concurring and dissenting.
I join in the result reached by the majority in affirming the order of August 28, 1987 committing Brandon Smith to the Glen Mills School. I dissent from so much of the majority opinion as declares that the ineffectiveness standard employed in review of adult criminal cases is applicable in juvenile matters. I also dissent from so much of the majority opinion as declares that post-adjudication motions are a means by which allegations of ineffectiveness may be brought before the juvenile hearing court.
*71The Honorable James J. Buckingham found seventeen year-old Brandon Smith delinquent on and guilty of the charges of aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, possessing an instrument of crime and violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. On July 21, 1986, Perry Stewart had stepped outside his residence to investigate a disturbance. As a group of people came running towards Stewart’s front door, Smith raised and aimed a gun towards one of the running persons. Smith shot Stewart in the calf of his right leg, causing an injury that resulted in two-and-one-half weeks of hospitalization, treatment with leg pins for five months and that left Stewart still on crutches at the adjudication hearing held eight months later. Following the delinquency adjudication, Smith was committed to Glen Mills School.
The majority relies upon two premises in support of its conclusion that the concept of ineffective assistance of counsel can be interposed in juvenile proceedings. First, a juvenile’s right to due process cannot be adequately reviewed unless the quality of representation by the juvenile’s attorney is directly examined. Second, the right to counsel necessarily involves a right to effective assistance of counsel which, in turn, can be reviewed applying the same standard developed and utilized in criminal proceedings. I disagree with both premises.
There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. The problem lies in ascertaining the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436-1437, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 538 (1967). The Supreme Court has stated clearly that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57, 87 S.Ct. at 1445-1459, 18 L.Ed.2d at 548-563 (notice of charges, right to counsel, confrontation, self-incrimination, and cross-examination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); *72Breed, v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (double jeopardy).
The Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (no right to jury trial).
It is certainly true that the Juvenile Act contains an express provision regarding the right to counsel:
§ 6337. Right to counsel
Except as otherwise provided under this chapter a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding under this chapter and if he [or she] is without financial resources or otherwise unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel for him [or her] ... If the interests of two or more parties may conflict, separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6337. There is nothing in the statutory provision which embraces the doctrine of effective assistance of counsel. I find no support in our caselaw for an enlargement of the statutory grant at this time.
The majority asserts that we have already found the “right to effective assistance of counsel where questions of paternity are involved.” I must respectfully disagree. In Corra v. Coll, 305 Pa.Super. 179, 451 A.2d 480 (1982), we did nothing more than hold that appointed counsel was mandated in paternity proceedings where future loss of liberty might result. The Corra panel had no occasion to consider, or review, the effectiveness of counsel. It is true that a panel of this court, in Banks v. Randle, 337 Pa.Super. 197, 486 A.2d 974 (1984), stated: “It is axiomatic that the right to the assistance of counsel means the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 337 Pa.Super. at 202, 486 A.2d at 977. However, the only cases cited in support of that axiom by the Banks panel were cases involving criminal defendants. Within the context of the paternity trial facing the Banks panel, I believe it was error for the court to rely upon the practice in criminal proceedings to equate *73assistance of counsel with effective assistance of counsel. The subsequent acceptance of the ruling set forth in Banks v. Randle by the panel in Kitrell v. Dakota, 373 Pa.Super. 66, 540 A.2d 301 (1988) did nothing to establish or strengthen the reasoning behind the rule. I continue to believe that Banks v. Randle and its progeny require re-examination.
Nor can I agree with the majority that “in light of the development of the law relating to the right to effective representation by counsel, the possible effect of the divergent sources of the right to counsel ... has become a distinction without a difference.” Majority slip opinion, page 5. Our former president judge, the Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth was correct when he observed that a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel is based on the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment. In re DelSignore, 249 Pa.Super. 149, 154-155, 375 A.2d 803, 806 (1977). Judge Spaeth went on to state:
A child’s constitutional rights in a juvenile proceeding are based entirely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment____ Thus, the standard for determining whether the right to counsel has been denied may be different depending on whether the defendant is a criminal defendant or a juvenile.
Id.
The majority seemingly places great weight on In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. 152, 454 A.2d 1008 (1982) in concluding that there no longer exists a criminal/civil dichotomy in matters of effective representation. I view that case as an exception which proves that the right to effective assistance does not follow automatically, but rather is applied in non-criminal cases only as necessary to assure adherence to the concept of due process.
In Hutchinson, our supreme court was required to balance the competing interests of the Commonwealth and of the individual in a civil commitment context. The court recognized that involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill persons constitutes deprivation of liberty and may be ac*74complished only in accordance with due process protections. In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. at 156, 454 A.2d at 1010. Mr. Justice McDermott, speaking for the court, found that certain testimony of the examining psychiatrist was clearly hearsay, and such evidence was crucial in establishing whether the respondent presented a clear and present danger to others under the Mental Health Procedures Act.
Although the court used the failure of respondent’s counsel to object to this hearsay testimony as evidence of counsel’s ineffectiveness, the court could have reached the same result of remanding for a new hearing by applying a straight due process analysis. The involuntary commitment of a respondent based solely on the hearsay testimony of a single witness would be constitutionally prohibited without any regard to counsel’s conduct. In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. at 159, n. 8, 454 A.2d at 1011-1012, n. 8; Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.Super. 155, 173-174, 339 A.2d 764, 773-774 (1975). The individual’s interest compels the conclusion that the exclusion of hearsay testimony is fundamental to the respondent’s receiving a fair trial. Id.
Moreover, the seriousness of the deprivation of liberty and the consequences which follow an adjudication of mental illness make imperative strict adherence to the rules of evidence generally applicable to other proceedings in which an individual’s liberty is at jeopardy. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp 1078, 1103 (E.D.Wis., 1972), vacated and remanded for more specific injunction sub.nom., Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). I therefore view In re Hutchinson as a case dealing directly with the denial of due process although unfortunately couched in terms of the so-called ineffective assistance of counsel.
In addition, I view the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix as instructive on the difficulties which can arise when one seeks to overlay a criminal process standard on a civil proceeding such as the court faced in In re Hutchinson. In recognizing the clear differ*75ence between a criminal case and an involuntary civil commitment proceeding, Mr. Justice Nix observed that “the best interest of the client in [civil commitment mental health] cases is not necessarily served by striving to seek the client’s release.” In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. at 159, 454 A.2d at 1012. Mr. Justice Nix’s concern is addressed to the second prong of the three-prong ineffectiveness test, namely, whether the particular course chosen by counsel had any reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interest. Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 3, 559 A.2d 504, 505 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bruner, 388 Pa.Super. 82, 104, 564 A.2d 1277, 1287 (1989). The same concern might very well arise in considering the third prong, namely, whether the course of conduct worked to the client’s prejudice. Id.
In Hutchinson, can we say with any assurance that the release of an alleged mental incompetent is always in the incompetent’s best interest, even where counsel may be privy to facts demonstrating that the client poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself or herself? In the case presently before us, can we say that the release and discharge of Brandon Smith would be in his best interest, especially if counsel knows or reasonably could know that the juvenile did, in fact, discharge the weapon which wounded Stewart and the juvenile would benefit from residency at Glen Mills School?
I am uneasy that the majority does not consider or weigh these issues. I believe that the counsel effectiveness standard espoused in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967) and its progeny, if applied to juvenile proceedings, is contrary to the whole concept of juvenile courts which were created in an attempt to depart from the traditional treatment of children as ordinary criminal defendants. I find nothing in In re Gault, supra, that compels a contrary conclusion. Accord, Commonwealth v. Durham, 255 Pa.Super. 539, 543, 389 A.2d 108, 110-111 (1978) (dissenting opinion, Price, J.).
Although the majority does not expressly say so, I would assume that they are in agreement with Judge Spaeth’s *76conclusion in In re DelSignore, supra, that the juvenile’s constitutional rights are based entirely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If this is so, I would prefer that the analysis go beyond finding that a ludicrous statutory result is reached if the right to representation by legal counsel found in the Juvenile Act is not meant to include the concept of able, effective representation. Majority opinion, page 43-45. I would agree that the purpose of providing representation is that such representation would be effective and helpful to both the juvenile and the court. However, this does not assist me in understanding how the absence of effective representation deprives the juvenile of due process in the context of a juvenile proceeding where the interests of all parties is directed towards the best interests of the juvenile.
It is not clear to me whether the majority relies upon statutory construction, the Fourteenth Amendment, or both, in order to reach its conclusion that the effective assistance of counsel standard is implicit in the right to counsel conferred by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6337. However, I do not believe that mere statutory construction, or pursuit of legislative intent, should suffice when seeking to establish and impose so important a concept as ineffective assistance of counsel into juvenile proceedings. Nor do I believe a principle born in the Sixth Amendment may become.a Fourteenth Amendment stepchild without doing violence to sound jurisprudence.
I agree completely with my distinguished colleague, Judge Tamilia, that the concept of ineffectiveness of counsel measured according to the standard provided by the adult criminal proceedings is not adaptable to the juvenile proceeding for the reasons that Judge Tamilia points out. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to juvenile proceedings. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 1(a). I share Judge Tamilia’s concern that the majority would create procedural rights to post-trial proceedings which have been rejected by the legislature and by the Supreme Court Criminal Rules Committee. To the extent that such an effort by *77this court impinges upon the general supervisory and administrative authority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as found in Article 5, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, I must disassociate myself from such an attempt. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 388 Pa.Super. 271, 277-278, 565 A.2d 481, 484-485 (1989).
The Honorable Samuel J. Roberts, in speaking for the Pennsylvania. Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, declared, “[A] statement of principle rarely solves concrete cases.” 427 Pa. at 601, 235 A.2d at 351. His caution followed his observation that an “axiomatic judicial assumption” had developed between the year 1932, when Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) was decided, and 1967, when the stewardship of William F. Washington’s trial counsel was under review before our supreme court. That axiomatic assumption was that any right of representation in a criminal case includes the right to “effective” or “adequate” representation. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. at 601, 235 A.2d at 351. And the supreme court granted allocatur in the Washington case “to explore a facet of the right to effective representation.” Id. Thus, even the inception of effective representation in a criminal context was not premised upon an axiom but rather constructed after careful consideration of whether such a standard furthered the objectives of the criminal process.
In the case now before us, all would agree that a juvenile has a due process right that any hearing in which the juvenile’s liberty is implicated must comport with fundamental fairness. The difficult task is giving content to that due process right. I differ from the majority in that I earnestly believe that the right to fundamental fairness for Brandon Smith can readily be guaranteed, applying the broad scope of review suggested by Judge Tamilia, and without resort to any criminal process standards.
The only substantive issues presented on this appeal-— apart from the attempt to create an effectiveness procedure for juveniles — involve (1) non-suppression of the allegedly *78improper in-hospital identification following an allegedly illegal arrest (2) the non-introduction of allegedly exculpatory eyewitness testimony, and (3) the non-impeachment of certain Commonwealth witnesses with supposedly prior inconsistent statements. I conclude that none of these issues give rise to a claim of fundamental unfairness.
At issue 1, I agree with the majority that Smith’s arrest could not have been suppressed, Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 351 Pa.Super. 412, 506 A.2d 415 (1986) and that the trial judge’s finding that an independent basis existed for making an in-court identification precludes our having to further review the hospital identification. The claims regarding the legality of the arrest and the suppression of Smith’s identification by Stewart are without merit.
At issue 2, I agree with the Commonwealth that the testimony of David Brinson-Glover, if helpful to the juvenile, would have been cumulative and that its non-admission in no way prejudiced Smith. On appeal, Smith relies upon the contents of a police report to suggest that he was not the shooter. The Brief for Appellant converts the written statements of the police officer in the report into “testimony” of Brinson-Glover. There is no suggestion in the Brief that Brinson-Glover would, in fact, have testified in specific support of Smith, if called as a witness, or that he was in any way prevented from testifying by the state. Smith did testify, denied shooting.Stewart and said he was elsewhere at the time of the crime. Alibi witnesses confirmed Smith’s account. Bernard Johnson testified that he had seen the shooting, that Smith was at the scene but that the shooting was done by some other person. My review of the entire record satisfies me that issue, 2 does not give rise to a viable due process claim.
At issue 3, both the Commonwealth and the majority recognize that the testimony of Bernard Johnson was favorable to Brandon Smith. I agree with them that it makes absolutely no sense to argue, as does Smith on this appeal, that trial counsel should have attempted to impeach this *79witness. This clearly falls short of implicating fundamental fairness.
It has been said, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!” This appeal can readily be determined consistent with Brandon Smith’s rights without resort to criminal law precepts. I refuse to believe that our legislature intended to equate a statutory right to representation in civil juvenile proceedings with the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel erected over many years through our criminal jurisprudence. I therefor dissent.