dissenting.
I respectfully dissent' from the majority’s reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s order denying workmen compensation benefits to appellant. Appellant executed a final receipt under *331the Workmen’s Compensation Act (the Act),1 an action which serves as prima facie evidence of the termination of an employer’s obligation to pay compensation for injuries sustained by an employee under Section 434 of the Act.
Section 434 further provides that a final receipt may be set aside if it can be shown that the relevant disabling injury had not, in fact, terminated when the final receipt was executed and if the petition to set aside the final receipt is filed within three years. Here, even if one were to conclude that appellant’s present injury arose from his previous injuries and, therefore, that his previous injury had not terminated, his petition to set aside the final receipt filed on January 24, 1990 was not timely since it was filed beyond the three year requirement of the statute.
Since the petition to set aside the final receipt was not timely filed, appellant is required to demonstrate that he is entitled to compensation for an injury attributable to aggravation of a pre-existing condition upon proof that he suffered such injury in the course of and related to his employment. Porochniak v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Container Corporation of America), 67 Pa.Commw. 368, 372, 447 A.2d 346, 348 (1982). This, appellant was unable to do.
Appellant’s own medical expert, Dr. .Christopher G. Lynch, testified on appellant’s behalf that his present injury was an extension of his chronic back problems but he never unequivocally established a causal connection between appellant’s present disability and his alleged work-related injury. In fact, Dr. Lynch testified just the opposite. Dr. Lynch examined appellant on the day before appellant’s alleged injury of June 29, 1989. Dr. Wolfe’s notes recorded that appellant told him on June 28, 1989, that his condition was the result of performing routine chores around the house two days earlier and that he had been experiencing severe back pains since that time. Appellant did not at that time indicate that he had hurt his back. at school during his employment since that alleged disability incident had yet to occur.
*332Appellant submitted medical records showing that he was hospitalized on July 3, 1989 at the Allentown Lehigh Valley Hospital Center. Upon admission, Dr. Lynch recorded that appellant had developed increasing low back pain “two weeks ago” following routine work around his home. R.R. at 35a. The hospital therapist included in her initial evaluation that appellant told her that his back problem resulted from pulling a rug off his deck. R.R. at 36a.
Despite the above evidence offered by appellant’s own expert witness and presumably disinterested hospital personnel, appellant testified that his injury took place, conveniently enough, at work on June 29, 1989, while he was moving boxes of files and tools. This allegation was corroborated by testimony from appellant’s co-worker.
In light of the above, the Commonwealth Court reversed the referee and the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board which had granted appellant’s petition for benefits. The majority opinion correctly states that this Court’s scope of review in workmen’s compensation matters is limited to determining whether there has been a violation of constitutional rights, errors of law committed, violations of Appeal Board procedures or whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. St. Joe Container Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Staroschuck), 534 Pa. 347, 351 n. 3, 633 A.2d 128, 130 n. 3 (1993). Generally, the appellate court’s role in these matters is not to reweigh evidence or to review the credibility of witnesses. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Skirpan), 531 Pa. 287, 292, 612 A.2d 434, 437 (1992). However, even though credibility determinations are within the exclusive province of the referee, findings of fact can be overturned if they are arbitrary and capricious. Id.
Accordingly, the referee’s decision in this matter is clearly arbitrary and capricious in face of irrefuted evidence that appellant’s injury did not occur in the course of his employment. In order to find in favor of the appellant, the referee below had to totally ignore the testimony and depositions of unbiased witnesses to whom appellant gave contemporaneous *333statements that his injury occurred in his home while doing routine chores. Most tellingly, the referee had to ignore appellant’s own medical expert and his notes taken the day before the alleged injury.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial in nature and is intended to benefit workers. This Court has in the past liberally construed the Act in order to effectuate its humanitarian objectives. Peterson v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (PRN Nursing Agency), 528 Pa. 279, 287, 597 A.2d 1116, 1120 (1991). However, workmen’s compensation should not be construed as a general disability insurance policy that covers household accidents and injuries. The majority opinion does this.
I would affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court in this matter.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, 77 P.S. §§ 1 et seq.