concurring and dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority here. I would not remand this case to the trial court with instructions that it reassess delay damages in accordance with new rule 238 for reasons more fully expressed in my dissenting opinion in Ceresini v. Valley View Trailer Park, 380 Pa.Super. 416, 552 A.2d 258 (1988) (en banc) (Cirillo, P.J., dissenting). I would remand with instructions that the court determine delay damages pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitative Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986), as explicated by that court’s promulgation of new rule 238. See Miller v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 381 Pa.Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443 (1989) (en banc) (Cirillo, P.J., dissenting). As I stated in my dissent in Miller, “[e]ven though the delay damages determination was made using an improper standard, the determination was made, and the issue resolved.” Miller, 381 Pa.Super. at 244, 553 A.2d at 447.
I do, however, agree with Judge Brosky’s discussion of the proper method by which to apportion delay damages among multiple defendants. I therefore concur in that portion of his majority opinion which deals with the issue of apportionment.