OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.This is an appeal from the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR) which denied PrimePay, LLC’s (Employer) request for a remand to produce after-discovered evidence of Mary T. Mack’s (Claimant) criminal activity against Employer.
Claimant was employed as a customer service representative and claims processor from October 2005, until March 28, 2007. Claimant was on approved medical leave of absence from March 29, 2007, through June 20, 2007, due to complications with pregnancy. Claimant requested, and was granted, an extension of her leave. Claimant was to return to work on Monday, July 9, 2007. Late on the evening of Sunday, July 8, 2007, Claimant emailed her supervisor and informed her that the babysitter unexpectedly quit and childcare was unavailable for the next day. On Monday, July 9, 2007, Claimant notified her supervisor that she could not report to work on Tuesday. Claimant was told that if she did not return to work on Wednesday, July 11, 2007, she would be terminated. Claimant did not return to work and was terminated.
Claimant’s application for unemployment benefits was denied under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation *686Law (Law), 43 P.S. § 801(e) 1. The Unemployment Service Center concluded Claimant was discharged for absenteeism, Claimant was warned about absenteeism and she did not establish good cause for the last absence.
Claimant appealed and at the hearing on August 28, 2007, Employer’s operations manager, Judy Weber (Weber), testified that Claimant was unable to state for certain when she would return, although she told Weber that her aunt, who could babysit, would be back from vacation in a week. Notes of Testimony, August 28, 2007 (N.T.), at 7; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 11a. Employer’s human relations department decided that because there was no time frame for Claimant’s return, and because Claimant had already been granted an extension of her leave, she would be terminated if she did not return on Wednesday. N.T. at 10; R.R. at 14a.
Claimant testified that she told Weber that she would have a babysitter by Monday, July 16, 2007. N.T. at 15; R.R. at 19a. Even though she was available as of July 16, 2007, Employer nevertheless terminated her employment.
The referee resolved conflicting testimony in favor of the Employer and found that Claimant failed to inform Employer that she would have childcare in place as of the following week. The referee held that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law beginning with waiting week ending July 14, 2007. However, finding that Claimant was available for work as of July 16, 2007, the referee held that she was eligible for benefits under Section 402(d)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1), beginning with waiting week ending July 21, 2007.
Both parties appealed from the referee’s decision. Employer also requested a remand to the referee for consideration of after-discovered evidence of Claimant’s criminal conduct. Employer alleged that after Claimant was terminated, Employer discovered that Claimant had misappropriated over $4,500 using her home computer and accessing Employer’s computer system.2 One week after the hearing, Claimant was arrested and charged with over 200 counts of computer theft, computer trespass, unlawful use of a computer, and other related crimes connected to her employment and the unauthorized theft of Employer’s funds. According to Employer, Claimant confessed to the arresting officer and was awaiting trial. Employer alleged that if the evidence had been discovered prior to Claimant’s discharge Employer would have discharged Claimant for willful misconduct.
The UCBR found that Claimant had good cause for not returning to work and credited her testimony that she informed Employer that she could return to work the following week. The UCBR held that Claimant was not ineligible for compensation pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Law. The UCBR also denied Employer’s request for a remand, and concluded, based *687on Preservation Pennsylvania v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 673 A.2d 1044 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), that the alleged criminal conduct was “unrelated” to Claimant’s discharge from employment; therefore, Claimant was eligible for benefits under Preservation Pennsylvania.
On appeal to this Court3, Employer contends that a remand is warranted in this case pursuant to this Court’s holding in Preservation Pennsylvania. This Court must agree.
It is well settled that to disqualify an employee from receiving unemployment benefits, the employer must prove: (1) the employee was engaged in willful misconduct; and (2) that the willful misconduct was the “actual reason” or the “cause” for the employee’s separation from employment. Gallagher v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36 Pa.Cmwlth. 599, 388 A.2d 785 (1978).
Preservation Pennsylvania carved out a narrow exception to this rule to allow after-discovered evidence of criminal conduct against the employer when the employer could not have known of the conduct prior to the employment separation. Now, an employer may meet its burden if it proves “by after discovered evidence” that the willful misconduct was concealed, and had the employer been aware of the conduct, it would have terminated the employee. In other words, Preservation Pennsylvania allows the employer to prove, after the fact, that it would have terminated the employee if it had been aware of the concealed misconduct.
The Board argues that the exception enunciated in Preservation Pennsylvania only allows for after-discovered evidence where there is a causal relationship between the actual termination and the employee’s criminal acts. The Board relies on the following excerpt from the case, in particular the emphasized language:
Thus where evidence of an employee’s embezzlement of an employer’s funds, or other criminal conduct committed against an employer which causes the employee’s unemployment, is received within a reasonable period of time after the employee’s separation and the employer promptly acts to contest a determination of eligibility of benefits, the Board is not deprived of authority to permit evidence of the after-discovered criminal conduct. (Emphasis added).
Preservation Pennsylvania, 673 A.2d at 1048.
The holding in Preservation Pennsylvania did not turn, as the Board suggests, on the fact that the real or “actual reason” for the termination related to or was caused by the employee’s embezzlement. In Preservation Pennsylvania, the embezzlement drained the employer’s funds and the employee was furloughed as a result of her employer’s inability to pay her salary. The case was decided in that context. Contrary to the Board’s analysis, whether the “actual reason” the employee in that case was separated from employment, i.e., furloughed due to the employer’s inability to pay her salary, was a consequence of her embezzlement, was not the test outlined in Preservation Pennsylvania. Rather, Preservation Pennsylvania allows an employer to turn the clock back and substitute after-discovered misconduct for whatever the “actual reason” was for the *688separation, so long as employer proves that the employee concealed the misconduct while employed.
Contrary to the Board’s position, the emphasized language in Preservation Pennsylvania does not compel a different result. While the opinion was written to address the specific factual situation presented, there is nothing in the opinion which suggests that its holding is limited to situations where the misconduct and the actual termination are interrelated. Indeed, to allow benefits merely because the actual reason for the employee’s termination happened not to be related to his concealed criminal misconduct defies logic and serves no purpose. Likewise, to deny benefits only where the criminal misconduct happens to result in circumstances that lead to the actual termination would leave the question of eligibility to mere coincidence, with no rational basis between denying and granting benefits. That is not what this Court intended in Preservation Pennsylvania.
Here, Claimant stole money from Employer while she was employed. Because Claimant concealed her misdeeds, Employer did not discover the theft until after she was terminated for absenteeism. Had Employer known about the theft, Claimant would have been fired for willful misconduct. It does not matter one iota that Claimant’s criminal misconduct was not related to the actual reason she was terminated, i.e., she was fired for absenteeism. The issue is not whether the criminal conduct was related to the discharge. The issue is whether the Claimant concealed from Employer criminal conduct which, had the Employer known, would have resulted in her discharge. Employer should be permitted to offer evidence of Claimant’s criminal conduct and argue, absent Claimant’s concealment, it would have fired her for such misconduct. This Court is constrained to conclude that the Board abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law when it denied Employer’s request for a remand.
Accordingly, the Board is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of November, 2008, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
. Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended.
. In its Brief, Employer refers to portions of Claimant’s testimony concerning charges incurred under Employer's flexible spending plan, a fringe benefit that allows employees to make pre-tax contributions to the plan and then make payments for medical expenses, prescriptions and co-pays by using a "flex card.” Employer presented into evidence records showing that Claimant's contributions to her plan totaled $1,500 and that she used her flex-card to pay for $6000.97 in charges. Claimant acknowledged that the flexible spending plan fell under her department and that she could authorize transactions under the plan. However, Claimant did not recall using the flex-card to overdraw her account. N.T. at 17-19; R.R. at 21a-23a.
. This Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 955 A.2d 1070 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008)