*1265DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge BUTLER.I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “[bjecause the family court did not make a specific finding that C.S. was the perpetrator of abuse of the minor supported by substantial evidence, we must vacate the BHA’s order dismissing C.S.’s appeal, and remand for a hearing before the BHA at which time DHS or DPW has the burden to prove, by substantial evidence, that C.S. abused the minor.” Majority Op. at 1264, n. 4. .
More specifically, it is my view that there was a specific finding by The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas— Family Court Division (family court), which was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, that C.S. was the perpetrator of abuse of the minor — not the sole or exclusive perpetrator but, nevertheless, that C.S. was the perpetrator. Moreover, it is my view that the specific findings were supported by substantial evidence. And additionally, in my view, the majority erred in the following characterization of the “proof’ requirement in this case:
Here, in order to deny C.S. expungement of the indicated report on the Child Line Registry, DHS or DPW must prove by substantial evidence that C.S. abused the minor, and cannot rely on the factual findings made by the family court that C.S. was the perpetrator of abuse based on prima facie evidence.
Majority Op. at 1264. But see In Interest of J.R.W., 428 Pa.Super. 597, 681 A.2d 1019, 1024 (1998) (wherein the Superior Court noted that the prima facie “standard of establishing abuse by the caretakers, coupled with the clear and convincing evidence necessary to find dependency, has been imposed by the Legislature as the standard which the Juvenile Court must apply in deciding abuse cases” as the fact of abuse “must be established by clear and convincing evidence”).
This is -a petition by C.S., Sr., (Petitioner), the father and indicated perpetrator of the abuse of a minor referred to herein as C.S. The petition requests this Court’s review of an Order and Decree of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Bureau of Hearings Appeals (BHA), affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) and the DPW to file an indicated report of child abuse against the father with the Childline Registry. More specifically, the BHA concluded that Petitioner’s appeal should be dismissed because it constituted an improper collateral attack against the finding by the Philadelphia Family Court that Petitioner abused C.S.
Petitioner contends that “BHA erred in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal, finding that the related dependency case was a collateral attack when the related dependency case applies a lower standard of proof than the BHA appeal.” Petitioner’s Brief at 9. The majority characterizes the issue slightly different:
On appeal, C.S. argues that BHA erred in dismissing his appeal without holding an administrative hearing on the merits because DPW had to prove with substantial evidence that he was the perpetrator of abuse of the minor. C.S. contends that it was error to rely on the findings of the family court, which found him to be the perpetrator of abuse by the lesser standard of prima facie evidence.
Majority Op. at Í255-56.
DHS filed an indicated report of child abuse with the Childline Registry against Petitioner as the father of C.S., the child in question. DHS also filed a dependency petition against the father on behalf of C.S. In the related dependency matter, a decision was issued in Philadelphia Family *1266Court finding that DHS presented clear and convincing, evidence that the subject child was abused, and that prima facie evidence was presented that the parents were the perpetrators of the abuse. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the family court decision. In Re: C.S., Jr., a Minor, Appeal of C.S., Sr., Father, (Pa.Super. No. 1353 EDA 2007, filed December 31, 2007). With regard to the indicated report, Petitioner filed an. appeal with the BHA, challenging DHS’ filing of the indicated report with the Childline Registry. To reiterate, the latter referenced appeal was dismissed by the BHA, and is now before this Court on a petition for review.
The BHA, adopting the recommendation of the ALJ in its entirety, held that Petitioner’s appeal should be dismissed because it constituted an unlawful collateral attack against the finding by the Philadelphia Family Court that C.S. was abused by Petitioner. Excerpts from the findings of the ALJ explain with considerable clarity,the legal issues.
In the instant case, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas — Family Court Division held that [Petitioner] committed child abuse against subject child. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed this decision. Since the family court already decided the issue that is the subject of [Petitioner’s] appeal with the BHA [(i.e., the existence of child abuse and the identification of the father as the perpetrator of that abuse)] [Petitioner’s] BHA appeal is a collateral attack on the family court judgment. [Petitioner] argues that the family court decision does not affect the BHA case because of the different burden of proof. [(Emphasis added)]. Specifically, in family court, prima facie evidence is the burden of proof used to identify a perpetrator of abuse. In a BHA case, the burden of proof is substantial evidence. Since substantial evidence has been defined as preponderance of the evidence, it is a higher burden of proof than prima facie.
However, the prima facie burden of proof in family court is part of a two step standard of proof. Specifically, the issue of whether a child has been abused is decided using the clear and convincing standard. If abuse is found, then, the identity of the perpetrator ■ is decided using the prima facie standard. The Pennsylvania Superior Court explained this split burden of proof: [in] In the Interest of J.R.W., 428 Pa.Super. 597, 631 A.2d 1019, 1024 (1993).
As such, family court uses a higher or comparable burden of proof. The clear and convincing standard is higher than the BHA’s substantial evidence standard. After there is clear and convincing evidence of abuse, the Legislature determined with the above-[referenced] appellate court’s approval that the likelihood of anyone committing the abuse other than a custodian of the child is so small that prima facie is sufficient against a custodian of the child. Furthermore, the more serious impact of a family court’s decision in comparison to that of a BHA decision indicates that the principle of collateral attack applies.
Adjudication of ALJ at 5.
So, from my perspective, the . issue before this Court is somewhat straightforward. Did the BHA err as a matter of law when it held that the appeal by C.S.’s father should be dismissed because it was an improper collateral attack on the Philadelphia Family Court decision?
This issue is very similar to one of the issues raised and discussed in this Court’s opinion in K.R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 950 A.2d 1069 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008). In K.R., this Court held, inter alia:
before a court can make a determination that a child is dependent because of *1267child abuse, the burden is on the petitioner to show that the juvenile was abused by clear and convincing evidence.
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While clear and convincing evidence is required to prove child abuse in a dependency adjudication, the court’s findings as to the identity of the abusers need only be established by prima facie evidence.
K.R., 950 A.2d at 1075 (emphasis added). (These issues were most recently addressed' by this Court in C.J. v. Department of Public Welfare 960 A.2d 494 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), which also cited, very approvingly, K.R.; note specifically pages 496 and 498-499 of C.J.).
In K.R., this Court also referenced, and rejected, an argument that was very similar to that of the Petitioner in the case sub judice. In K.R., “the appellants argued that if the Act affords the trial court jurisdiction to make a finding of abuse, the identity of the abuser may not be established on a prima facie basis, but must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 1076.
Petitioner’s argument was also rejected by our Superior Court in the family court appeal related to the case sub judice.
DHS, for purposes of dependency, had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that child abuse occurred. It did not have to establish by clear and convincing evidence, that it was at Father’s hand; rather, DHS had only to establish a prima facie case that the abuse occurred as a result of Father’s. acts or omissions. In other words, if the burden of proof were the same to show who caused the injuries and whether there were serious injuries caused, Father might have an arguable claim. While the evidence of the injuries caused must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, once that is shown, prima facie evidence is sufficient to establish that the primary caretakers are responsible. Left uncontradicted and unexplained, we conclude that DHS established a prima facie case against Father.
In Re: C.S., slip op. at 4.
Moreover, in K.R., this Court specifically addressed the issue of due process which is at the heart of Petitioner’s argument against his being barred from collaterally attacking the decision of the family court.
Based on the principles set forth in J.R.W. and J.G. [v. DPW, 795 A.2d 1089 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002)], it is clear that the Secretary may rely on the factual findings of the trial court in a dependency adjudication to dismiss an appeal for a request for expungement. Here, similar to J.G., K.R.’s appeal is from a “founded” report of child abuse and, thus, the issue before this Court is one of law regarding the due process owed. Accordingly, if the findings made in the dependency proceeding in this case establish that K.R. abused the minors, it is unnecessary to provide K.R. with a separate administrative hearing to establish that K.R. abused the minors.
K.R., 950 A.2d at 1078.
Though there was only an “indicated report” of child abuse in this case involving C.S., as distinguished from the “founded report” in K.R. and C.J., for purposes of our analysis in this case, the difference is not significant.1 See Section 6303 of the *1268Child Protective Services Law, as amended, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303; and Section 6302 of the Juvenile Justice Act, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. In each of the three cases there were judicial findings that there was clear and convincing evidence of dependency, and prima facie evidence of abuse. I agree with the AL J that “family court uses a higher or comparable burden of proof,” than that used in expunction proceedings before the BHA. (Adjudication of ALJ at 5).
So, this Court specifically rejected in K.R., the Petitioner’s argument herein, that “BHA erred in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal based on collateral attack, since collateral attac[k] can not occur when different standards of proof exist in each case.” Petitioner’s Brief at 8 (emphasis added). The different standards of proof in each case are not legally significant in the matter before the Court. As this Court’s decision in K.R. (as applied in C.J.) should control the outcome herein, the order of the BHA should be affirmed. Therefore, I must dissent to the majority opinion which vacates the order of the BHA arid remands for a hearing before the BHA.
. Even though the DHS chose not to convert its "indicated report” of abuse to'a "founded report,” as the county agencies did in K.R and C.J., the action of DHS was the judicial equivalent of converting its "indicated report” to a "founded report” for purposes of the instant petition for review, given the legislative deter-ruination that evidentiary findings of child abuse sufficient to support dependency adjudications are also sufficient to warrant and sustain founded reports of child abuse with the Childline Registry. Evidentiary findings sufficient to sustain founded reports of child *1268abuse are certainly sufficient to sustain an indicated report.
Very much like the facts in K.R. and C.J., in this case, there was an "indicated report” of abuse; a trial on the merits of dependency petitions, with findings of abuse based upon clear and convincing evidence, and a finding as to the identity of the abuser based upon prima facie evidence; there were appeals of the trial court’s decisions to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court decisions; and there were collateral proceedings by the abusers challenging, unsuccessfully, the indicated/founded reports.
The only significant factual difference in the three cases was that after the trial court proceedings, the county agencies in K.R. and C.J. summarily changed the reports of abuse from "indicated” to "founded,” based exclusively on the adjudicated decisions by the trial courts. For whatever reason, in C.S., DHS did not make the summary change from "indicated” report to "founded” report. The latter notwithstanding, the evidentiary legal principles of K.R. and C.J. are very much applicable to this case. (As an aside, if DHS had chosen to convert the indicated report in this case to a founded report, this case would have been rendered moot because there is no right to appeal a founded report).