filed the following dissenting opinion, in which HornEy, J., concurred.
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, the factual situation was different from that in the instant case. The Tennessee constitution fixed the maximum number of State Senators and Representatives, and called for a census of qualified voters every ten years and a reapportionment among the several counties and districts in accordance with such enumerations. In adopting the latest reapportionment Act in 1901, the Tennessee General Assembly chose to rely upon the Federal Census, and departed widely from the constitutional standard of apportionment. Since that date all legislative proposals for reapportionment failed of passage. Meanwhile there was a substantial growth and redistribution of population, causing a considerable disparity in the ratio of representation to population as between the various counties and districts, and a consequent dilution of the voting strength of the complainants.
In Maryland, the Constitution itself fixes the exact number of State Senators and Delegates and the counties and districts from which they are each elected. There is no provision in the Maryland Constitution or law that calls for reapportionment. Representation in the Senate has always been based on geographical considerations, and never on population. In 1776 the Senate was composed of fifteen Senators, nine from the Western Shore and six from the Eastern Shore. In 1851, each county and the City of Baltimore became entitled to one Senator. The Convention probably followed the pattern of the United States Senate, composed of two *442senators from each state. In 1864, Baltimore City was divided into three districts, and by constitutional amendment in 1922, it became entitled to six. That is the present arrangement; one Senator from each county and one each from the six districts of Baltimore City. See Md. Const., Art. Ill, sec. 2.
In the House of Delegates, population did not become a factor until 1851. In 1864 and again in 1867, a sliding scale was adopted fixing the representation by numbers ranging from two to six. See Md. Const., Art. Ill, sec. 5. In 1922, Baltimore City became entitled to 36 Delegates, six from each district. Due to recent shifts in population Baltimore City’s representation is now almost at par. The four metropolitan counties have suffered. In 1950, a constitutional amendment, last ratified in 1956, froze the representation on a basis cal-calculated to some extent upon the figures of the Federal Census of 1940. This prevented the small counties from gaining increased representation as their population grew, at the expense of the larger counties and the legislative districts of Baltimore City, whose representation had long since reached the maximum and been frozen at six delegates. The complaint in the instant case is not that the Legislature has failed to obey any constitutional or statutory mandate, but that since 1956 it has repeatedly failed to enact proposals for constitutional amendments to set up a legislative body giving more weight to population than to geography as prescribed in the present Constitution. The crucial question in this case is whether Maryland courts can or should attempt to redress the alleged wrong.
Baker v. Carr, supra, was a civil action brought in the Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988, to redress an alleged deprivation of Federal rights. It sought a declaration that the 1901 Act of Tennessee was unconstitutional, and an injunction restraining the State Board of Election Supervisors from certifying any further elections under it.1 It further prayed that unless and until the General Assembly should enact a valid reapportionment, the District Court *443should either decree a reapportionment by mathematical application of the Tennessee constitutional formulae, or direct the appellees to conduct legislative elections, primary and general, at large. In reversing the three-judge Federal court and remanding the case to the District Court, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the right asserted was within the reach of judicial protection in the Federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 But there was no suggestion as to how the District Court should proceed. It would appear that the selection of a remedy was left to the ingenuity of the District Court, if and when it should find that the allegations of the bill were supported by proof of an invidious, and an otherwise irremediable, discrimination.
If we assume that no valid justification for the present allocation of representation in Maryland can be made, and that no remedial constitutional amendment can pass the Legislature,3 and relief by the calling of a Constitutional Convention is likewise unavailing,4 the instant case would seem to fall within the ambit of Baker v. Carr, supra. But there are points of distinction. If the Tennessee Act of 1901 were stricken down, and the Legislature were recalcitrant, it is conceivable that the District Court might there order an election to be held and the votes tallied in accordance with the mathematical formulae set out in the Tennessee Constitution. At least, the Court would not have to invent formulae for the purpose. On the other hand, if the provisions of the Maryland Constitution were stricken down there would remain no guide, standard or constitutional means whereby a legislative body could be *444constituted. Even if the Legislature should then meet and adopt a Constitutional amendment, grave doubts would arise as to their authority to act, even if all of their prior acts were hot put in question. The gravity of this situation has impressed other courts, see Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S. W. 2d 40 (Tenn.) (appeal dismissed 352 U. S. 920), State v. Zimmerman, 23 N. W. 2d 610 (Wis.) and Butcher v. Rice, 153 A. 2d 869 (Pa.), and led them to decline to intervene. There would also be a serious time lag before the people could vote upon the proposal and new elections could be held under an amendment so adopted.5
I believe it is a basic tenet of the common law, to which the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled under Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights, that judges do not make law but discover it. Thus, if a novel point is decided, or an erroneous decision is overruled in those rare instances that are permissible under the rule of stare decisis to which this Court adheres, the decision relates back to the beginning. Likewise, a decision construing a constitutional provision or statute relates back to the date of its adoption or enactment. It is for this reason that courts seek to find the popular or legislative intention contemporaneous to the adoption or enactment. It would seem to follow that a present declaration and construction of the Fourteenth Amendment would necessarily relate back to the time of its adoption, and not merely speak from the date of the declaration. In any event, it would seem that once a declaration is made, no court can suspend the operation and effect of the decision to a later date. Quite apart from the doctrine of relation back, an adjudication that the present Legislature is unconstitutionally constituted would destroy its power to enact even a proposed amendment to the Maryland Constitution.
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, suggested that the decision in that case might be applied prospectively, like a legislative enactment, but apparently the suggestion was not approved by any other member of the Supreme Court. In the New Jersey case, *445cited by the majority in the instant case, apparently the Supreme Court of that State made no declaration but merely retained jurisdiction with the clear intimation that, unless the Legislature should act before a dead line, which it fixed, a declaration would be made. I know of no Maryland precedent for such action.
The statement in the majority opinion in the instant case, that if the provisions of the Maryland Constitution, Art. Ill, secs. 2 and 5, were stricken down, in whole or in part, the Legislature would possess the power to remedy the situation, I think is gratuitous and unsupportable. The point is not properly before us under Maryland Rule 885, since it was not raised below, and was never mentioned in the arguments in this Court. See also Comptroller v. Aerial Products, 210 Md. 627, and Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369. In any event, the matter of how the Legislature shall be selected has always been regulated in Maryland by the Constitution itself. To my mind, no doctrine of plenary or inherent powers can take away a right to deal with a subject matter expressly reserved to the people of this State, and vest it in a legislative body. Cf. Bennett v. Jackson, 116 N. E. 921 (Ind.).
The opinion of a majority of the Court in the instant case goes even further. It directs the chancellor, upon proof of the allegations of the bill, to make a declaration striking down the provisions of one or more sections of the Constitution, but at the same time to defer the effectiveness of the declaration until after the expiration of the terms of office of the present members. I cannot understand how that can be done. But if it can, I cannot see how those members could enact legislation reapportioning and reconstituting the General Assembly in the teeth of constitutional provisions that are still in force and effect. Yet this is required, in addition to the passage of a constitutional amendment, as a condition precedent to the validity of the 1962 elections. The opinion further directs that a clause ratifying the proposed legislative reapportionment be included in the proposed constitutional amendment. It seems to me that this is an advisory opinion to a coordinate branch of the Government which is not a party to the suit, and a declaration in terrorem.
*446I find nothing in the Maryland law to support the proposition that reapportionment is a subject fit for judicial determination or action. In Art. Ill, sec. 19, of the Maryland Constitution it is provided that “each House shall be the judge of the qualifications and elections of its members, as prescribed by the Constitution and Daws of the State * * This is in line with Art. 8 of the Declaration of Rights concerning the separation of powers. This Court cannot require the legislature to take action within the scope of its prerogative, by mandamus or otherwise. Planning Commission v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 24; Connor v. Board of Supervisors, 212 Md. 379, 385; Watkins v. Watkins, 2 Md. 341. Cf. Fergus v. Marks, 152 N. E. 557 (Ill.). Of course, courts cannot compel the people to adopt a new Constitution. Under Art. I of the Declaration of Rights the people have “at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish the form of Government in such manner as they may deem expedient.” On the other hand the Legislature itself cannot impose non-judicial duties upon the courts of this State. Cromwell v. Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 28, and cases cited. The rule of judicial abstention is wider than the doctrine of separation of powers. The English and colonial precedents cited by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr denied judicial relief, even before the doctrine of separation of powers was enunciated. The rule of judicial abstention is sometimes based on a lade of jurisdiction, sometimes on judicial policy.
A declaratory judgment itself is not mandatory, but is limited to occasions where a declaration will serve a useful purpose or terminate controversy. Givner v. Cohen, 208 Md. 23, 37. Constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly. Liberto v. State’s Attorney, 223 Md. 356, 360. We have repeatedly held that this Court cannot render advisory opinions. Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471. Whether this court is prevented from deciding moot cases by a lack of jurisdiction or a rule of decision is beside the point.6 There is little dispute as to the end result.
The prayer in the bill wherein it is implied that, as an al*447ternative, elections at large should be decreed by the court and enforced through the agency of the Board of State Canvassers, set up by Code (1957), Art. 33, sec. 142, seems to me to be untenable. It has been held that the Board acts in a ministerial capacity only. Bowling v. Weakley, 181 Md. 496. Clearly, the Board has no statutory authority to reapportion. Moreover, Art. III, sec. 9 of the Maryland Constitution specifically requires that Senator and Delegate reside in the county or legislative district which he may be chosen to represent. It has been held that courts may order an election at large for members of the Federal House of Representatives. See Brown v. Saunders, 166 S. E. 105 (Va.), and Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355. But those cases turn on the fact that the Federal Constitution, Art. I, sec. 4, expressly confers upon Congress a power to legislate on the subject and that Congress has enacted legislation providing, in effect, that if the States fail to reapportion so as to equalize votes in Congressional elections according to the constitutional standard, elections shall be at large.7 There is no equivalent provision as to the members of State legislatures. Cf. Shriver v. Gray, 276 F. 2d 568 (C. A. 5th). Congress has no constitutional power to legislate on the subject, except interstitially, as in the Federal statutes upon which Baker v. Carr, supra, was based.
The appellants argue that even if we lack the power to enforce a declaration, it would serve a useful purpose. I venture to disagree. I think it is not within the realm of judicial propriety to issue a declaration in terrorem. In the words of Mr. Justice Clark this would amount to “blackjacking the Assembly.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion (p. 62, Footnote 151) said: “Appellants’ suggestion that, although no relief may need be given, jurisdiction ought to be retained as a ‘spur’ to legislative action does not merit discussion.” The suggestion was not discussed by any other of the members of the Court, in Baker v. Carr, supra. I assume, therefore, that the decision was predicated upon a finding that the Federal District Court possessed the authority to make a declaration effective, although the means was left to future determination.
*448The argument that convinces a majority of this Court seems to be that because we are obliged to follow the interpretation of the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court as the Supreme law of the land, we must take some action. It is true that this Court is as firmly bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court as are the Federal courts. But I venture to doubt that the Supreme Court can confer jurisdiction upon the State courts, even to enforce the Federal Constitution, if they possess no such power under the Constitution and laws of this State. Cf. Niemotko v. State, 194 Md. 247. In any event, I think the Supreme Court, in Baker, did not purport to deal with the authority of State courts at all. Nor do I think the remand of the case of Scholle v. Hare, 369 U. S. 429, forecloses the matter. The remand was for the purpose of allowing the Michigan court to give further consideration to the question presented in the light of Baker v. Carr. As I understand it, this was not an adjudication that the State court was not free to adopt its own view of the availability of a State remedy.
In Baker, the Supreme Court held that in an extreme case of disproportion in voting strength the Federal courts can and should “fashion” a judicial remedy. It did not hold that there must be a State remedy. On the contrary, in the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Brennan, he said (pp. 235-237- of 369 U. S.) : “* * * in Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S. W. 2d 40, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that it could not invalidate the very statute at issue in the case at bar, but its holding rested on its state law of remedies, i. e., the state view of de facto officers, and not on any view that the norm for legislative apportionment in Tennessee is not numbers of qualified voters resident in the several counties. Of course this Court was there precluded by the adequate state ground, and in dismissing the appeal, 352 U. S. 920, we cited Anderson, supra, [343 U. S. 912] as well as Colegrove [328 U. S. 549]. Nor does the Tennessee court’s decision in that case bear upon this, for just as in Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 19 N. W. 2d 914, and Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184, 177 F. Supp. 803, a state court’s inability to grant relief does not bar a federal court’s assuming jurisdiction to inquire *449into alleged deprivation of Eederal constitutional rights. Problems of relief also controlled in Radford v. Gary, 352 U. S. 991, affirming the District Court’s refusal to mandamus the Governor to call a session of the legislature, to mandamus the legislature then to apportion, and if they did not comply, to mandamus the State Supreme Court to do so. And Matthews v. Handley, 361 U. S. 127, affirmed a refusal to strike down the State’s gross income tax statute—urged on the ground that the legislature was malapportioned—that had rested on the adequacy of available State legal remedies for suits involving that tax, including challenges to its constitutionality. Lastly, Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U. S. 804, in which Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in this Court’s refusal to note the appeal from a dismissal for want of equity, is sufficiently explained by his statement in Cook v. Portson, supra: ‘The discretionary exercise or nonexercise of equitable or declaratory judgment jurisdiction * * * in one case is not precedent in another case where the facts differ.’ 329 U. S., at 678, n. 8.” Mr. Justice Clark in his concurring opinion also cited the Kidd and Anderson cases as resting upon adequate state grounds to support the State judgments. It would seem that no member of the Supreme Court, with the possible exception of Mr. Justice Douglas, thought that the Kidd case was overruled, or that the ruling in Baker precluded the State courts from adopting their own views as to the availability of State remedies.
Since I find nothing in the prior decisions of this Court that would support the exercise of an equitable remedy under the allegations of the bill, I think the chancellor’s dismissal of the bill should be affirmed. Judge Plorney authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views here expressed.
. One point left open in Baker was whether the local Boards of Election were indispensable parties.
. It is a somewhat ironic thought that if the Supreme Court had not declined to examine the evidence, on the ground that it was a political question, it would probably have been compelled to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment itself was never validly adopted. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 450.
. A bill designed to that end failed of passage by only two votes in the recent Legislative session.
. The Attorney General argues that the failure to call a Constitutional Convention after the election of 1950 was not due to the recalcitrance of the Legislature or any other State official, but because there was not the requisite number of votes to meet the requirements of the Maryland Constitution, Art. XIV, sec. 3.
. It should be noted that the members of the Legislature are elected for four years in Maryland, Art. Ill, sec. 6.
. See Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43.
. See 2 U. S. C. § 4.