definite, not an approximate, amount. Checking with the pharmacy, McDonald confirmed that the prescription had contained twelve tablets. Later in the evening, Welch called McDonald at the correctional facility and asked if “everything was all right,” an unusual call for her to make. McDonald reported these events, including the discrepancy in the pill count, to RCC Superintendent Michael O’Malley.
O’Malley, who knew that Welch had previously had a drug problem, met with her on October 7. At O’Malley’s behest, Welch telephoned McDonald after the meeting and admitted that she had taken the two tablets. O’Malley took no further action regarding the incident. In March 1989, however, an employee of RCC wrote to the state’s attorney alleging drug diversions from the RCC infirmary, and shortly thereafter, O’Malley received a letter from the state’s attorney inquiring about “potential drug abuse” at RCC. O’Malley assigned Assistant Superintendent Stewart Robinson to investigate the matter.
On April 3, Robinson interviewed defendant as part of the internal RCC investigation. Defendant read and signed a so-called Garrity warning, see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967), which informed her that any information or evidence she might provide could not be used against her in any criminal proceeding. She then admitted that she had taken the two Vicodan tablets from the prescription container in October. A summary of the internal RCC investigation was prepared on April 3.
As a result of the complaint to the state’s attorney, Trooper Steven Brown of the Vermont State Police Drug Task Force began an independent criminal investigation. On or about March 24, 1989, he interviewed nurse McDonald, who related the events of October 5 and told him of defendant’s admission that she had taken two Vicodan tablets. He also interviewed Robinson and O’Malley, who confirmed that defendant had admitted the Vicodan incident and had, in O’Malley’s words, “fallen off the wagon.” Brown already knew of defendant’s pre*75vious drug problem. During the course of his investigation, Brown reviewed pharmacy files at the RCC, but did not examine personnel records or other files related to RCC’s internal investigation. He attempted to interview defendant, but she refused and instead gave him a prepared statement that did not mention the October 1988 incident. After Brown concluded his investigation, the state’s attorney decided not to bring criminal charges against defendant for diversion of the two Vicodan tablets.
Lt. Gary Boutin, one of Brown’s supervisors, suggested a check of area pharmacies to see if defendant was “doctor shopping” — i.e., securing prescriptions for controlled substances from more than one practitioner. Brown called all the pharmacies in Rutland and obtained information on defendant’s prescriptions from four of them. He discovered that some of the prescriptions overlapped. He went to the pharmacies, obtained the original prescriptions, and then visited the practitioners involved. Three of them signed statements to the effect that defendant had not told them about existing prescriptions, a fact that would have been material to a decision to prescribe medication for her. In these interviews, Brown saw no patient files and sought only to verify the prescription evidence he already had. On the basis of this investigation, the State charged defendant with four counts of concealing a material fact in obtaining regulated substances.
II.
Defendant first contends that Trooper Brown violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution when he inspected her pharmacy records without a warrant. Defendant argues that she has a legitimate expectation of privacy in her pharmacy records because they are medical records and society recognizes the confidentiality of medical records. The State contends that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in prescription records that must be kept readily available, pursuant to Vermont law, for inspection by authorized officials. The trial court found that a privacy interest existed, but concluded that no search warrant was required because extensive federal and state regulatory schemes govern controlled *76substances and the records fell within the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (because owner of automobile junkyard, a closely regulated industry, has reduced expectation of privacy, Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for government search has lessened application). We discuss first whether defendant possesses a privacy interest in her pharmaceutical records.
A.
As we recently noted, the privacy right protected by both the Fourth Amendment1 and Article 112 is the right to be free from unreasonable government intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy. State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 6, 587 A.2d 988, 992 (1991). While this “core value,” id., is the same under both the United States and Vermont Constitutions, our Article 11 jurisprudence has diverged from the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 310, 576 A.2d 118, 120 (1990) (federal law “tends to derogate the central role of the judiciary in Article Eleven jurisprudence”); State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 487, 536 A.2d 902, 907 (1987) (in focusing away from judicial review and curtailing scope of protected right to be free from unlawful governmental conduct, federal test is incompatible with Article 11).
Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the items seized before the court will consider *77whether the search was unreasonable. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978). Defendant places particular emphasis on the Rakas criterion that the privacy interest must derive from “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Id. Defendant does not assert any property interest in the prescription records, but contends that prescription records are confidential medical records and that her legitimate expectation of privacy derives from society’s recognition of the privacy of such records.
Defendant may not have standing to assert her Fourth Amendment claim, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (limited official access to prescription records for dangerous drugs does not implicate patient’s privacy interests), but we need not decide that issue today. We reach the merits of defendant’s claim under Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution and find our analysis would be the same under either the federal or state constitutions.
In deciding whether defendant has standing to assert her privacy claim under Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution, we look at the objective relationship of the person to the place searched or items seized, as opposed to a subjective evaluation of the legitimacy of the person’s expectation of privacy. Wood, 148 Vt. at 489, 536 A.2d at 908; see also Kirchoff, 156 Vt. at 10, 587 A.2d at 994 (inquiry is objective — i.e., whether reasonable person should know occupant sought to exclude public). A defendant “need only assert a possessory, proprietary or participatory interest in the item seized or the area searched to establish standing to assert an Article Eleven challenge.” Wood, 148 Vt. at 489, 536 A.2d at 908. Here, defendant can claim no possessory or proprietary interest in the pharmacies or their records, and the term “participatory interest” is not defined in our cases; however, the dictionary defines the word “participate” as follows: “To receive or have a part or share of; to partake of; experience in common with others . . ..” Black’s Law Dictionary 1118 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has defined “participatory” to “connote[] some involvement in the underlying criminal conduct” that generated the seized evidence. State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 339-40, 554 A.2d *781315, 1321 (1989). It accorded standing to a defendant, whose gambling activities generated certain telephone toll calls, to challenge the seizure of records related to calls that were made from a codefendant’s hotel room. Id.
In the instant case, it was defendant whose illicit actions gave rise to the pharmaceutical records. Further, patients, including defendant, share with their pharmacists an expectation that information obtained in an inspection of their prescriptions will not be disclosed except in certain limited ways. 18 V.S.A. § 4211 (access to records barred to all but authorized officials, and no person having knowledge by virtue of his office of any such record shall divulge such knowledge, except in connection with a prosecution or licensing proceeding).
In so holding, we reject defendant’s claim that her privacy interest in the pharmacy records is predicated upon doctor-patient confidentiality. Neither the statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1612(a), nor the evidentiary rule, V.R.E. 503, includes pharmacists among the professionals covered by the patient’s privilege. The reason may be that the communications involved in pharmacy records are between a prescriber and a pharmacist, not between a prescriber and patient. But even if pharmacists were included, the rules of evidence exempt from privilege any report of a medical condition “required to be made by statute.” V.R.E. 503(d)(6). Under 18 V.S.A. § 4217, it is the duty of every doctor and hospital to report promptly to the board of health all cases wherein a person has been or is being treated for drug abuse. We are satisfied that there is no patient’s privilege available to defendant herein with respect to her pharmaceutical records. We agree instead with the trial court, that defendant does have a privacy interest that derives from her expectation that those records cannot be arbitrarily disclosed, and hold that she has standing to raise her claim under Article 11. We move now to a consideration of the merits of her claim.
B.
Under Article 11, a search requires a warrant and probable cause except in exceptional circumstances which make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. Berard, 154 Vt. at 310-11, 576 A.2d at 120-21. Article 11 does not *79contemplate an absolute prohibition on warrantless searches or seizures, but circumstances under which warrantless searches or seizures are permitted must be jealously and carefully drawn. State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 328, 532 A.2d 958, 960 (1986). Our analysis in the instant case involves two questions: first, whether the inspection of defendant’s prescription records was justified as an exception to the warrant requirement, and second, whether authority for a warrantless inspection may be used to gather criminal evidence regarding an individual’s prescription activity.
1.
The trial court adopted the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement and concluded that the warrantless inspection of prescriptions for controlled substances was reasonable. This exception to the warrant requirement has been applied to allow warrantless administrative inspections of businesses that are closely regulated by the government where such inspections are necessary for effective enforcement of the law. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 699-701, and cases cited therein. “[Wjhere the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 702. Warrantless inspections have been upheld in cases involving a liquor dealer, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970), a gun dealer, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972), a mining company, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605 (1981), and an automobile junkyard, Burger, 482 U.S. at 712. We believe the state’s interest in regulating pharmacies and controlling the illicit use of drugs is as great as that of the federal government in regulating the just-named industries. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 (state has “vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs”); Commonwealth v. Lipomi, 385 Mass. 370, 381, 432 N.E.2d 86, 93 (1982) (state interest in inspection of pharmacies is as urgent as federal regulatory interests in liquor and gun cases).
The “pervasively regulated industry” exception has been adopted in several states in litigation involving owners or pro*80prietors of pharmacies. See Mendez v. Arizona State Board of Pharmacy, 129 Ariz. 89, 91, 628 P.2d 972, 974 (1981); Hosto v. Brickell, 265 Ark. 147, 153, 577 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1979); Lipomi, 385 Mass, at 381, 432 N.E.2d at 93; State v. Rednor, 203 N.J. Super. 503, 508, 497 A.2d 544, 547 (1985); People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 222, 231, 350 N.Y.S.2d 74, 84 (Crim. Ct. 1973); Poindexter v. State, 545 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Federal courts have upheld inspections of pharmacy records on the less-than-probable-cause standard of an administrative warrant. See 21 U.S.C. § 880(d)(1) (probable cause to issue administrative inspection warrant is “valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this subchapter or regulations”); United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987) (literal reading of § 880 means all investigator had to show in order to secure administrative warrant was that drugstore handled controlled substances); United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137, 1141 (5th Cir. 1978) (“valid public interest” is constitutional standard for administrative warrant, even though less stringent than probable cause for criminal search).
Vermont has long required anyone selling potentially dangerous drugs, including narcotics, to keep accurate records. As early as 1904, the Legislature required that such records specify “the kind and quantity of the article sold, and the time when, and the name of the person to whom such sale is made, which record shall be open to all health officers, members of the state board of health and state officials who may wish to examine the same.” 1904, No. 143, § 13. In 1915, the Legislature required prescriptions for the use of narcotics. Records of their sale were to be kept for not less than two years, and to be “at all times open to inspection by [health officials and] police authorities and police officers of cities and towns.” 1915, No. 197, § 4. In 1945, the Legislature adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 1945, No. 113, which put into place many of the statutory provisions still in effect today, including the requirement that pertinent records be open to inspection by state and federal officials responsible for enforcing narcotics laws. Id. § 17. In short, the Legislature has consistently recognized the state’s interest in regulating the drug industry and that official access to prescription records is critical to effective drug enforcement. *81We conclude that Vermont’s pharmaceutical industry qualifies as a “pervasively regulated industry.”
Pronouncing an industry “pervasively regulated” will not alone validate a warrantless inspection. The United States Supreme Court has held that “[i]n the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.” Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315. In Burger, the Court upheld, against a Fourth Amendment challenge, New York’s regulation of the automobile junkyard industry, which allowed warrantless inspection of required records of automobile parts, because the statute satisfied three criteria necessary to make the inspections reasonable: (1) the state must have a substantial interest in regulating the industry, (2) regulation must reasonably serve the achievement of state interest, and (3) the statute must inform the industry that inspections will be made on a regular basis and must place appropriate restraints upon the discretion of the inspecting officers. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.3
Taking each Burger criterion in turn, we first find, as already stated, that the state has a substantial interest in the regulation of dangerous drugs. We conclude, second, that Vermont’s statute permitting authorized persons warrantless access to prescription records of controlled substances reasonably serves the achievement of that interest. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597 (New York central reporting system allowing authorized personnel to inspect without warrant the prescription records of users of Schedule II drugs “is manifestly the product of an orderly and rational legislative decision”). At present, chapter 84 of Title 18 regulates the possession and control of certain classes of drugs. 18 V.S.A. §§ 4201-4248. The department of public safety is charged with the duty of enforcing the drug laws of the state, id. § 4218(a); § 4218(b) gives its authorized *82agents access “at all times ... to all orders, prescriptions and records kept or maintained under [chapter 84].”4 Obtaining or attempting to obtain a regulated drug by fraud or deceit or by concealment of a material fact is prohibited under chapter 84. Id. § 4223. Recognizing the privacy interest of the individual, the Legislature has appropriately limited inspections to specifically authorized federal and state officers and prohibited disclosure of knowledge obtained during an inspection, except in connection with a criminal prosecution or licensing proceeding. See id. § 4211. Although § 4218 allows access “at all times,” no provision is made for warrantless entry of closed premises. It is a reasonable inference that the Legislature intended to authorize inspections only during normal business hours, and we have no reason to believe the Legislature intended otherwise. Vermont’s statutes differ from the New York scheme challenged in Whalen in that Vermont has no central reporting system and permits a broader group of personnel to inspect prescriptions. These differences, however, are differences in implementation and do not affect the reasonableness of warrantless inspection as a form of regulation.
In further discussion of the second criterion, the Burger Court held that the New York regulations of automobile junkyards permitting warrantless inspections were not only reasonable but were also necessary. The Court analogized the exigency facing the police in their inspection of the junkyard in Burger to that facing the investigators seeking to inspect a gun dealer’s storeroom in Biswell, namely, that in order for the deterrent function of the regulations to be effective, “‘unan*83nounced, even frequent, inspections are essential.’” Burger, 482 U.S. at 710 (quoting Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316). The need for authority to conduct warrantless inspections of pharmacy records arises from the same exigency. Indeed, federal law prohibits anyone from refusing to make, keep, or furnish records required to be kept under the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U. S.C. § 842(a)(5). Although it may be argued that the defendant in this case, a customer and not a pharmacist, was never in a position to alter or hide pharmacy records, this does not affect the need for official authority to inspect those records without a warrant. To hold otherwise would place investigators in the curious position of having to secure a warrant in order to examine records which it is unlawful for the pharmacist to refuse to provide. We address this question further in our discussion of the use of inspection authority in gathering criminal evidence, below.
With respect to the third Burger criterion, the Supreme Court stated that “the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. We believe the Vermont statutes perform these functions. Pharmacists may not dispense drugs without obtaining a license, 26 V. S.A. § 2042, and this necessarily implies knowledge of their record-keeping obligations. The Legislature has limited inspections to specifically authorized federal and state officers. 18 V.S.A. § 4211. It has also limited the scope of those inspections to required records and to enforcement of chapter 84 provisions only. Id.; see also Olson v. State, 287 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1973)(inspections and warrantless searches authorized under controlled substances regulations cannot be used to further investigations for violations of other chapters of Florida statutes). Thus, we are persuaded that the statutory scheme satisfies the three criteria deemed necessary in Burger to make warrantless inspections reasonable. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.
We therefore hold that the warrantless inspection of pharmacy records maintained under Title 18, chapter 84, is permissible, and agree with the trial court that the inspection un*84dertaken by Trooper Brown in this case conformed to statutory authority and was reasonable.
2.
Next, we consider whether a warrantless inspection may be used to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. Some jurisdictions have held that the exception to the warrant requirement applies only to routine administrative inspections, not to criminal investigations. See Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 440, 436 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1982); State v. Penn, 61 Ohio St. 3d 720, 726, 576 N.E.2d 790, 794 (1991). In Burger, the United States Supreme Court observed, however, that administrative regulations “may have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws,” 482 U.S. at 713, and that the inspecting officers in that case acted within their regulatory authority when they examined vehicle parts to ascertain if the vehicles had been stolen. Id. at 716; see also Nechy, 827 F.2d at 1167 (where inspection of pharmacy records was reasonable, and evidence of criminal violations was obtained, “the motives of the officers conducting it will not turn it into a violation of the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70, 74 (6th Cir. 1982) (administrative standard of probable cause sufficient for warrant even where inspection was in pursuit of criminal evidence); Rednor, 203 N.J. Super, at 509, 497 A.2d at 547, and cases cited therein (“In determining the constitutionality of a search, we concern ourselves with the propriety of the conduct, not the motivation of the searcher.”). In the instant case, Trooper Brown’s access was lawful, and we hold that his enforcement powers, which include enforcement of criminal violations of 18 V.S.A. § 4223, under which defendant herein was charged, allowed him to look at prescription records in furtherance of his investigation.
Finally, we address defendant’s claim that 12 V.S.A. § 1612(a) and V.R.E. 503 prohibited the prescribers in this case from disclosing any information to Trooper Brown when he interviewed them to verify the prescriptions. The trial court concluded that any information communicated to a prescriber by defendant was not privileged under 18 V.S.A. § 4223(b), which nullifies any privilege where the communication .is made in an attempt to obtain drugs illegally. Defendant argues that this is circular *85reasoning whereby the State may declare information non-privileged after it has already engaged in improper interviews in order to gather evidence of violations.
Interviews with prescribers are not dealt with in chapter 84. We agree that the trial court’s reasoning raises a circularity, but we do not concede that the interviews here were improper. Without deciding whether or not the information communicated to the prescribers and thence to Trooper Brown was privileged, we find that any error was harmless. At the time of the interviews, Brown already had in his possession prescriptions that indicated probable violations by defendant. He sought merely to verify that the prescriptions had indeed been written by each prescriber, and elicited from them the opinion that had they been aware of a concurrent prescription from another prescriber, their own prescribing decisions would have been affected. Of course, prescribers of dangerous drugs are themselves subject to regulatory provisions pursuant to chapter 84. See, e.g., 18 V.S.A. § 4210(a), (d) (physicians must keep records, subject to inspection by authorized federal and state officers, of all regulated drugs received, sold, administered, dispensed or professionally used); id. § 4217 (physicians must report all cases of drug abuse). If there was error here, it was harmless.
In sum, we hold that defendant cannot prevail in her challenge to the constitutionality of the warrantless inspection of her prescription records at the various pharmacies.
III.
Defendant next argues that Brown’s doctor-shopping investigation was prompted by knowledge of involuntary statements she made to RCC personnel in which she admitted taking the Vicodan tablets. Those admissions, she claims, tainted any evidence obtained by Brown, which therefore should have been suppressed. The trial court agreed that her statements were made under threat of being fired, and granted her motion to suppress the statements she made to Superintendent O’Malley on October 7,1988, those she made to nurse McDonald over the telephone on October 7, 1988, and those made to Assistant Superintendent Robinson at the interview on April 3, 1989. The *86court did not suppress evidence gathered by Brown at the Rut-land pharmacies, finding that his investigation had proceeded independently from the RCC investigation.
Under both the United States and the Vermont Constitutions, a confession must be voluntary in order to be used against a criminal defendant. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450-51, 450 A.2d 336,348 (1982). Statements made “under threat of removal from office,” like those defendant made in this case to O’Malley, McDonald, and Robinson, are involuntary. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Defendant’s statements were properly suppressed, therefore, and any evidence gathered as a product of those statements would be tainted. See Badger, 141 Vt. at 440-41, 450 A.2d at 342-43 (evidence that is the product of an initial illegality is tainted and should be suppressed unless purged of the taint). Further, if the State has used the product of coerced statements as a “springboard” to future proceedings, the State must demonstrate an independent source for its evidence. In re Hill, 149 Vt. 431, 439-40, 545 A.2d 1019, 1025 (1988); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (inquiry is whether the evidence objected to by defendant was obtained “‘by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint’”) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).
Brown’s inquiry began in March 1989 following a letter to the state’s attorney from an RCC employee. Brown learned of defendant’s admissions during his interview with McDonald on or about March 24, 1989, after defendant’s talk with O’Malley but before her talk on April 3 with Robinson when she signed the Garrity warning. Suppressed statements therefore mingled with independent observations by McDonald. The independent observations, however, indicated to a virtual certainty that Welch had taken the Vicodan tablets. Among these observations were defendant’s unusual behavior in personally retrieving the inmate’s prescription, the missing tablets, the range “10-12” noted in the medication log, and the call that evening from defendant asking if everything was all right. It was not necessary, therefore, for Brown to “exploit” the suppressed statements in order to build a case against defendant.
*87Defendant argues that Lt. Boutin’s suggestion to check the pharmacies was itself tainted by knowledge of defendant’s admissions, but the trial court found that Lt. Boutin suggested the pharmacy check because of his experience, his prior knowledge of defendant’s drug problem, and McDonald’s observations. The court found further that Brown declined the offer of O’Malley and Robinson to review RCC personnel files, its records, or its internal investigation materials, and the court concluded that the State’s case was not predicated upon the RCC internal investigation or upon any RCC records or personnel files. We agree that the record shows an independent basis for Brown’s inspection of the pharmacy records. Defendant’s motion was properly denied.
IY.
Defendant’s next claim is that the Garrity warning immunized her from prosecution based on her statements to Robinson on April 3. In addition, she argues that Robinson was acting on behalf of the State when he initiated the interview, and therefore, she is immune pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1664.
The rule in Garrity and defendant’s signature on the “Employee Warning” form foreclose the use of her statements or any evidence derived from those statements in subsequent criminal proceedings. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98. But defendant’s argument on this point is essentially a reworking of the “taint” argument, and is consequently meritless. We have held that the trial court’s finding of an independent source for the State’s case on the doctor-shopping charges is supported by the record. Immunity under Garrity is not implicated here.
Defendant also claims immunity under 12 V.S.A. § 1664. This statute grants authority to immunize individuals compelled to testify in court or grand jury proceedings who wish to invoke their right against self-incrimination. Their testimony, and any evidence derived directly or indirectly from it, cannot be used in subsequent criminal proceedings against them. Defendant asserts that the Corrections Department and the State are the same entity, because Brown needed no subpoena in order to see the prescription records at the RCC. She contends that Robinson was acting on behalf of the State when he provided defend*88ant with the Employee Warning. She concludes that she is, therefore, immunized under § 1664 and that the State must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that any proffered evidence was derived from sources totally independent of the compelled testimony.” 12 V.S.A. § 1664(a).
Defendant’s conclusion is groundless. Immunity applies only to those called to testify in a proceeding before or ancillary to a court or grand jury and who wish to invoke their rights against self-incrimination. The statute makes no reference to administrative proceedings. Id. Moreover, even if we were to find that the State and the Corrections Department are the same entity, Robinson had no statutory authority to grant immunity. That prerogative belongs solely to the presiding judge, at the request of the attorney general or state’s attorney. Id. § 1664(b), (c); see State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. 97,107, 499 A.2d 45, 52 (1985). Further, as we have previously noted, Brown possessed independently acquired information, separate and apart from any statements made by defendant, that justified the prosecution. We find no error in the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s immunity arguments.
V.
Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that she knowingly concealed a material fact when she obtained overlapping prescriptions for regulated drugs from different practitioners. The State does not dispute that 18 V.S.A. § 4223(a)(2) requires a “knowing” mens rea, but argues that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant concealed material facts by deliberately withholding information about her prescriptions. The trial court agreed.
Intent must often be inferred from what a person does, and proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 456, 554 A.2d 253, 255 (1988). The definition of “conceal” is “to hide, secrete, or withhold from the knowledge of others,” Black’s Law Dictionary 288 (6th ed. 1990), all of which connote intentional, knowing conduct. The trial court found that defendant was a trained nurse whose job at the RCC included dispensing drugs to inmates, and that the overlapping prescriptions from different dispensers all involved prescrip*89tions for the very same drug. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had concealed the material fact of a prior prescription and obtained drugs in violation of the law. We are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to support beyond a reasonable doubt the court’s conclusion that defendant had concealed material information.
Affirmed.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution states:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and ,. possessions, free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants, without oath or affirmation first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby by any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his, her or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.
The New York Court of Appeals, in a split decision, recently ruled, however, that the statute at issue in Burger violates the New York Constitution’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures because (1) the essential element of pervasive governmental supervision is lacking, and (2) the statute fails to set forth appropriate guidelines or restrictions for warrantless searches. New York v. Keta, 60 U.S.L.W. 2656 (April 2, 1992).
Other sections of chapter 84 also require that drug records and prescriptions be kept readily available for inspection: 18 V.S.A. § 4210(d) (records of authorized sale or dispensing of drugs to be kept for three years “subject to inspection by a federal officer or an officer of this state . . . engaged in the enforcement of the federal drug laws or of this chapter”); § 4211 (prescriptions and records “shall be open for inspection only to federal or state officers”); § 4218(c) (each party to transaction of sale by duly licensed manufacturer of regulated drugs to keep record for three years “in such a way as to be readily accessible for inspection”); § 4215(a) (pharmacist shall keep record of prescriptions, with full name and address of patient, for period of three years, “so as to be readily accessible for inspection by a federal or state officer... engaged in the enforcement of the federal drug laws or of this chapter.”).