(concurring):
My view of this case differs enough from those of my colleagues to warrant a brief outline first of the facts and then of my conclusion therefrom.
Appellant, represented by an attorney, sought to execute on the two judgments it had earlier obtained against the appellees in these cases — one in the Civil Division and the other in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the trial court. The sparse records before us reflect that the trial ju4ge, without comment, denied leave to appellant to file a wage attachment against appellee Johnson;1 and refused by written order to enter a judgment of condemnation upon a garnishment which appellant had issued against the garnishee of appellees, the Boyds, with a comment that the original judgment obtained by appellant “may be void under authority” of Marshall v. Burleson, D.C.App., 313 A. 2d 587 (1973) (Emphasis added.) Appellant now challenges the propriety of these actions by the trial court.
Since appellant in this court does not dispute it was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, as defined recently by our decision in Marshall, when it had earlier obtained the judgments in these cases, I proceed on that assumption, also. The issue then posed, as I see it, is whether ndw we should either (1) declare these judgments void, or (2) refuse to permit their enforcement and leave them dangling on our court system’s dockets like so many useless appendages.
The general rule is that for a judgment valid on its face to be declared void there must be a defect going to its very essence. I find no authority which persuades me that a judgment obtained through the unauthorized practice of law under the circumstances disclosed here is so utterly flawed that it must as a matter of law be voided.2 Nor do I find anything in Marshall3 that requires us to reach that conclusion.
*364Hence we are left in my view with the question whether we should as a matter of public policy and equity declare that there shall be no execution upon any extant judgment obtained through what Marshall declared was the unauthorized practice of law.
While this court should not, after our explicit ruling in Marshall, sanction further unauthorized practice of law by collection agencies, we must recognize that to declare unenforceable the facially valid judgments in the instant cases because they were obtained in violation of the principles later announced in Marshall would effectively render unenforceable every judgment presently of record in the name of a collection agency. The resulting confusion between creditors and debtors in the District of Columbia would be quite contrary to public policy and equity. Specifically, if a judgment, valid on its face, held in the name of a collection agency is rendered unenforceable, the creditor would appear to be foreclosed from further proceedings on the debt. Alternatively, the debtor, unless the statute of limitations has run, might be liable also to the creditor for the underlying debt and be left with two judgments of record against him on but one obligation.
Balancing the considerations of public policy and equity,4 I think we are required to permit the enforcement of judgments in favor of collection agencies entered of record at the time of Marshall, provided their subsequent enforcement complies with the applicable rules of the court.5 See Bump v. Barnett, supra.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court and allow appellant to proceed to enforce its judgments.
. Appellee Johnson neither filed a brief nor entered an appearance in this court.
. See Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d 7579 (1944). Appellees cite City of Downey v. Johnson, 263 Cal.App.2d 775, 69 Cal.Rptr. 830 (1968) and Leonard v. Walsh. 73 Ill.App.2d 45, 220 N.E.2d 57 (1966) for the proposition that such judgments are void. In my view, these decisions are inapplicable to the case at bar, for both involved judgments secured by non-lawyers acting in a representative capacity and were voided on appeal rather than on collateral attack. I perceive no reason to extend the reasoning of those cases to the facts disclosed on this record.
.Appellees argue that the injunction approved in Marshall specifically applies to actions taken by appellant in attempting to enforce its pre-Marshall judgments, and that such actions are simply a continuation of its unauthorized practice of law. I do not think Marshall is dispositive of the issue raised here, for that opinion nowhere purports to decide the effect to be given judgments entered prior to its rendition.
. Appellees have never challenged the validity of the original obligations upon which appellant sued and obtained its judgments. Nor have appellees attacked by appropriate motion in the trial court or on brief and in argument in this court the validity of these judgments on their merits; hence the proposition suggested in the dissenting opinion (at 365) that those judgments were entered contrary to law is not before us and I would not consider that which has not been developed on the record and briefed and argued.
. In the instant cases I understand appellant at oral argument to have waived its 20% fee for services rendered to its own client, the creditor.