dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County on the able opinion of President Judge Dale F. Shughart who, in pertinent part, said
The plaintiffs contend 1) that the No-fault Act applies to the accident because under the language of the act Fleagle was a “victim” 2) that Fleagle is entitled to basic no-fault benefits from his insurance company, West American, and is not precluded from such recovery by operation of an exclusion within the West American policy and 3) that PMA Insurance Co. as the workmen’s compensation carrier has no right of subrogation against Erie Insurance Exchange. By answer the Fleagles request similar findings.
Defendant West American Insurance Co. contends 1) that the No-Fault Act does not apply to the accident because under the terms of the Act Fleagle was not a “victim” intended to be covered by the provisions of the Act and 2) that if no-fault applies Erie Insurance Exchange is on the risk as a result of an exclusion within the West American policy which exempts from coverage injury to a person resulting from the conduct of a business of servicing automobiles unless the injury occurs off the business premises. Defendants PMA Insurance Co. and L. B. Smith, Inc. did not file answers.
Briefs have been submitted; argument was heard, and the matter is ready for disposition. No cases dealing with the precise issue presented here have been submitted to us, and our research has not discovered a case on point.
*318Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 of November 25,1970, as amended, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. (pkt. part, 1978-1979), provides that the object of construction is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. The policy of the legislature regarding the No-fault Act is found within the Act:
[p]urposes.—[therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.
40 P.S. § 1009.101(b) (emphasis added).
To be eligible for no-fault benefits Fleagle must be a “victim” of a motor vehicle accident. “ ‘Victim’ means an individual who suffers injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” 40 P.S. § 1009.103 (emphasis added). Crucial to establishing the identity of a victim under the Act is the definition of “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” which means:
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, or alighting from it. Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle does not include; (A) conduct within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles unless the conduct occurs off the business premises;
40 P.S. § 1009.103 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the wording of the statute, the plaintiffs argue that “conduct” must be interpreted to mean conduct involved with the maintenance or use of the injuring vehicle. Through interpolation the plaintiffs contend that the statute should read “[maintenance or use of a motor vehicle does not include: (A) conduct [involving the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle] within the course of the business of repairing ...” The impact of such an interpolation would be that unless the injured party was actually working on a motor vehicle at the time *319of the accident or there was direct conduct in relation to the injuring vehicle, the no-fault exclusion for business conduct would not apply. As support for their interpolation the plaintiffs argue that Fleagle was a pedestrian when he was hit and his presence on the parking lot was totally extraneous to the operation of the business.
Unless the language of a statute is unclear, the statute should be followed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. While the No-fault Act is not a model of clarity, the business exclusion within the maintenance or use definition is clear. “Conduct with the course of a business of repairing or servicing a motor vehicle” applies to just such a situation as presented by the facts in the case at bar. Fleagle was crossing the parking lot of his employer to retrieve a vehicle to drive into the garage to work on it. His conduct was clearly furthering the business of L. B. Smith, Inc. of servicing automobiles. Epler v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163 (1978); Baker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 143, 362 A.2d 1150 (1976). His conduct was within that contemplated by the business exclusion to no-fault application as enunciated in § 1009.-103 of the No-fault Act. Limiting Fleagle’s conduct to times when he was physically working on a vehicle for purposes of applying the exclusion, as plaintiffs urge, would contradict the express language of the statute.
Tort liability has been partially abolished by the No-fault Act which provides in relevant part:
[pjartial abolition.—[t]ort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place in this State in accordance with the provisions of this act if such injury arises out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
40 P.S. § 1009.301(a) (emphasis added).
The partial abolition of tort liability and the six saving sections which follow the main statement in § 1009.301 do not apply to the instant case because the facts as here presented invoke the business exclusion in the definition of “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle”. Because Fleagle does not fall within the definition of “victim”, the *320provisions of the No-fault Act are not applicable. He retains his right of action to recover on a theory of tort liability.
We are not unmindful of the fact that if Fleagle simply had been a pedestrian not within the employ of L. B. Smith, Inc. and not acting within the course of the business of repairing vehicles at the time of the accident, the result here would be different. The business exclusion to the maintenance or use definition is relevant in establishing whether a “victim” is entitled to no-fault benefits. It creates two classes of individual, those with tort remedies and those with no-fault remedies. Singer v. Shephard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
The right of subrogation of L. B. Smith, Inc. and so PMA Insurance Co. as the workmen’s compensation carrier remains because the provisions of the No-fault Act are not controlling here. Section 671 of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act of December 5, 1974, as amended, 77 Pa.C.S. § 1 et seq. (pkt. part, 1978-1979), provides for the right of subrogation.