(concurring). A circuit court's power to determine fees for court-appointed counsel is of major concern to circuit courts, attorneys, county boards and the people of the state, who ultimately must pay the fees. Unfortunately, the majority opinion interpreting rules this court adopted adds confusion rather than clarity to this issue. I write in the hope that the Judicial Council (the proponent of Chapter 81, Supreme Court Rules, in 1979), the State Bar of Wisconsin (the proponent of the 1988 amendment to *19SCR 81.02) and the Law Revision Committee, sec. 13.83 (1), Stats. 1987-88, will study this question and seek clarification of the circuit courts' power to fix attorney fees either by petitioning this court for amendment of Chapter 81 of the Supreme Court Rules or by seeking legislative change.
The majority opinion sets forth three holdings: (1) SCR 81.01 (1988) does not apply to this case. Majority opinion at 10. (2) SCR 81.02 (1988) applies to this case and establishes a mandatory schedule for attorney fees. Majority opinion at 13. (3) Despite the mandatory nature of SCR 81.02 (1988), the circuit court may fix higher attorney fees in this case "to accommodate the constitutional requirement that an indigent defendant be afforded counsel in a criminal prosecution." Majority opinion at 14.
I concur in the mandate. I conclude, however, that SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) apply to this case and that these rules are directory.
The effect of the majority's holdings is problematic. By expressly separating SCR 81.01 (1988) and SCR 81.02 (1988), the majority opinion interprets Chapter 81 of the Supreme Court Rules as creating two rules for fixing the fees of court appointed counsel — one rule for cases governed by SCR 81.01 (1988) and another rule for cases governed by SCR 81.02 (1988).
Does the majority opinion mean to say that a court's power to determine fees for court-appointed counsel is different under SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988)? Does the majority opinion mean that SCR 81.01 (1988) is, as precedent indicates, directory? Or does the majority opinion mean that precedent is being overturned and that fees fixed under SCR 81.01 (1988) must follow the mandatory fee schedule of SCR 81.02 (1988)?
*20Moreover, under the majority's interpretation of SCR 81.02 (1988), may the circuit court ever reduce the hourly fees in order to fix a total reasonable compensation? One would think not when the majority insists that SCR 81.02 (1988) is mandatory. Nevertheless the majority opinion hints that the court retains the power under SCR 81.02 (1988) to review the total compensation reached by multiplying the fee by the reasonable number of hours and reduce it where necessary. Unfortunately the majority's treatment of these basic issues is sure to raise questions when the bench and bar must adhere to these rules every day in the courtrooms of the state.
I address each of the majority's holdings separately.
The parties, the circuit court, and I conclude that both SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) are applicable to this case. The majority opinion holds that SCR 81.01 (1988) is inapplicable and that SCR 81.01 (1988) applies only when a statute fixes a fee; no statute fixes a fee in this case.
The majority opinion's attempt to sever SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) is not justified. The language of SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) makes clear that these two provisions set forth one rule to guide courts in fixing fees for all court appointed counsel.
Supreme Court Rule 81.01 (1988) explicitly refers to and incorporates the rate schedule in SCR 81.02 (1988). SCR 81.01 (1988) states that the circuit court "shall fix the amount of [attorney's] compensation for the services and provide for repayment of disbursements in such sum as the supreme court has specified in SCR 81.02 ." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 *21(1988) are intertwined; they cannot be separated. As this court said in Romasko v. City of Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 2d 32, 41, 321 N.W.2d 123 (1982), SCR 81.01 (1988) "makes applicable the compensation schedule in SCR 81.02." Contrary to the majority's assertion, this case supports reading SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) together and applying both to all court appointed counsel. By not applying SCR 81.01 (1988) in this case, the majority opinion undercuts our opinion in Romasko.
Moreover, the drafting history of Chapter 81 confirms that SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) are to be read together. Memorandum and drafting notes to both rules demonstrate that SCR 81.02 (1988), in conjunction with SCR 81.02 (1988), was to apply to all cases, regardless of whether a statute fixed a fee. See discussion pp. 27-28 infra.
The majority holds that in cases in which SCR 81.02 (1988) applies, the fee schedule is mandatory. Thus the appointing court may not fix attorney fees at higher or lower amounts than the 81.02 (1988) schedule provides. It rests this holding on the rule's use of the word "shall" in SCR 81.02 (1988) and its conclusory statement that interpreting SCR 81.02 (1988) as mandatory does not "produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court." SCR 99.01 (14) (1988).1
*22I conclude that interpreting SCR 81.02 (1988) as mandatory produces a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court.2 The manifest intent of the court, as I shall demonstrate below, is that these rules are directory.
Moreover, the majority's holding that SCR 81.02 (1988) is mandatory necessarily means that SCR 81.01 (1988), which also uses the word "shall" and refers to and incorporates SCR 81.02's (1988) fee schedule, is also mandatory. The internal reference between the two rules means that any interpretation of one rule dictates the interpretation a reader must place on the second rule. Supreme Court Rules 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) are either both mandatory or both directory; one rule cannot be mandatory and the other directory.
It is precisely this result, the mandatory gloss on SCR 81.01 (1988) which necessarily follows from the *23majority holding that SCR 81.02 (1988) is mandatory, that is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court. Interpreting SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) as mandatory contradicts the drafting history of these rules, raises serious issues of judicial usurpation of legislative power and of creating a confrontation of constitutional magnitude between the legislature and this court, and contradicts In Matter of Estate of Trotalli, 123 Wis. 2d 340, 358-59, 366 N.W.2d 879 (1985).
Drafting history. The legislature has fixed attorney fees of court-appointed counsel since at least 1862, 117 years before the adoption of Chapter 81 of the Supreme Court Rules.3 Sec. 757.49, adopted as sec. 256.49 in 1957 to make all the statutory attorney fee provisions uniform, provided that the appointing court "shall... fix the amount of [the attorney's] compensation for the services ... as the court shall deem proper, and which compensation shall be such as if customarily charged by attorneys in this state for comparable services."4 Our *24court declared that sec. 757.49 "authorized the appointing court to fix a fee which would be fair and reasonable for the services reasonably necessary under the circumstances." Conway v. Sauk County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 603, 120 N.W.2d 671 (1963).
Section 757.49 allows the appointing court to fix reasonable fees; it is directory. Our court has, over the years, repeatedly interpreted and applied sec. 757.49 to determine the fees of court appointed attorneys and construed the statute as not "requiring the application of the full minimum rates of the State Bar of Wisconsin." State v. Kenney, 24 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 128 N.W.2d 450 *25(1964).5
In 1979 the supreme court "repealed" sec. 757.49, Stats. 1979-80, replacing it with SCR 81.01 that the court characterized as an "equivalent provision."
The supreme court adopted the precursor of SCR 81.02 in 1978 as a rule for compensating counsel, without any discussion of the relation between it and sec. 757.49. This rule was revised and numbered SCR 81.02 in 1979.6
*26In adopting SCR 81.01, the supreme court revised sec. 757.49 by replacing the words "in such sum as the court shall deem proper, and which compensation shall be such as is customarily charged by attorneys in this state for comparable services" with the words "in such sum as the Supreme Court has specified in SCR 81.02." The drafting notes state that SCR 81.01 was derived from sec. 757.49 "and was redrafted to be reconciled with SCR 81.02." The goal was to have SCR 81.01 and 81.02 apply to all cases regardless of whether a statute fixed a fee. See Judicial Council Committee Note — 1979, in West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, ch. 81, p. 332 (Special Pamphlet 1989), p. 811. See also Memo from Bruce Feustel, Senior Legislative Attorney, LRB-Rule 91/4, 2/9/79, in the drafting material on SCR ch. 81 at the Office of the Judicial Council, Madison, Wis.
*27The supreme court characterized SCR 81.01 as "an equivalent provision" to sec. 757.49. See court order dated December 11, 1979, in West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated (Special Pamphlet 1989), pp. 1-2. See also sec. 757.49, West's Wis. Stats. Annot., p. 379 (1981).
By characterizing SCR 81.01 as the equivalent to sec. 757.49, the court manifested its intent that SCR 81.01 is to be directory.
Constitutional issue. When the court adopted chapter 81 it recognized that it had to make supreme court rules "equivalent" to sec. 757.49, Stats. 1977, because the court has no power analogous to the legislature's to repeal a legislatively enacted statute.
I know of no authority in Wisconsin recognizing this court's power to repeal a statute or to repeal a statute by reformulating it as a Supreme Court Rule.
The court has recognized that it does not have the power to repeal a statute even when it holds the statute unconstitutional in a case in which the issue of constitutionality is briefed and argued. Even after this court's declaration of unconstitutionality, the statute remains on the statute book as a statute. If the court later changes its mind and holds that a statute previously declared unconstitutional is really constitutional after all, the statute is in full force and effect if the legislature has not repealed or amended it. See State v. Field, 118 Wis. 2d 269, 274, 347 N.W.2d 365 (1984) (the court declared a statute unconstitutional in 1974; it then declared the statute constitutional in 1984; the legislature had not amended or repealed the statute between 1974 and 1984; the court declared the statute to have been in full force and effect from 1974 through 1984).
The court does not have the power to repeal a statute by reformulating it as a rule. The court cannot rely *28on sec. 751.12, Stats. 1987-88,7 as authority to repeal sec. 757.49 and enact a contrary provision as a rule. First, sec. 751.12 providing for the supreme court's promulgating rules regulating pleading, practice and procedure expressly provides that statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure "may be modified or suspended" by supreme court rules adopted under sec. 751.12. But sec. 751.12 does not permit the supreme court to repeal a statute by a rule.
Second, even if sec. 751.12 permitted the supreme court to adopt a rule that repeals a statute, SCR 81.01 *29and 81.02 were not rules adopted by the court pursuant to sec. 751.12. The court expressly stated that SCR 81.01 and 81.02 were adopted as Supreme Court Rules. This court recognizes that important differences exist between rules adopted under sec. 751.12 and the Supreme Court Rules. See court order dated December 11,1979, in West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated (Special Pamphlet 1989), p. 1; SCR 98.01 (3); sec. 751.12, Stats. 1987-88.
The majority's interpretation creates a conflict between the statute and the Supreme Court Rules. The majority opinion has in effect repealed a legislatively enacted statute permitting courts to fix reasonable fees for court-appointed counsel and replaced it with a significantly different Supreme Court Rule that mandates a fee schedule. Had the majority opinion interpreted SCR 81.01 (1988) and SCR 81.02 (1988) as directory, as I urge, the effect would be that the court rules are the same as sec. 757.49 and the statutory enactment would not be affected. The majority opinion thus raises a significant constitutional question of judicial usurpation of legislative powers and creates a confrontation of constitutional magnitude between the legislature and this court. An interpretation of chapter 81 raising these constitutional questions is, in my opinion, contrary to the manifest intent of this court. I do not think the court intended SCR chapter 81 to create these constitutional issues.
Trotalli. Furthermore the interpretation of SCR 81.02 (1988) as mandatory, and by necessity SCR 81.01 (1988) as mandatory, produces a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court demonstrated in In Matter of Estate of Trotalli, 123 Wis. 2d 340, 358-59, 366 N.W.2d 879 (1985). In Trotalli, we held that the circuit court may be justified in reducing the com*30pensation of an appointed guardian ad litem to a sum less than that produced by multiplying the reasonable number of hours spent on the case by the hourly fee set forth in SCR 81.02 (1988). When the court held that the total compensation for a court-appointed counsel may be reduced, it in effect permitted the circuit court to reduce the hourly rate. The Trotalli case teaches that SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) give the circuit court discretion in fixing fees for court appointed counsel.
In addition, reading SCR 81.02 (1988) as mandating an hourly rate of compensation unduly interferes with the appointing court's inherent power and responsibility to appoint counsel to assure the integrity of the judicial process. The circuit court concluded that to provide efficient and fair justice in a timely manner to satisfy the necessities of this case, it should appoint counsel at rates higher than those set in SCR 81.02 (1988). Because the circumstances vary from case to case and the circuit court has the responsibility and power to secure representation, Contempt in State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987), the supreme court obviously intended SCR 81.02 to be directory, leaving the decision regarding the hourly rate needed to secure counsel for the case to the discretion of the appointing court.
Finally, if SCR 81.02 (1988) is mandatory, as the majority opinion holds, it follows that the circuit court cannot reduce the total compensation after the circuit court determines at the beginning of the case what the hourly fee is and determines each month that the number of hours submitted by the attorney in his or her monthly bill is reasonable. The majority recognizes the difficulty with this chain of reasoning: prohibiting a court from fixing reasonable fees at the end of a case is inconsistent with the rule ordinarily stated in our attorney compensation cases that at the end of the case a *31court has the power to determine the reasonableness of the total fee under the totality of the circumstances.
The majority opinion states that "under 81.01 and 81.02 a court is not permitted to set the total amount of compensation counsel is to receive before any services have been rendered." Majority opinion at 14. Why should the majority opinion speak about SCR 81.01 when the majority opinion has concluded that SCR 81.01 (1988) does not apply to this case? Is the majority suggesting that the circuit court has the same power under SCR 81.02 (1988) that it possesses under SCR 81.01 (1988), namely the power at the end of the case to evaluate the reasonableness of the total compensation to be paid court-appointed counsel? If so, then SCR 81.02 is not mandatory, as the majority holds. The majority does not explain this internal inconsistency in the opinion.
For the reasons set forth I conclude that interpreting SCR 81.02 (1988) as mandatory produces a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court.
hH H-l h-1
Even if I were to agree with the majority opinion's interpretation of SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988), and I do not, the record does not justify the majority's holding that the circuit court could fix fees in excess of the mandatory SCR 81.02 (1988) fee schedule in this case in order to ensure the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. The court would have to remand the case to the circuit court to take evidence and make appropriate findings.
The majority opinion reasons that the circuit court properly acted to "accommodate the constitutional *32requirement that an indigent defendant be afforded counsel in a criminal prosecution." Majority opinion at 14. The record offers no evidence or court determination that the defendant was indigent or unable to find counsel at the rates set forth in SCR 81.02 (1988).
To the contrary, the defendant was found not indigent by the state public defender's office. When the circuit court attempted to investigate the defendant's alleged indigency, the defendant failed to disclose any financial information and refused to authorize the public defender's office to release his financial statements. Indi-gency is a question of fact and the burden of proof of indigency is on the defendant. State v. Buelow, 122 Wis. 2d 465, 364 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1984). The defendant did not meet his burden in this case.
The county expressly challenges the claim that the defendant was unable to obtain counsel at the rates set forth in SCR 81.02 (1988). Nothing on the record justifies the circuit court's decision to set a rate in excess of the fee schedule in SCR 81.02 in order to entice counsel to take the case. The only evidence in the record that supports the contention that the defendant could not obtain counsel is his unsupported statement. The circuit court made no attempt to verify the defendant's assertion or help him procure counsel.
The majority opinion states that the circuit court made the appointment of counsel pursuant to its "constitutional obligation to provide counsel, at county expense, to an indigent accused of a crime." Majority opinion at 14. According to its order, however, thé circuit court did not appoint counsel to satisfy the constitutional rights of the defendant. The circuit court expressly relied on its inherent power to appoint counsel for the proper administration of justice, specifically citing Contempt in State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 403 *33N.W.2d 438 (1987), in its order appointing counsel. In Lehman, the circuit court appointed stand-by counsel for. an indigent defendant who waived counsel and wanted to represent himself. This court concluded that the circuit court's power to appoint counsel in the Lehman case was not tied to any constitutional right of the defendant but "was based, as it should be, on a determination that the needs of the Trial Court, and not the defendant would be best served by doing so." 137 Wis. 2d at 77.
The record supports the county's stipulation in the case at bar that "the decision to appoint counsel in this case was based upon a determination that the needs of the trial court, not the defendant, would be best served by doing so." Stipulation, majority op. at 8, note 7.
Given this record and the absence of a finding or evidence of indigency or of a finding or evidence of inability to find counsel at the rates set forth in SCR 81.02,1 conclude that there is no support for the majority's assertion that the circuit court appointed counsel at higher rates in order to accommodate the defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
Each month the circuit court in this case determined that the number of hours submitted by Attorney Hayes-Brook in her monthly bill was reasonable, and the County Board has not disputed this determination. The board argues only that the circuit court had no authority to fix hourly rates of compensation higher than those set in SCR 81.02 (1988). The County Board has raised a legitimate and reasonable concern on behalf of its citizens.
I conclude that the only interpretation of SCR 81.01 (1988) and 81.02 (1988) that comports with the language of the rules, the drafting history, the case law and this court's constitutional powers is that the circuit court js *34authorized to set reasonable attorney fees in each case and that the fee schedule in SCR 81.02 (1988) is a guideline for reasonable fees.
For the reasons set forth herein, I concur in the mandate of the court but I do not join in the opinion.
The general rule, oft-stated in the cases, is that the word "shall" is presumed mandatory when it appears in a legislative enactment. A second rule, also oft-stated in the cases, is that the word "shall" is construed as directory if necessary to carry out the clear intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm., 82 Wis. 2d 585, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 *22(1978); Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331, 340, 288 N.W.2d 779 (1980); and State v. Hervey, 113 Wis. 2d 634, 642, 335 N.W.2d 607 (1983).
These two rules are applicable to the interpretation of the Supreme Court Rules. They are embodied in SCR 99.01 (14), which provides that the word "shall" as used in the Supreme Court Rules means "the action is mandatory" unless this construction "would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court."
To determine whether the legislature intends the word "shall" to be construed as mandatory this court examines such factors as the history of the provision, the evil to be remedied and the general object sought to be accomplished, and the consequences resulting from alternative interpretations. State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 207, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976); Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm., supra, 82 Wis. 2d at 572. These factors are helpful to determine whether a construction of SCR 81.01 and 81.02 as mandatory would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court.
1862 Wis. Laws ch. 80, fixed the county's liability for fees to counsel to defend indigent criminals to the amount the appointing court certifies as "reasonable compensation therefore" "and which sum shall in no case exceed fifteen dollars per day for each day actually occupied in such trial or proceeding."
SCR 81.01 is the culmination of legislative and judicial efforts to establish guidelines for compensation for court-appointed counsel. The genesis of SCR 81.01 is sec. 256.49, Stats. 1957, later renumbered sec. 757.49, Stats. 1979-80. Sec. 256.49 provided, inter alia, that compensation for court-appointed attorneys shall be set by the appointing court in the amount customarily charged by attorneys in this state for comparable services.
Sec. 256.49. Compensation of attorneys appointed by court. Notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes, in all cases where the statutes fix a fee and provide for the payment of expenses of an attorney to be appointed by the court to perform certain designated duties, the court appointing the attorney shall, *24after the services of the attorney have been performed and the disbursements incurred, fix the amount of his compensation for the services and provide for the repayment of disbursements in such sum as the court shall deem proper, and which compensation shall be such as if customarily charged by attorneys in this state for comparable services.
Section 256.49 was enacted in 1957 at the request of Philip Haberman, Executive Director of the State Bar of Wisconsin. Apparently the objective of the proponents of sec. 256.49 and the legislature in adopting sec. 256.49 was to replace the conglomeration of statutory provisions governing compensation to court-appointed counsel with one statute authorizing the appointing court to fix compensation that would be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
Prior to the enactment of sec. 256.49, there were numerous statutes relating to compensation of court-appointed counsel. Some statutes authorized the trial court to order reasonable compensation for appointed counsel. See, e.g., sec. 48.25(6), Stats. 1955. Other statutes authorized the trial court to order reasonable compensation but set maximum fees which were not to be exceeded. See, e.g., sec. 12.25, Stats. 1955.
The maximum fees set by the legislature became outdated. Sec. 256.49 replaced these varied provisions with a standard for the determination of the value of legal services, namely, the customary charge by attorneys in Wisconsin for comparable services.
In cases applying sec. 757.49 and determining the customary charge for comparable services, this court referred to the minimum fee schedule promulgated by the State Bar of Wisconsin as evidence of reasonable and customary charges for services. The court concluded, however, that because of the certainty of payment by the county and the lawyers' obligation to see that justice is done in our criminal courts, the rates in the fee schedule should be reduced by about one third to reach the reasonable and customary charges to be paid to court-appointed attorneys. See, e.g., Conway v. Sauk County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 604-606, 120 N.W.2d 671 (1963); State v. Kenney, 24 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 128 N.W.2d 450 (1964); State v. DeKeyser, 29 Wis. 2d 132, 138-39, 138 N.W.2d 129 (1965); State v. Sidney, 66 Wis. 2d 602, 609-610, 225 N.W.2d 438 (1975).
On May 19,1978, in response to the petition of the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), the supreme court adopted a rule that would become the foundation of SCR 81.02. The petition sought to increase the compensation for counsel appointed by this court to represent BAPR in attorney discipline cases. Without explanation the supreme court adopted an apparently broader rule regulating hourly compensation for specified attorneys (not limited to attorneys for BAPR). The relation between this rule and sec. 757.49 was apparently not examined. See the file on this rule in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, State Capitol, Madison, Wis. The rule stated:
[A]ttomeys appointed by the Supreme Court, to provide legal services for the Supreme Court, judges sued in their official capacity, indigents, and boards, commissions and committees appointed by *26the Supreme Court are entitled to be compensated at the following rates:
(a) Court time — $50 per hour
(b) Office time — $35 per hour
(c) Travel time — $25 per hour.
Both sec. 256.49 (the forerunner to SCR 81.01) and the 1978 Supreme Court Rule (the forerunner to SCR 81.02) were revised in 1979 on petition of the Judicial Council.
The Judicial Council recommended that the 1978 Supreme Court Rule regarding attorney fees be amended and numbered SCR 81.02. The council interpreted the 1978 Supreme Court Rule as governing only compensation paid to attorneys appointed by the supreme court and recommended that the rule be amended to apply also to compensation paid to attorneys appointed by the court of appeals and trial courts of record. The recommendation was adopted as SCR 81.02. See Judicial Council Committee Notes — 1979, in West's Wisconsin Court Rules and Procedure, ch. 81 (1988), p. 811. The drafting history of SCR 81.02 demonstrates that SCR 81.01 and 81.02 are to be read together and as directory.
Sec. 751.12, Stats. 1987-88, reads as follows:
751.12 Rules of pleading and practice. The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. The effective dates for all rules adopted by the court shall be January 1 or July 1. A rule shall not become effective until 60 days after its adoption. All such rules shall be printed by the state printer and paid for out of the state treasury, and the court shall direct the rules to be distributed as it deems proper. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure may be modified or suspended by rules promulgated under this section. No rule modifying or suspending such statutes may be adopted until the court has held a public hearing with reference to the rule. Notice of public hearings shall be given by publication of a class 3 notice, under ch. 985, the expense of the publication to be paid out of the state treasury. Notice shall also be given in an official publication of the state bar of Wisconsin, the notice to be published not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of hearing. The state bar of Wisconsin shall not charge the state treasury for publication of this notice. Proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be set forth in full in the notice. This section shall not abridge the right of the legislature to enact, modify or repeal statutes or rules relating to pleading, practice or procedure. The judicial council shall act in an advisory capacity to assist the court in performing its duties under this section.