with whom McKU-SICK, Chief Justice, and NICHOLS, Justice, join, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. Subchapter V of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4591-4594-A (1979 & Supp. 1985-1986), does not disclose any legislative intent to make unlawful the operation of a fixed route system of buses inaccessible to persons using wheelchairs when, as here, there is no evidence of invidious motivation, and substantial alternative and supplementary services are provided.1 In addition, the court’s decision invites the judiciary to engage in ad hoc cost-benefit analysis both in defining unlawful public accommodations discrimination and in fashioning a remedy. Thus, the court places in the hands of the judiciary decisions that are more appropriately entrusted to the Legislature.
The reasoning of the court in holding South Portland’s public transit system unlawful is flawed. The court does not analyze the language or legislative history of section 4591 and 4592. Instead, the court applies the principle of “reasonable accommodation” to these sections to determine whether the public transit system is unlawful:
The tension between the legislative statement of policy and the substantive prohibition mandates an application of the doctrine of reasonable accommodation to claims of discrimination in public transportation based on physical handicap. Only in this manner is it possible to distinguish between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons. The requirement of reasonable accommodation is both rational and meaningful. The obligation of the proprietor of a place of public accommodation with regard to physical barriers, is limited to that which can reasonably be accomplished without undue financial or administrative burden. The rights of the handicapped are advanced as technological change removes the justification for the erection or maintenance of barriers.
Supra at 955-956 (emphasis added).
In reaching this result the court relies on dicta in two United States Supreme Court cases construing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13, 99 S.Ct. 2361, *9582370, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979); Alexander v. Choate, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 712, 718-20, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). The reliance is misplaced, not only because the language of section 504 is dissimilar to that of sub-chapter V, but more significantly because the cases reach results directly contrary to the result the court strains to reach in the instant case. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 413, 99 S.Ct. at 2370 (section 504 does not require an educational institution “to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person”); Alexander, 105 S.Ct. at 721-25 (limiting Medicaid hospital coverage to 14 days does not deny handicapped access to Medicaid services or discriminate in the provision of benefits).
More fundamentally, the court errs in its use of the principle of reasonable accommodation to make the initial determination whether South Portland’s public transit system is unlawful. The principle of reasonable accommodation is properly invoked to determine the scope of remedial relief. See Percy v. Allen, 472 A.2d 432 (Me.1984) (affirmative defense of a bona fide occupational qualification requires defendant prove infeasibility of remedy); Percy v. Allen, 449 A.2d 337, 341-46 (Me.1982) (same); Maine Human Rights Commission v. Local 1361, United Paperworkers Union, 383 A.2d 369, 375-78 (Me.1978) (after plaintiff establishes prima facie unlawful discrimination, defendant must show that there is no accommodation that is not undue hardship).2 The application of the reasonable accommodation principle represents essentially a factual inquiry into what is “reasonable” under all the circumstances and must of necessity involve a measure of judicial discretion. Cf. Percy, 472 A.2d at 433-34; Local 1361, 383 A.2d at 378-81; Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me.1979) (any remedy under the MHRA is granted only through the exercise of the sound discretion of the court). By importing the principle into the initial finding of unlawful discrimination, the court has made the initial finding ás discretionary as the fashioning of remedial relief. When both the right and the remedy become discretionary, the judiciary has usurped the legislative function.
I turn then to examine the MHRA to determine whether the decision of the Superior Court may be affirmed on any" alternative basis. I note preliminarily that there is no statutory requirement that South Portland operate a public transit system. This determination is properly left to the respective towns or cities. In the instant case, South Portland decided to establish a public transit system that included fixed route buses owned and operated by the city and the paratransit services purchased from RTP. By its determination to provide a public transit system, South Portland became subject to the provisions of subchapter V pertaining to public accommodations.
To determine the legislative intent underlying the separate provisions of subchapter V, subchapter V must be considered in its entirety and in its relationship to the rest of the Act. See Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me.1983); Frost v. Lucey, 231 A.2d 441, 446 (Me.1967). The statutory history of Maine’s public accommodations provisions is also relevant as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607, 613 & n. 3 (Me.1975); Finks v. Maine State Highway Commission, 328 A.2d 791, 797 (Me.1974).
Subchapter V begins with a legislative declaration of principle: “The opportunity for every individual to have equal access to places of public accommodation without discrimination” is “declared to be a civil right.” § 4591. Section 4592 enforces this civil right by defining “unlawful public accommodations discrimination” of two types *959in two separate paragraphs. By its second definitional paragraph section 4592 prohibits any person from advertising that a place of public accommodation will deny its “accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges” on the basis of race, color, sex, physical or mental handicap, religion, ancestry or national origin. In short, the second paragraph prohibits the publication of an intention to discriminate but does not require any affirmative measures. The plaintiffs do not contend that South Portland has violated this provision.
By its first definitional and core paragraph section 4592 prohibits any place of public accommodation from withholding its “accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges” from any person on grounds of race, color, sex, physical or mental handicap, religion, ancestry or national origin, or discriminating against any person in the terms “upon which access to such accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges may depend.” The plaintiffs’ contention is that South Portland’s transit system violates this paragraph of section 4592.
Section 4592 derives from predecessor provisions that antedate the enactment of the MHRA. The second definitional paragraph of section 4592 derives from a statute enacted in 1917. P.L.1917, ch. 225 prohibited a place of public accommodation, including a public conveyance, from publishing an intention to discriminate on grounds of religion, class or nationality. In 1971 this provision was incorporated into the MHRA. P.L.1971, ch. 501, § 1 (codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592 (1979)).
In 1959, the Legislature enacted the predecessor provision to the first definitional paragraph of section 4592 to prohibit places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin. P.L.1959, ch. 282. In 1971 this provision was also incorporated into the MHRA. P.L.1971, ch. 501, § 1 (codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592 (1979)). Subsequently, in 1974, the Legislature added physically handicapped persons as a protected class under section 4592, but did not otherwise restructure the section.
The legislative history of section 4592 indicates that this enforcement provision is intended to operate in a case of alleged discrimination against physically handicapped persons as it operates in other cases of discrimination. Discrimination because of race, national origin, religion, age or sex results primarily from stereotyping attitudes that are embodied in practice. Discrimination against a physically handicapped person results in part from this invidious stereotyping. Insofar as such discriminatory stereotyping is embodied in practice, the law prohibits it. See Maine Human Rights Commission v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1231 (Me.1983) (the MHRA “is intended to prevent discrimination against the physically handicapped based on unfounded stereotyping”). However, physical barriers also hamper the efforts of certain physically handicapped persons as they seek to participate fully in society on equal terms with other persons. Although the legislative history and present language of section 4592 supports the conclusion that the practice of discriminatory stereotyping is prohibited and affirmative measures may be ordered to effect attitudinal changes, there is nothing that prohibits physical barriers. Without an express statutory standard of such prohibition, a construction of section 4592 that required affirmative measures to eliminate physical barriers would represent a major departure from this court’s prior decisions construing the MHRA and from the corpus of antidiscrimination law. See Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit, Inc., 64 Cal.App.3d 881, 134 Cal.Rptr. 844 (1976) (a provision requiring “full and equal access” for the physically handicapped does not require structural modifications); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 79 A.D.2d 516, 433 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1980) (mem.) (the New York statute prohibiting public accommodation discrimination does not mandate “special efforts" to accommodate *960the disabled).3 Cf. Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F.Supp. 825, 832 (D.Colo.1978) (contrasting racial discrimination cases with claims of discrimination against physically handicapped persons).
The conclusion that section 4592 does not define South Portland’s transit system as unlawful is reenforced by consideration of the nature of transportation.4 As David Lewis, an economist and expert witness for South Portland, testified, consumer demand for transportation is a “derived demand.” That is to say, unlike employment, education, or housing that are ends in themselves though also means to a productive and satisfying life, public conveyance or transportation is not desired for its own sake, but purely as one method of movement to assist in obtaining other ends. The important goal of transportation is to be able to reach a destination. The plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dennis Cannon, a specialist with the United States Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, essentially agreed, testifying that the design of a transit system and the means employed are less important than the benefits provided, that is, the frequency and volume of transportation services.
In the instant case the fixed route buses and the paratransit service are alternative methods providing access to the metropolitan area so that users of these services may reach their destinations. Through the paratransit programs South Portland is providing substantial services to make a method of public transportation available on an individualized basis and arguably to greater numbers of physically handicapped persons than would the relief demanded by the plaintiffs.5
An examination of the remaining provisions of subchapter V fully supports the position that section 4592 is not intended to eliminate physical barriers. In the same 1974 act that added physically handicapped persons as a protected class, the Legislature provided for specific affirmative requirements for buildings and facilities, but not for public conveyances. P.L.1973, ch. 705, § 12 (codified as amended at 5 M.R. S.A. § 4593 (Supp.1985-1986)). Section 4593 and the subsequently enacted sections 4594 and 4594-A 6 provide detailed requirements, precisely differentiated by date of construction or remodeling, for making *961“any building or facility” usable by a physically handicapped person.7 When the Legislature intended subchapter V to embrace affirmative action to eliminate physical barriers, it so provided under sections 4593, 4594, and 4594-A.
The conclusion that section 4592 does not impose affirmative requirements to eliminate physical barriers is further reenforced by an examination of subchapter IV of the MHRA pertaining to fair housing. Section 4581, like section 4591, declares a broad principle: “[t]he opportunity ... to secure decent housing ... without discrimination” is “declared to be a civil right.” Section 4582, the parallel provision to section 4592, enforces this civil right by defining “unlawful housing discrimination.” The definition of “unlawful housing discrimination” is stated in terms of a listing of prohibited conduct. Prior to 1983 the only affirmative requirement to eliminate physical barriers in housing appeared in subchapter V as part of section 4593. § 4593(1) [2d para.] (repealed 1983) (1% of living units in any public housing must be accessible to a person using a wheelchair). In that year the Legislature added a new final paragraph to section 4582. P.L. 1983, ch. 437, § 3. This new paragraph, further defining “unlawful housing discrimination,” requires public housing or any housing financed in whole or in part by public funds that is constructed or remodeled on or after January 1, 1984, to provide, out of every twenty living units, one that is accessible to handicapped persons.
Thus, an examination of both subchap-ters IV and V demonstrates that when the Legislature intended to impose affirmative requirements to eliminate physical barriers, it so provided. This court should not read affirmative requirements for public conveyances into section 4592 when the statute provides no such express provision.8 See Marsh, 64 Cal.App.3d at 891-92, 134 Cal.Rptr. at 850 (if the legislature had intended an equal access statute to require structural modifications, then the legislative inclusion of structural modification requirements in a different statute would be redundant).
The plaintiffs additionally contend that the operation of fixed route buses inaccessible to persons using wheelchairs separates this group of the physically handicapped and therefore constitutes discrimination “in the price, terms or conditions upon which access” to the public transit system depends. The plaintiffs point to the statutory definition of discrimination as including segregation or separation. § 4553(2). The Legislature, however, provided in sections 4582, 4593, 4594, and 4594-A for separate accommodations to meet the needs of physically handicapped persons. The limited accommodation required for buildings and facilities in fact separates persons using wheelchairs from other persons. See, e.g., § 4582 (one out of every 20 units of public housing must be accessible to handicapped persons); § 4593(1) (places of public accommodation must have one public walk, one primary entrance, and one rest room stall, each of particular dimensions).9 Sections 4593, *9624594 and 4594-A provide for access by persons using wheelchairs to a public building and facilities within the building by providing a specialized entrance to ánd route through the building as one of its entrances and interior routes. In the instant case, South Portland has made the urban area and destinations therein accessible to persons using wheelchairs by providing specialized transportation services as one part of its transit system. Thus it cannot be found that the provisions of sub-chapter V ban such separation in public transportation while authorizing it in other public accommodations such as buildings and other facilities.
The structuring of a public transportation system to meet the needs of physically handicapped persons and achieve thereby the desirable goal of enriching society by helping physically handicapped persons to participate more easily in the social, economic, cultural and political affairs of a community is an extremely difficult task. For the courts to assist properly in the achievement of this goal, the applicable statutes must provide some legal standard or guidelines from which the judiciary can discern the rule of law that must be administered. Even if one accepts the court’s rationale that unlawful discrimination is established by the absence of reasonable accommodation, its finding of unlawful discrimination can only be reached by restricting the application of this rationale to the fixed route buses and ignoring the remainder of South Portland’s public transit system.
In the instant case South Portland after extensive deliberation determined on a particular package of transportation services as most reasonably accommodating the transportation needs of its residents. Another court has characterized the nature of such a decision in the following words:
Providing public transportation for the mobility disabled is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. It requires more than an analysis of available technology to determine what is reasonably safe, reliable and effective. It also involves the identification of those to be served and their differing needs. The record in this case shows that much more is involved than wheelchair accessibility. The statutory definition of disabled ... includes more than those who are confined to wheelchairs. Indeed, ... there are differing configurations of wheelchairs which significantly affect the use of hydraulic lifts. There are also questions of priorities in making public expenditures and conflicting needs.
Atlantis Community, 453 F.Supp. at 830. When reviewing the challenged actions of a unit of local government, this court gives significant weight to its reasoned judgment. See Roy v. City of Augusta, 414 A.2d 215, 217 (Me.1980); see also Rhode Island Handicapped Action Committee v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 718 F.2d 490, 500 (1st Cir.1983). Judicial restraint is a particular requisite when the challenged decision involves the weighing of interrelated technological, social, and fiscal considerations. Statutory rights are not to be measured, as the court suggests, solely by a judicial evaluation of changing technology. See Atlantis Community, 453 F.Supp. at 832. Even when such rights are clearly defined, a court must be reluctant to engage in an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis in fashioning a remedy. See Rhode Island Handicapped Action, 718 F.2d at 498. The Legislature offers the appropriate forum to evaluate the interrelated considerations and to develop policies to meet changing social needs. The provisions under the MHRA delineating technical building requirements represent a legit*963imate exercise of this legislative power. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4582, 4593, 4594, 4594-A (Supp.1985-1986). Moreover, by defining what is unlawful discrimination, these sections help to define the scope of the relief available under the MHRA. See § 4613. The Legislature and not the courts has the chief responsibility to identify when the design of a public transportation system amounts to unlawful public accommodation discrimination and to determine the scope of any necessary affirmative action.
Because I find no basis for holding that subchapter V of the MHRA defines South Portland’s public transit system as unlawful public accommodations discrimination against those persons using wheelchairs, I would vacate the judgment and remand to the Superior Court for entry of judgment for South Portland.
. South Portland’s public transportation system consists of two major components: 1) services provided by fixed route buses, without wheelchair lifts, owned and operated by South Portland, and (2) paratransit services obtained by contract between South Portland and the Regional Transportation Program (RTP) and provided by buses, with wheelchair lifts, not owned or operated by South Portland. The paratransit service provided is literally "door-through-door." The driver of the bus will give the user of the service necessary assistance in getting out of or into a building that is the pick-up point or destination, in or out of the bus, and in properly securing safety devices within the bus.
After South Portland withdrew from METRO, the paratransit program continued at the same level of service as had previously existed until June 1, 1985, when South Portland contracted with RTP for additional services for handicapped persons.
South Portland also has a brokerage program service with RTP. This program purchases transportation services on fixed route buses for elderly, handicapped or low income persons. For the fiscal year 1984-85, South Portland paid RTP approximately $13,500 for this program. RTP received funds from a variety of other sources, including the Department of Human Services, Bureau of Social Services, and Bureau of Maine’s Elderly, resulting in a purchase from South Portland of approximately $55,700 worth of bus tickets for use on its fixed route buses.
. The guidelines set forth in subchapter III of the MHRA dealing with unlawful employment discrimination should be noted. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4572, 4572-A, 4573, 4574 (1979 & Supp.1985-1986). No comparable guidelines are provided in subchapter V dealing with unlawful discrimination by a public transit system. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592 (1979).
. The plaintiffs in Eastern Paralyzed Veterans sought to compel the public defendants to buy buses and to construct terminals that were accessible to persons using wheelchairs and to semiambulatory persons. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ cause of action insofar as it was based on the New York statute prohibiting public accommodation discrimination. 79 A.D.2d at 517-18, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63. The language of the statutory provisions construed in Eastern Paralyzed Veterans is almost identical to the language of the comparable Maine provisions. Compare N.Y.Exec.Law § 292(9) (Con-sol.1983) (defining place of public accommodation) and § 296(2)(a) (defining unlawful public accommodation discrimination) with 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(8) and § 4592. The court on remand in Eastern Paralyzed Veterans enjoined new construction at 10 terminals that did not include elevators. In so doing the court applied statutes specifically requiring structural modifications to make public buildings accessible to physically handicapped persons. 117 Misc.2d 343, 458 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1982).
. Cf. Lagasse v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 497 A.2d 1112, 1117 (Me.1985) (statutes "take on vitality only when read in the transforming light of a real life situation, and then the question becomes what the legislature intended or reasonably would intend the words of that statute to mean when addressed to that particular situation”).
. Statistical evidence presented at trial tended to show that based on usage in cities of comparable size, lift-assisted boardings of buses might be expected to range between one and 5.3 per day in South Portland whereas the daily usage of paratransit services serving the physically handicapped would approximate some 37 one-way trips. See also Rhode Island Handicapped Action Committee v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 718 F.2d 490, 491 (1st Cir.1983) (53 buses out of a fleet of 267 operating throughout Rhode Island were equipped with lifts; there were 488 one-way trips by persons using wheelchairs in the year 1980 and 605 in the year 1981).
. See P.L.1981, ch. 334, § 3 (codified at 5 M.R. S.A. § 4594 (Supp.1985-1986)); P.L.1983, ch. 437, § 5 (codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4594-A (Supp. 1985-1986)).
. While "facility" is not defined, the Legislature provided that a "facility” as well as a building must meet requirements pertaining to walks, entrances, restrooms, and tactile warnings on doors to hazardous areas. §§ 4593(1), (2); 4594(2); 4594-A(2). Whatever is included under "facility,” it clearly does not cover means of public conveyance. Nor do the plaintiffs contend that a "facility” is a means of public conveyance.
. The Legislature has imposed specific affirmative requirements for public transportation upon the Department of Transportation. 23 M.R.S.A. § 4209 (1980 & Supp.1985-1986). The Department shall select regional public transportation agencies throughout the state. Id. § 4209(1). These agencies shall plan for “a permanent and effective public transportation service, with particular regard to low income, elderly and handicapped residents." Id. § 4209(2)(B).
.Similarly, section 4594(2) imposes requirements based on the specifications of the American National Standards Institute, Specifications for Making Buildings and Facilities Accessible to and Usable by Physically Handicapped Persons (ANSI A 117.1-1980). These specifications generally require one “route” through a building *962accessible to persons using wheelchairs and accessible doors and toilet stalls along that one route. Id. §§ 4.3.2, 4.3.9, 4.13.1, 4.17.1. Section 4594-A(2) imposes as requirements for new construction the standards adopted pursuant to 25 M.R.S.A. §§ 2701-2704 (Supp. 1985-1986). These standards require, inter alia, one public walk of particular dimensions, one elevator, and one toilet stall of particular dimensions. Id. § 2702(2), (6), (8).