(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
At the time the plea in this case was taken GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(f) required that when the plea was to murder, armed robbery or treason, the trial court inform the defendant that he could not be placed on probation. In People v Freeman, 73 Mich App 568; 252 NW2d 518 (1977), it was recognized that a failure to so advise could amount to reversi*237ble error although there was no reversal in the case because as the result of a sentence agreement defendant knew, prior to his plea, that he would be sentenced to prison if he pleaded guilty. I am aware of People v Lendzian, 80 Mich App 323; 263 NW2d 360 (1977), where there was no reversal when defendant was not informed of his ineligibility for probation. However, in Lendzian the trial court did inform the defendant that armed robbery was "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years” and defendant stated on the record that he understood the possible punishment for armed robbery. The court was of the opinion that defendant's understanding of possible punishment was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(f).
In this case the trial court only advised defendant that "the maximum penalty is life” and said nothing about "any term of years”.
This case is distinguishable from both Freeman and Lendzian and the plea-based conviction should be vacated. Although, considering the crime pled to, as well as defendant’s criminal record, he probably had no expectation of being placed on probation.
Defendant’s second claim of error is based on GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(d) which requires that the plea-taking court advise the defendant of the "mandatory minimum prison sentence, if any, for the offense”. When this language has been applied to a sentence for second-degree murder, armed robbery or treason, and where the term of confinement may be "imprisonment for life or any term of years”, confusion has resulted.
One might think that when the rule speaks of a mandatory minimum sentence it means a mandatory minimum sentence definitely stated as to *238length of time in the sentencing statute (i.e., 20 years for possession of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams) MCL 333.7403; MSA 14.15(7403). This was apparently the interpretation arrived at by a majority of the Court in People v Freeman, 73 Mich App 568; 252 NW2d 518 (1977), with one judge giving no opinion on the issue. The opinion simply stated that there was no mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery, citing the armed robbery statute. MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797.
However, the Freeman Court made no mention of People v Burridge, 99 Mich 343, 345; 58 NW 319 (1894), where the Court stated that "any term of years” must be construed for a time not less than two years. It was apparently the fate of Burridge to be overlooked from time to time.
Apparently, it was overlooked by the Supreme Court in Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), where the Court said in reference to GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(b):
"In Hord, the judge informed the defendant that by pleading guilty to robbery armed he subjected himself to a possible sentence of 'up to life’ but did not advise him that he could not be placed on probation. A person convicted of armed robbery is subject to a sentence of life or any term of years (MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797), and may not be placed on probation (MCLA 771.1; MSA 28.1131).
"The rule does not require the judge to inform the defendant of all sentence consequences — only the maximum sentence, any mandatory minimum and, as appears below, if he is on probation or parole, the possible effect on his status as a probationer or parolee.
"The rule reflects the extent to which this Court is willing to impose on the judge the obligation of informing the defendant of such consequences. A failure to impart the information so required by this subsection (b) will continue to require reversal.” (Emphasis added.)
*239There was no reversal of Hord, supra, nor was there any mention of Burridge, supra, or that the words "any term of years” created a mandatory minimum sentence of any period.
In People v McKnight, 72 Mich App 282; 249 NW2d 392 (1976), in a per curiam opinion, this Court found no error in the trial court’s advising defendant that the minimum sentence for his plea to armed robbery would be one year in prison. The Court made reference to People v Burridge, supra, by stating in the opinion that the Supreme Court in its ruling in Hord, supra, rejected Burridge, supra. The Court also said, referring to the ruling in Hord in the Guilty Plea Cases, supra:
"In this case the Court expressly stated that failure to advise a defendant of any mandatory minimum sentence was reversible error. Hord was not advised that the offense of armed robbery carried any mandatory minimum sentence. Nevertheless, his plea-based conviction was affirmed. We must infer from this that there was no necessity to advise a defendant of any minimum sentence before accepting a plea of guilty to an offense punishable by imprisonment for life or 'any term of years.’ ” People v McKnight, supra, 283-284.
However, the question was not resolved.
In People v Harper, 83 Mich App 390; 269 NW2d 470 (1978), the Court seemingly returned to interpreting "any number of years” as establishing a mandatory minimum sentence of some duration. Recognizing that the Burridge case had been discredited by the Guilty Plea Cases, supra, and People v McKnight, supra, the Court concluded that the phrase did not mean a minimum of two years but asserted that it must mean some minimum period and then set about determining such *240period by the statutory construction.1
In Harper, the trial court had informed the defendant that as far as armed robbery was concerned it was mandatory that the court sentence him to some term of years. The appellate court, at the conclusion of the statutory construction portion of its opinion concluded its ruling on the issue by saying:
"Our analysis does not require reversal here. First of all defense counsel had no objection and was satisfied with the court’s compliance with GCR 1963, 785.7 in this regard. Secondly, under prior case law advice to the defendant that he was required to be imprisoned for a minimum of a term of years was sufficient. Neither do we say that in the future since 'any term of years’ mandates a minimum sentence of a year and a day that fact must be communicated to the defendant in those words under pain of reversal. We suggest only that a more exact way of stating the rule appears to be: A defendant who must be sentenced to 'any term of years’ may not be sentenced to less than a minimum of a year and a day (366 days) to a (minimum) maximum of 18 months and 1-1/2 days (549 days).” (Emphasis added.) People v Harper, supra, 398-399.
I conclude that the holding in Harper, supra, is that as long as the trial court informs the accused that the punishment is imprisonment "for life or for any term of years” it is sufficient. However, the suggestion is made that further amplification could be made by spelling out a specific minimum sentence of some length, possibly one year and a day. I further conclude, as the law now stands, that as long as the trial court informs the accused that the possible sentence for second-degree murder, *241armed robbery or treason, is imprisonment for life or for any term of years, it is not necessary that the court name some period of time as a mandatory minimum sentence, particularly in view of the fact that there is no definitive statement as to what such mandatory minimum period should be.
In this case the trial court only advised the defendant that the maximum penalty was life. This is not sufficient compliance with GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(d) under any interpretation reversal is required.
A final observation may be in order. Had we held that the trial court should have advised defendant of a mandatory minimum sentence then, presumably, there would be no point in advising him that he would be eligible for probation and a failure to do so would be harmless error.
Defendant’s plea conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded for trial.
I make no comment concerning the Court’s reasoning in construing the statute which led to the conclusion that the phrase means that the minimum sentence would be a year and a day (366 days) to a minimum-maximum of 18 months and 1-1/2 days (549 days).