concurring:
While I agree with the majority’s determination that a juvenile has the right to effective counsel and that, in this case, counsel’s stewardship was not deficient, I do so reluctantly.
To be sure, a juvenile, during the adjudicatory stages of a delinquency proceeding, is entitled to nearly the full panoply of due process safeguards accorded adult criminal defendants. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970), aff'd 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6337; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6338; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). However, juveniles do not have an absolute right to all constitutional safeguards developed to protect adults accused of crimes. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); Commonwealth v. Durham, 255 Pa.Super. 539, 389 A.2d 108 (1978) (juvenile defendant not entitled to a jury trial).
The separate juvenile system was specifically created to provide for the treatment and rehabilitation of children and not for their punishment or confinement. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. In the past, juvenile court proceedings were considered mere civil inquiries to determine children’s need for treatment, reformation and rehabilitation by the Commonwealth which acted as parens patriae. Janet D. v. Carros, *70240 Pa.Super. 291, 362 A.2d 1060 (1976). And, although the child’s procedural rights have been greatly expanded by the Supreme Court of the United States, the notions that the purpose of the juvenile system is to treat and rehabilitate the child and that the Commonwealth proceeds as parens patriae remain. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16, 87 S.Ct. at 1437; Janet D. v. Carros, 240 Pa.Super. 291, 362 A.2d at 1072-1073.
My concern is that, as the juvenile system becomes essentially identical to the criminal system, it evolves into an adversarial system, and the very qualities for which it was created — “every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention” — will be lost forever. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 551, 91 S.Ct. at 1989. The Commonwealth is no longer the parens patriae, but now, through the adoption of adult criminal procedures, it is quickly becoming only a prosecutor. As our Supreme Court stated in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, “[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.” 403 U.S. at 552, 91 S.Ct. at 1989. Thus, I write separately to express my “disillusionment” and concern for our ever increasing departure from the original meritorious reasons for the creation of the independent juvenile system.