dissenting. Because I believe that this Court lacks jurisdiction to discipline a judge who has left the bench, I respectfully dissent. This Court’s position in In re Wheel, 148 Vt. 632, 632-33, 533 A.2d 1194, 1195 (1987) (mem.), that jurisdiction attaches only to complaints filed during judicial tenure, is both the majority rule and the correct one.
Notice of the complaint, within the judicial tenure, establishes jurisdiction. In re Hunt, 302 S.E.2d 235, 239 (N.C. 1983). Although courts are divided about whether, once disciplinary proceedings have commenced against a judge, subsequent resignation or retirement can divest the court’s jurisdiction over the matter, see Shaman, Lubet, and Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 1.09, at 16 (1990), I find no court that has gone so far as to hold that it can take jurisdiction over a complaint filed against a judge who has already left the bench. See In re Probert, 308 N.W.2d 773, 777-78 n.10 (Mich. 1981). Citing the ABA Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement 2 (tentative draft 1977), the Probert court emphasized that the main purpose for judicial discipline is not to punish judges but to protect the public. Id. Once the offending judge is gone from the bench, this purpose no longer exists. The rule operates like a statute of limitations. Id.
The model standards in judicial discipline take the position that the professional conduct board rather than the judicial conduct board should have jurisdiction over ex-judges who are accused of unethical conduct during their judicial tenures. ABA Standards, supra, § 3.2, at 18; see also Florida Bar v. McCain, 330 So. 2d 712, 714-17 (Fla. 1976) (lawyer can be sanctioned for misconduct committed while previously serving as judge); In re McKenney, 424 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Mass. 1981) (court has continuing authority to sanction ex-judge as member of bar for misconduct during judicial office); In re DeLucia, 387 A.2d 362, 366 (N.J. 1978) (same).
Under this rule, assistant judges, who are usually not attorneys, may escape discipline altogether, but only if they never attempt to return to the bench. If the judge does return to the bench, the complaint can be revived because the judge’s previous acts of misconduct, committed during a prior term as judge, “follow the judge to any subsequent judicial of*639fice.” In re Romero, 668 P.2d 296, 299 (N.M. 1983); see also In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270, 279 (Mo. 1980) (generally accepted that court may sanction judge for conduct committed in prior term unless legislation expressly forbids it). The concerns for public protection are then revived. Moreover, if the behavior is sufficiently serious to be criminal, the ex-judge can be prosecuted regardless of the retired status. See, e.g., State v. Wheel, 155 Vt. 587, 590, 587 A.2d 933, 936 (1990) (assistant judge convicted of false swearing).
Because I do not believe the Court has jurisdiction over this matter, I do not reach the merits and cannot agree that any sanction can be imposed even for a clear violation of the code.