dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550, an employee of a state agency is not entitled to indemnification pursuant *78to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8548 when he is found to have committed wilful misconduct. The majority today holds that, although appellant has previously been found liable for the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment, he may not have committed willful misconduct and thus, is entitled to indemnification under section 8548. It bases this conclusion on the premise that appellant may not have intentionally committed these intentional torts. I am unable to join such a result for I believe a jury’s determination that an individual has committed the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment constitutes a judicial determination that the individual has committed willful misconduct because these torts are by definition intentionally committed and are clearly outside the scope of a police officer’s duties.
The decision reached by the majority rests on the proposition that it is conceivable that a jury could find a police officer liable for the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment under circumstances demonstrating that the officer had not intentionally used unnecessary or excessive force.1 This assertion is simply incorrect for the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment are intentional torts and thus, share a common denominator in that each which requires a conscious intent on the part of the actor to bring about the harm in question.
This element of intent is clearly set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21(1) (1965), in which the tort of Assault is defined as follows:
§ 21 Assault
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if
*79(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby put in immediate apprehension.
(2) An action which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for an apprehension caused thereby although the act involves an unreasonable risk of causing it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
(emphasis added). The definition of Battery set forth in section 18(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, likewise, states,
§ 18. Battery: Offensive Contact
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a mere offensive contact with the other’s person although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
(emphasis added). Finally, the tort of false imprisonment as defined in section 35 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly sets forth the same element of intent as it provides,
§ 35. False Imprisonment
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and
*80(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.2
(emphasis added).
Due to this element of intent, the jury’s previous verdict against Officer Renk can only be construed as a determination that he intentionally (i.e. wilfully) used force in excess of that reasonably needed to make an arrest and intentionally arrested appellee without probable cause. Because the City of Pittsburgh does not pay its officers to perpetrate such intentional torts upon citizens, these actions are clearly beyond the scope of a police officer’s duties and amount misconduct which, as previously noted, was wilfully committed. Thus, I would affirm the Commonwealth Court’s decision to deny appellant indemnification on the ground that the previous verdict against him amounted to a judicial determination that appellant had committed willful misconduct. . Since the majority refuses to do so, I must respectfully dissent.
NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, J., join in this dissenting opinion.. It is well established that a police officer is privileged to make an arrest when he has probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and to use reasonable force to effectuate an arrest. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 118-121,140-144(1965). Thus, the majority correctly notes that an officer may only be subjected to liability for assault and battery when the force employed by the officer is excessive and may only be held liable for false imprisonment when an arrest is unsupported by probable cause.
. In the context of an arrest, an actor is liable for false imprisonment when he causes the false arrest of another person. A false arrest is defined as 1) an arrest made without probable cause or 2) an arrest made by a person without privilege to do so. Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions § 13.04.