dissenting.
The majority essentially relies upon Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Independent State Stores Union, 520 Pa. 266, 553 A.2d 948 (1989) (ISSU) in holding that the arbitrator in the present case lacked authority to alter the *105penalty imposed by the Manheim Central School District (District) against the grievant. As I am certain that ISSU is distinguishable on a number of independent grounds, I believe that the arbitrator had such authority. Accordingly, I believe that the trial court erred in vacating the arbitrator’s award and that the majority has erred in affirming the trial court. Hence I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly notes that a court’s scope of review over arbitration awards is limited to deciding whether the arbitrator’s decision can be viewed as having been rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement. After properly stating the well known “essence test”, the majority nevertheless permits the trial court to intrude into the exclusive domain of the arbitrator.
In ISSU, the Supreme Court was called upon to review the dismissal of an employee of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) who had falsified business records and stolen money from the PLCB store where he had worked. The employee was suspended pending a further investigation into the matter. While that investigation was proceeding, the employee entered a hospital and was treated for mental illness. When the PLCB asked for substantiation of said treatment, the employee failed to provide any such information. The PLCB dismissed the employee.
The employee then filed a grievance, alleging that his misconduct was caused by his mental illness. At a hearing before an arbitrator, the employee’s union gave evidence that the employee had been hospitalized and further presented expert medical opinions that he had been suffering from a stress-related mental disorder. The arbitrator decided that because of the employee’s mental condition, the PLCB lacked just cause to terminate the employee and reinstated the employee under conditions not relevant here. On appeal, we affirmed. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Independent State Store Union, 100 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 272, 514 A.2d 959 (1986). The PLCB filed a petition for allowance of appeal which the Supreme Court granted. After hearing argument on the matter, the Su*106preme Court reversed and reinstated the discharge of the employee.
The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Nix and represented the view of Justices Flaherty, McDermott, Papadakos and Stout. That opinion referred to Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Union of Security Officers, 500 Pa. 213, 455 A.2d 625 (1983) and County of Centre v. Musser, 519 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988), stating that both of these cases limited the arbitrator from dispensing his own brand of industrial justice. As the ISSU majority stated, “[I]t should be recognized that a governmental agency does not have the freedom of a private enterprise to relinquish powers inherently essential to the proper discharge of its function.” ISSU, 520 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 278, 553 A.2d at 954. Justice Papadakos, while joining the majority opinion, authored a concurring opinion. He recognized that the concept of just cause had to encompass elements of justification or excuse. As Justice Papadakos stated, “In this case, [the employee] was given the opportunity to explain away his dereliction and failed to do so.” Id.1 In the present case, the grievant presented evidence of his mental problems in a timely fashion. Furthermore, there is no question that the mental problems were a causative factor in the conduct which led to his discharge. For that reason alone, I believe ISSU is distinguishable.
It must be pointed out that both Philadelphia Housing Authority and Centre County are distinguishable for additional reasons. Both of those cases involved criminal conduct on the part of the discharged employee. In the present case, the grievant is charged with “immorality”. It cannot be seriously contended that all immoral conduct is criminal and in the present case, no one contends that the *107grievant committed any crime. Furthermore, Centre County is further distinguishable from the present case because the collective bargaining agreement in effect in that case had an explicit provision which stated, “Should a grievance over discharge ... go to arbitration for determination, the sole question to be decided by such arbitrator shall be the question of fact as to whether or not such employee was discharged for just cause.” Id. 519 Pa. at 384, 548 A.2d at 1196. No such provision is contained in the collective bargaining agreement signed by the District and the union in the present case.
As did the discharged employees in Philadelphia Housing Authority and Centre County, the employee in ISSU engaged in criminal conduct. The grievant’s conduct here was not criminal. I believe that is a crucial factor, especially where the criminal conduct reflects upon the employee’s ability to do his job. As the grievant here committed no crime, the present case is distinguishable from all of the previously mentioned cases.
I believe that an even more important reason exists for distinguishing the present case from ISSU. As quoted before in this opinion, the majority opinion in ISSU relied upon a governmental employer’s inability to relinquish powers essential to the discharge of its function. As the majority opinion there stated, “We find nothing in the labor agreement here involved or any circumstance to suggest that the LCB had ‘bargained away’ its power to discharge a proven thief; and it would be ‘manifestly unreasonable’ to conclude that the agency intended to do so.” Id. 520 Pa. at 277-78, 553 A.2d at 953-54.
One cannot seriously question a school district’s ability to relinquish some of its powers relating to the discharge and discipline of its professional employees. The Legislature has explicitly sanctioned such relinquishment. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Neshaminy Federation of Teachers v. Neshaminy School District, 501 Pa. 534, 462 *108A.2d 629 (1983)2, the Legislature enacted what is now Section 1133 of the School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by the Act of June 29, 1984, P.L. 438, 24 P.S. § 11-1133 (Supp.1989-90). That section provides:
Nothing contained in section 1121 through 1132 shall be construed to supersede or preempt a provision of a collective bargaining agreement in effect on July 23, 1970, or any date subsequent thereto, negotiated by a school entity and an exclusive representative of the employees in accordance with the act of July 23, 1970 (P.L. 563, No. 195), known as the “Public Employe Relations Act”, which agreement provides for the right of the exclusive representative to grieve and arbitrate the validity of a professional employe’s termination for just cause or for causes set forth in Section 1122 of this act____ (emphasis added).
To argue that the arbitrator lacked the authority to decide whether the School District had just cause to terminate the grievant without allowing him to collect accumulated back benefits based on ISSU is to ignore Section 1133 of the School Code. That section could not be more explicit and the only reasonable interpretation of it leads to the conclusion that the arbitrator’s award here drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
A few more points must be made. The arbitrator here was asked to determine if the School District had just cause for the grievant’s dismissal. “Just cause” does not exist in a vacuum. Whenever one looks at any disciplinary action and the concept of just cause, one must ask, “Was there just cause for the disciplinary action taken? ” Here, the School District decided to terminate the grievant without permitting him to collect benefits accumulated over twenty years of satisfactory service. Furthermore, the award of *109the arbitrator did not put the grievant back into the classroom because the award required that the grievant either resign or be fired at the end of the medical sabbatical. As grievant’s counsel stated in the brief to this Court:
In the case at bar, Arbitrator Zirkel fashioned a remedy which allowed the grievant use of the benefits he had earned during twenty years of satisfactory service. He did not, however, reinstate grievant to the classroom. The grievant’s conduct, while not criminal, may have violated public policy, but the arbitrator’s award did not. The arbitrator’s award furthered the public policy of the Commonwealth, in that it balanced the valid and important interests of the District in protecting its students from the actions of an emotionally ill teacher against the valid and important interest of the teacher in utilizing his earned benefits to recover his mental health. To ensure that the benefits were used for the purpose of recovery of health, the arbitrator went so far as to require the teacher to confirm weekly psychiatric treatment. The District can point to no established public policy violated by the arbitrators fair and evenhanded remedy; indeed, it is the District’s determination to deprive [grievant] of the use of earned benefits to recover his mental health that violates the express public policy of the Commonwealth. The Legislature provided for the accumulation of sick leave, and for the vested right to sabbatical leave for the restoration of health, through the Public School Code____ Nowhere did the Legislature limit use of those earned benefits to teachers suffering from physical illnesses. The public policy of the Commonwealth, as expressed by legislative enactment, is to provide teachers with financial security in times of illness, to enable them to recover their health.
(Brief for Appellant, pp. 30-31) (emphasis in original).
To recap, I believe that ISSU, relied upon by the majority in holding that the arbitrator lacked the power to modify the penalty imposed, is inapposite. Similarly, both Philadelphia Housing Authority and Centre County are also *110distinguishable. I would reverse the order of the trial court and reinstate the arbitration award.
. When referring to the employee’s failure to explain away his dereliction, we believe Justice Papadakos was discussing the failure to provide substantiation of the illness prior to his termination. It is also possible that the evidence offered at the arbitration hearing, while opining that the employee was mentally ill, did not opine that the mental illness was the cause of the employee’s dishonest and criminal conduct. For purposes of this analysis, either meaning supports my belief that the present case is distinguishable from ISSU.
. “It appears to us that the legislature’s action in adopting Section 1133 of the Code was a direct response to the decision of our Supreme Court in Neshaminy,....” Wilson Area Education Association v. Wilson Area School District, 90 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 151, 156, 494 A.2d 506, 509 (1985).