(concurring specially).
I agree that the park provision (Act of April 28, 1988, ch. 686, art. 1, § 26, 1988 Minn.Laws 1199-1200) is not a special law and does not impermissibly contain more than one subject as prohibited by Minn. Const, art. 4, § 17, which provides: “Sec. 17. Laws to embrace only one subject. No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.”
Chapter 686, an omnibus appropriations bill, was crafted and passed pursuant to Rule 2.02, Joint Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives, Official Directory of the Minnesota Legislature 270-71 (1987-1988), which provides in part:
[T]he Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House shall report to their respective houses, unless directed by concurrent resolution to report different appropriation bills, eight separate appropriation bills as follows:
*156(a) A bill appropriating money for the general administrative and judicial expenses of the State government for the succeeding two fiscal years including salaries, office expenses and supplies and other necessary expenses connected therewith;
(b) A bill covering all appropriations relating to public welfare, health and corrections for the support and maintenance of all State penal and charitable institutions, and other institutions of the State except educational for the two succeeding fiscal years;
(c) A bill appropriating money for the support and maintenance of all State educational institutions for the two succeeding fiscal years;
(d) A bill covering all appropriations providing for the payment of claims against the State of Minnesota which may have been allowed by the Finance Committee of the Senate or the Appropriations Committee of the House;
(e) A bill covering all appropriations made for semi-state activities;
(f) A bill covering all appropriations for construction and major rehabilitation of public buildings to be financed by issuance of bonds;
(g) A bill covering all appropriations for maintenance, repair, and minor rehabilitation and construction of public buildings; and
(h) A bill covering appropriations for the department of transportation. No other appropriations shall be contained in any of said bills but all other appropriations shall be contained in separate bills.
This rule provides for eight major omnibus appropriation bills for the succeeding biennium. These major appropriation measures have been provided by joint rule or practice since statehood, varying in number as the needs of the state have grown in complexity. At one time the rule read “shall report to their respective houses three separate bills” and was changed in 1939 to read “six separate bills.” In 1971 the rule was changed to read “eight separate appropriation bills,” the provision that exists today.
In recent years other omnibus non-appropriation measures on substantive areas of the law have also been enacted. This trend of lumping numerous individually introduced measures into one all-encompassing measure has lessened paperwork and improved legislative procedural efficiency. While salutary in purpose, vices of logrolling and tradeoffs are possible. As recently as 1986, the legislature was alerted to the possible violation of article 4, section 17 by Justices Yetka and Simonett’s special concurrence in State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 784-85 (Minn.1986), which involved a provision in an appropriation bill. Since statehood this court has invalidated legislation under this constitutional provision in only two cases: State v. Women’s & Children’s Hosp., 143 Minn. 137, 138-39, 173 N.W. 402, 402 (1919), and Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515,-(Gil. 392, 404) (1866), but neither involved appropriation bills.
It is evident by the opinions of the justices in this matter that the court is increasingly concerned about the possibilities of future violations of article 4, section 17. I have written separately because of the chaos that could result if an omnibus appropriation bill was declared invalid. Appellants argued before the trial court and before us that severability of the challenged provision would suffice. In view of the court’s holding and views today, that issue need not be decided now. I do point out that the constitutional provision says “[n]o law shall embrace more than one subject” and a likely possibility exists that if an improper provision is included in a major appropriation law the entire law could fall. This approach clearly would be a greater deterrent to risking a constitutional violation than severing only a challenged provision — because the latter approach would then permit the legislature “to take a chance” since the entire law would not fall.
Here the title of chapter 686 is long and reads in part:
An act relating to the organization and operation of state government; appropri*157ating money for the general legislative, judicial, and administrative expenses of state government; providing for the transfer of certain money in the state treasury; fixing and limiting fees; authorizing suburban Hennepin regional park district to acquire land for Lake Minnetonka regional park without local consent; * * *.
It complies with Rule 2.021 and the thread binding its provisions as a single subject is broadly labeled in the first two clauses. Additionally, the legislative history does not indicate logrolling; it did pass the House in that body’s appropriation bill, and was retained in conference deliberations in the final measure adopted by the House and Senate.
The views of the justices expressed today should be considered as instructive, alerting a co-equal branch of government, the legislature, to our concerns. In past eases this court has given a liberal construction and deferred to the legislature’s classification of the single subject requirement. See, e.g., Wass v. Anderson, 312 Minn. 394, 252 N.W.2d 131, 137 (1977); Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 576-78, 50 N.W. 923, 924 (1891). Anyone challenging the constitutionality of a law has an extraordinary burden of persuasion in order to overcome the general presumption of constitutional validity. See McGuire v. C & L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Minn.1984).
. While the legislature "may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints,” United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5, 12 S.Ct. 507, 509, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892), failure of the legislature to conform to its procedural rules, such as Rule 2.02, "will not impair the validity of a statute.” Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure § 24(1) (1989).