dissenting.
The majority holds that even after a guilty plea has been accepted by a court following a determination that a factual basis exists therefor, the court may subsequently reject the guilty plea sua sponte because of information contained in a pre-sentence report. Because I believe this is contrary to the terms of 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 109 and 110, I must respectfully dissent from this part of the majority’s decision.
On the evening of December 6, 1990, the appellant, Agustín Rosario, and his sister, Nancy Rosario, met Maurice Scott, a gentleman of seventy years, at Stanley’s Cafe, a bar in Lancaster County. After Scott had purchased several drinks for appellant and his sister, he agreed to meet them later that evening at Nancy Rosario’s apartment. When appellant and his sister returned to the sister’s apartment, Nancy boasted that she had been “getting over” on a man she had just met at *270a bar. When Scott arrived later that evening, he was met by appellant; appellant’s sister; appellant’s brother, Edwardo; James Adams; and James Rice. The group consumed a six pack of beer which Scott had purchased, and later the Rosarios were able to persuade Scott to give them additional money to buy a second six pack of beer. When a request was later made for additional moneys, however, Scott refused. Shortly thereafter, he fell asleep on a couch.
The Rosarios then began to speak together in Spanish so that Adams and Rice, who did not speak Spanish, were not able to understand what was being said. Adams and Rice were told to go into the bedroom, and the door was closed. While in the bedroom, they heard strange noises, and when the door was opened a few inches, they saw Nancy Rosario hitting Scott on the head. Before they could see more, the door was abruptly pulled shut. A few minutes later, however, appellant entered the bedroom and said, “I never did anything like this before.” After appellant returned to the living room, Edwardo entered the bedroom and told Adams and Rice that Nancy was stabbing Scott with a knife. Adams and Rice then left the bedroom and saw Nancy Rosario repeatedly stab Scott in the chest. They said that when Scott attempted to struggle, he was restrained by Edwardo Rosario. While this occurred, appellant stood nearby and watched. Adams and Rice then fled. After' they had gone, according to other evidence, the Rosarios removed Scott’s dead body and cleaned the apartment. Scott’s body was found the following morning in his car, which was standing in an alley behind Stanley’s Cafe. Scott’s wallet was empty.
The police investigation quickly turned toward Nancy Rosario’s apartment. On the afternoon of December 7, 1990, appellant agreed to accompany a state trooper to the local police station for questioning. There, he denied that Scott had ever been in his sister’s apartment. After being arrested later the same evening, however, he gave a statement implicating his sister and denying his own involvement.
Appellant was subsequently charged with murder and criminal conspiracy. Prior to trial, however, the Commonwealth *271caused the information to be amended by adding an additional count which charged appellant with hindering apprehension or prosecution in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5105(a)(3). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant then entered a plea of guilty to hindering apprehension or prosecution, and the charges of murder and conspiracy were to be nol pressed.
At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecuting attorney represented to the court that a factual basis for the guilty plea existed as follows:
Yes, Your Honor, on the morning of December 7th, 1990, at 324 Front Street, apartment three, in Marietta, Pennsylvania, Nancy Rosario, that’s the resident — Nancy Rosario, the sister of these two defendants — approximately one to two o’clock in the morning killed an individual by the name of Maurice Scott by stabbing him multiple times in the body.
The role of these two defendants, who happened to be visiting her at that particular time, their [sic] being residents of the City of Lancaster, were [sic] that they helped dispose of his body after he was killed.
Appellant did not state agreement or disagreement with these facts, and the trial court, as the record unequivocally discloses, accepted appellant’s guilty plea. When the trial court subsequently reviewed a pre-sentence report, however, the court learned that there was evidence from which it might be inferred that appellant had been part of a conspiracy to rob the victim at the time of his death.1 On this basis the trial court sua sponte withdrew its acceptance of appellant’s guilty plea. It said there was not a factual basis for the guilty plea even though it had previously found that a factual basis existed. The court directed that appellant be tried on all counts of the information.
Appellant’s counsel did not assert the bar of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, and appellant was tried and found guilty of murder of the second degree and criminal conspiracy. On direct appeal, he is represented by new counsel who argues that trial counsel *272was ineffective for failing to raise the defense of Section 110 of the Crimes Code.2
In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course chosen by counsel did not have a reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests; and (3) counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced appellant. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 534 Pa. 488, 496, 633 A.2d 1100, 1104 (1993); Commonwealth v. Williams, 532 Pa. 265, 274, 615 A.2d 716, 720 (1992); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242, 250, 615 A.2d 704, 708 (1992).
Section 110 of the Crimes Code, most accurately described as a compulsory joinder provision, “bars a subsequent prosecution for violation of a different statutory provision if the defendant has already been either acquitted or convicted of another offense which arose from the same criminal episode.” Commonwealth v. Bellezza, 412 Pa.Super. 469, 474, 603 A.2d 1031, 1034 (1992). See also: Commonwealth v. Kresge, 317 Pa.Super. 405, 410, 464 A.2d 384, 388 (1983). Section 109 defines a conviction to include a “guilty plea that has been accepted by the court.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 109(3) (emphasis added). Appellant contends that since his guilty plea had been unequivocally accepted by the trial court, he had been convicted under Section 109; and, according to Section 110, he could not be prosecuted thereafter on other charges arising from the same criminal episode.
Nancy Rosario, the sister of appellant, entered a plea of guilty to murder of the third degree. After accepting the guilty plea, however, the court changed its mind and rejected the plea under circumstances similar to those in the instant case. The trial court then denied a motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy and Section 110 of the Crimes Code. On appeal, a panel of the Superior Court affirmed. See: Commonwealth v. [Nancy] Rosario, 418 Pa.Super. 196, 613 A.2d 1244 (1992). The Superior Court held that a trial *273court can always withdraw, prior to sentencing, its acceptance of a plea of guilty. In interpreting Section 109 of the Crimes Code, the Court said that the acceptance of a plea of guilty by a court continues only “[s]o long as it stands and is capable of supporting a judgment [of sentence].” Id. at 205, 613 A.2d at 1249, quoting Model Penal Code, § 1.09, Comment. Section 109, the Court concluded, does not “speak to the power of the court to strike a plea of guilty before sentence.” Commonwealth v. [Nancy] Rosario, supra. The Supreme Court, however, has granted allocatur and already has heard argument. See: Commonwealth v. [Nancy] Rosario, 535 Pa. 646, 633 A.2d 151 (1993). A decision is expected shortly.
The Nancy Rosario case is in conflict with another decision of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Kotz, 411 Pa.Super. 319, 601 A.2d 811 (1992). In Kotz, another panel of the Superior Court held that a trial court could not sua sponte, prior to sentencing, vacate a plea of guilty which the court had already accepted. The Court said: “Absent [ ] an application/motion by the defendant, a guilty plea, which is spoken of in terms of a verdict of guilty, may not be removed by a trial court sua sponte.” Id. at 326, 601 A.2d at 815.
Appellant argues that the Nancy Rosario case is also in conflict with the decision of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Branch, 417 Pa.Super. 571, 612 A.2d 1085 (1992). In Branch, however, the trial court had not accepted the plea of guilty but had deferred its decision to accept or not accept the plea bargain until after a pre-sentence investigation had been completed. The Superior Court held that, under such circumstances, the trial court could subsequently reject the defendant’s guilty plea without violating principles of double jeopardy. Factually, therefore, the decisions in Branch and Rosario are distinguishable. They are also distinguishable in that the Branch court’s decision was based on principles of double jeopardy. That court did not consider the statutory language contained in Sections 109 and 110 of the Crimes Code. But see: Commonwealth v. Branch, supra at 579-581, 612 A.2d at 1089-1090 (Concurring Opinion by Johnson, J.).
*274Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the lines of reasoning followed by the Rosario and Branch courts are at variance. Despite the express language of section 109 that a conviction includes “a guilty plea that has been accepted by the court,” the Rosario court held that there can be no conviction for purposes of applying Section 110 until there has been a judgment of sentence. The Branch court, however, followed decisions holding that if a plea of guilty has been entered and accepted by the trial court, there is a final determination of guilt and jeopardy has attached. “Rejecting a guilty plea after acceptance and setting the case for trial constitutes double jeopardy.” 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 223 at p. 271. See: United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.1983) (double jeopardy violated where, after accepting guilty plea, court rejected plea solely on information in presentence report); United States v. Hecht, 638 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir.1981) (double jeopardy violated where, after accepting guilty plea, court vacated plea after concluding erroneously there was no factual basis for it).
In my judgment, the reasoning of the Kotz and Branch courts is more in keeping with Sections 109 and 110 of the Crimes Code. It is also in accord with the federal decisions which have found double jeopardy violations where a court, after accepting a plea of guilty, has later rejected the plea sua sponte. See: United States v. Cruz, supra; United States v. Hecht, supra.
These cases recognize, however, that “ ‘even if jeopardy attaches at the time of acceptance of the plea, it does not attach irrevocably and may be released if there is manifest necessity.’ ” Commonwealth v. Branch, supra, 417 Pa.Super. at 577, 612 A.2d at 1088, quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 223. Similarly, for purposes of interpreting 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 109 and 110, an acceptance of a plea of guilty is not irrevocable and may be withdrawn in cases of manifest necessity.
Here, however, there is no such manifest necessity. It may be, as the trial court has suggested, that it was misled by the factual basis presented prior to its acceptance of appellant’s *275plea of guilty to hindering prosecution. If there was any misrepresentation of the facts, however, that misrepresentation was made by the prosecuting attorney. The record is clear that neither the defendant nor his counsel contributed to any misrepresentation of the facts. Throughout the subsequent trial, moreover, it was always the position of the defendant that he had not participated in the killing and that his only offense had been in helping his sister conceal the body after Scott had been killed.
Contrary to the majority’s view, I find no conflict between Sections 109 and 110 of the Crimes Code and Pa.R.Crim.P. 320. All can be read in pari materia. See: Lohmiller v. Weidenbaugh, 503 Pa. 329, 332, 469 A.2d 578, 580 (1983) (where an act of the general assembly and a rule of procedure relate to the same subject, they must be read in pari materia so as to give effect to both). Should there be a conflict, however, the plain meaning of the substantive rule must be given preference over the procedural rule. See: Shapiro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 286, 210 A.2d 890, 895 (1965) (Supreme Court will not construe procedural rule in way which would contradict an express statute on the same subject). See also: Marquez v. Hahnemann Med. College & Hosp. of Phila., 56 Pa.Commw. 188, 194, 424 A.2d 975, 978 (1981) (procedural rules were not intended to change substantive rights). This is particularly so where the substantive rule is based on constitutional principles of double jeopardy. See: Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 64, 436 A.2d 147, 153 (1981) (In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court’s rule making authority is limited by the Constitution so that procedural rules may not interfere with substantive rights).
Section 109 of the Crimes Code provides that a conviction occurred when appellant’s plea of guilty to hindering prosecution was accepted by the court. Section 110 of the Crimes Code provides that following a conviction for hindering prosecution, appellant could not thereafter be prosecuted for any other offenses arising out of the same criminal episode. Fundamental principles of statutory construction prevent a court from disregarding the clear and plain meaning of a statute. *276Gutman v. Worldwide Ins. Co., 428 Pa.Super. 309, 313, 630 A.2d 1263, 1265 (1993). See also: Hanley and Bird v. Commonwealth, 139 Pa.Commw. 563, 572, 590 A.2d 1382, 1388 (1991) (statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning where words are unambiguous). Moreover, the decision in Kotz holds and the decision in Branch implies by dictum that the trial court could not sua sponte withdraw its acceptance of appellant’s guilty plea and require him to stand trial on additional charges arising from the same criminal episode.
When the trial court withdrew its acceptance of appellant’s guilty plea and ordered a trial, appellant’s trial counsel objected on double jeopardy grounds but did not assert as a bar thereto the provisions of Section 110 of the Crimes Code. In post-trial motions, counsel also asserted that a violation of double jeopardy had occurred as a result of the court’s order. The bar of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, however, was not raised until the instant -appeal. It is perhaps difficult to believe that trial counsel could have had any reasonable basis calculated to serve his client’s interests for faffing to assert the bar of Section 110 of the Crimes Code. However, there has been no evidentiary hearing; and, therefore, counsel has not had an opportunity to offer an explanation for his conduct. Under these circumstances, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine appellant’s contention that trial counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective.3
Cavanaugh, McEwen and Kelly, JJ. joined.. There was also a public outcry regarding appellant’s being allowed to plead to a lesser offense.
. Trial counsel had argued that appellant’s trial violated principles of double jeopardy. This argument, however, was decided against appellant and is not now pursued on appeal.
. I agree with the majority that there is no merit in appellant’s remaining contentions.