(dissenting). Today the majority provides some measure of relief to appellants for loss of their appeal as of right and takes steps to prevent similar losses to future litigants. It does this by giving the present appellants twenty-one days to file an application with the Court of Appeals seeking leave to appeal.
Also, it amends MCR 7.203(A)(1) to cross-reference MCR 7.202(7)’s definition of final judgment and amends MCR 7.204(A) to cross-reference MCR 7.203(A). In this way future litigants will be put on notice that an appeal of right must be filed (1) within twenty-one days of a final judgment or a final order or (2) within twenty-one days of entry of the last order denying a postjudgment motion filed within the initial twenty-one-day period.
However, the defense attorney in this case reasonably and in good faith relied upon published decisions of the Court of Appeals. These cases were not expressly overruled when this Court amended MCR 7.202(7)’s definition of “final judgment.” Furthermore, the relevant court rules, before our amendments today, were not a model of clarity. The defense attorney lost his clients’ appeal as of right, may also be denied on appeal by leave, and may be hable for malpractice as a result. This Court contributed to the attorney’s confusion, and the attorney should not be required to suffer because of it.
As to future litigants, although the cross-referencing could prevent the loss of an appeal in a case similar to the instant case, another harsh result *292lurks within the court rules. The “one final judgment principle” adopted by this Court in its October 19, 1995, amendment of MCR 7.202 can effectively cut off a litigant’s appeal as of right from a default judgment.
Some default judgments are entered because the defendants do not receive actual notice of the action in time to file an answer. If such defendants also receive no notice of the default judgment until more than twenty-one days after entry of the order, the court rules deny them an appeal as of right. Certainly, they may seek leave to appeal. Nonetheless, the “one final judgment principle” has an especially harsh effect in the context of default judgments.
I believe this situation constitutes a denial of access to the court system, and, as such, should not be condoned. The Court should release for public comment and hearing a proposed amendment of MCR 7.203(A). The amendment should provide for an appeal as of right from an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment. It should be available where the defaulted party did not make an appearance before entry of the judgment.
Although the actions of the present appellants were in error, they were reasonable. They were based on published case law that had not been expressly overruled and an understandable confusion regarding the effects of MCR 7.202(7)’s amendment. I disagree that as a result of their reasonable actions the defendants should lose their appeal as of right, especially since they may yet be denied an appeal by leave. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand as on leave granted.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J. *293Corrigan, J., took no part in the decision of this case.