dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is my view that the robbery was still in progress when Mr. Jackson was shot. If that is so, under Maryland law, as it existed at the time of the shooting, Mr. Sydnor had the right to shoot Mr. Jackson. It helps, I think, to revisit the facts.
Mr. Sydnor was peaceably sitting on the steps of a house in Baltimore City. He was unarmed, and so far as the record reflects, minding his own business. Mr. Jackson came down the street looking for someone to rob. He saw the defendant sitting on the steps and made the fatal mistake of thinking that Mr. Sydnor, sitting so peaceably, would give up his money upon being threatened by Mr. Jackson’s handgun. Such was not the case.
Mr. Jackson brandished a handgun at the defendant and demanded his money. It appears that this threatening display was not sufficient to cause Mr. Sydnor to give up his money. Mr. Jackson then made another mistake; he began to beat the defendant over the head with the gun, while forcibly removing $30.00 from the pockets of Mr. Sydnor. In addition to being an unkind act, this was another mistake, as it raised the ire of the defendant and he began to scuffle with Mr. Jackson. The altercation moved from the steps, to the curb, and perhaps even into the street where Mr. Sydnor eventually wrestled the gun from the possession of Mr. Jackson.
It can be presumed that Mr. Jackson, who a moment before had been removing Mr. Sydnor’s money through violent means, upon having his handgun taken by the defendant, realized that he had made a mistake in his choice of victims; nonetheless, he continued to attempt to complete the robbery by carrying away Mr. Sydnor’s money. He was not fast enough — bullets were faster.
The defendant was not convinced that the robbery was complete because his money and the robber were still on the scene, even though Mr. Jackson was attempting to complete the robbery by asportation. The defendant decided to remain with his money, albeit that his money was in the hands or *224pockets of another. The money was still not completely gone from Mr. Sydnor’s possession; it had not yet been carried away, so he thought, and so do I. It was right there. And he, Mr. Sydnor, had Mr. Jackson’s gun, that had, but mere moments before, been drumming a tune upon his head.
Mr. Sydnor, while attempting to forestall the carrying away of his money and the consummation of the robbery, affirmed his possession of the money, by denying Mr. Jackson the opportunity to immediately carry away the money. In the process, Mr. Jackson got shot with his own gun, several times, and subsequently died.
The activities of the morning of December 9,1998 took place in an exceedingly short span of time and distance. From the time of the accosting of Mr. Sydnor by Mr. Jackson with the gun, to the report to the police that the shots were fired, less than two minutes passed and less than, in my view, twenty-one feet were traversed.1 I believe that Mr. Jackson was struck *225by the bullets approximately five to probably no more than twenty feet from where the fight for the gun terminated. In the intervals of time and distance between when Mr. Jackson began the robbery and when he was shot, Mr. Jackson had demanded Mr. Sydnor’s money at gunpoint, an argument had ensued over whether Mr. Sydnor was willing to relinquish his money, Mr. Jackson then beat the defendant about his head with the gun, and forcibly removed Mr. Sydnor’s money. Mr. Jackson then wrestled with Mr. Sydnor for the gun, moving into the street in the process. Upon losing possession of the gun, Mr. Jackson turned and ran probably between sixty and two hundred forty inches before the bullets struck him. After he was shot, he may have run further before he collapsed. In my view, the robbery was ongoing as Mr. Jackson and the stolen money were still in the immediate vicinity and Mr. Sydnor had a right to attempt to retain what was his, using the gun as necessary. He had the right to keep Mr. Jackson from carrying away his money and completing the robbery. That Mr. Jackson had afforded Mr. Sydnor the opportunity to use a gun to forestall the robbery, by bringing the gun to the robbery, should not afford Mr. Jackson the right to carry away the money when he, Mr. Jackson, no longer had the gun. Under the majority’s theory, a robber can rob a victim at gunpoint, then hand the gun to the victim and walk away with impunity.
I do not believe that, had Mr. Sydnor tackled Mr. Jackson, and physically, using non-lethal force, asserted his control over his money, that the majority would hold, under the circumstances of this case, that Mr. Sydnor was engaged in a subsequent robbery of Mr. Jackson. In that case, the majori*226ty would, I believe, hold that the robbery by Mr. Jackson of Mr. Sydnor was not complete, and, under those circumstances, would not hold that Mr. Sydnor was assaulting Mr. Jackson.
I do not believe that the average citizen of Maryland, no matter what their status in life, has to permit themselves to be robbed. Had a bank employee shot a robber leaving from in front of the bank, I have little doubt that the majority would hold that the robbery was still in progress. It should be no different for the average person.
Mr. Sydnor took the means, an appropriate and, unarguably, effective means then available to him, to stop the robbery. I am a believer in the rule of law. But I do not believe that it requires victims of violent crimes to submit to being robbed and beaten at gunpoint, without the right to respond with all necessary force during the act. Had Mr. Sydnor possessed his own weapon, rather than wrestling Mr. Jackson’s from him, the majority, presumably, would even then hold that, once Mr. Jackson turned away, Mr. Sydnor could not have then used his gun to reclaim his money even though it was a mere second, and mere feet or even inches, from the time and place where the money was taken. If that is to be the law, it should not be. The law should not be changed to require complacent and compliant victims. Before today, forcible robberies could be resisted with all force.
I believe that the law is better stated in the Kentucky case of Flynn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 572, 573, 264 S.W. 1111, 1112 (1924), where the Court said, in relevant part:
The right to kill in defending against a robbery does not end as soon as there is such a change of possession of the property taken as will render the crime technically complete, but remains with the owner as long as his property is in his immediate presence, and the killing of the robber will prevent it from being taken away.
The Georgia courts have held similarly. In Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 705-06, 17 S.E. 628, 630 (1892), overruled on other grounds, Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938), the Georgia Supreme Court held:
*227The taking was not a past, but a present and progressing injury; and if the defendant acted under a reasonable belief that the purpose of the taking was robbery, he had the right to arrest it in the manner he did, although there may have already been such a change in possession as would in law amount to a robbery. The right of the owner of property to defend it against a felonious taking, to the extent if necessary of killing the person taking, does not end at the moment the guilt of that person is technically complete. It extends not merely to the prevention of such asportation as may be sufficient to render the person guilty of robbery, and which may be effected by the slightest change of possession, but to the prevention of his carrying off the property which he has thus gotten from the owner. The object of the law being to allow the owner to protect his property against the robber, it would be unreasonable to hold that at the moment such asportation is accomplished, and before the robber has gotten away with the article taken, the right of the owner to defend his property is at an end; and that where the moment before he could have lawfully killed in defense of it, he must yield after the slightest change of possession has been effected, and if he then killed the robber to prevent the article from being carried off, would be guilty of murder.
As I view the facts of the instant case, Mr. Sydnor’s money was still in his immediate presence, and he killed Mr. Jackson to prevent it from being “carried” away. The proof is in the evidence. Mr. Jackson’s body was probably within fifteen or twenty feet of the place where the physical altercation, which was a part of the robbery, terminated near the curb. Transcripts of the calls to 911 indicated that the shots were heard within two minutes of the initial accosting of Mr. Sydnor by the armed Mr. Jackson.
This is not a case where Mr. Sydnor saw Mr. Jackson on the street a week after the robbery, and shot him in order to get his money back. In the present case, Mr. Jackson had not initially left the scene — in fact he never left it. He was still attempting to complete the robbery, by carrying the stolen *228money away, when he was stopped by gunfire. The majority’s position apparently is that victims who are' robbed by armed force, must do nothing to stop the robber from escaping, once the robber turns away with their money in his hands and takes several steps. The majority does not sufficiently address the fact that robbery is not only a taking of property by force, but it is a forcible taking and carrying away of property. At the time he was shot, Mr. Jackson was carrying away property he had, just seconds before, taken by force and at gunpoint.
The majority confuses the law of self-defense, with the different and separate rules relating to the use of force by a victim to prevent a robbery. Doing so primarily by skillfully melding the two concepts together in its discussion. In my view, they are very different concepts and historically have been treated as such. In short, any degree of force can be used to stop a forcible robbery in progress. The law of self-defense discussed by the majority may well be right, in its proper place. However, it simply is not, for the most part, applicable to a forcible robbery in progress, and the combining of two concepts into a self-defense concept, is, I respectfully suggest, inappropriate. The entire law of duty to retreat is out of place in a case of resistance to a forcible robbery. It has heretofore been the law in Maryland that while the forcible robbery continues, it can be resisted with all force available to the victim. Though self-defense is correctly described by the majority — this is not a “self-defense” case. It is a resistance to an ongoing robbery case. It makes no difference whether Mr. Sydnor was still under attack, or whether Mr. Jackson had turned away, as it might in a case of self-defense in an assault case. This is a robbery case — the rules are, and have always been, different.
Although some of the Maryland cases cited by the majority include charges of robbery as collateral charges, not a single case involved the use of deadly force to stymie a forcible robbery. To the extent that self-defense was a part of the cases, it was in its traditional sense, not as it relates to the right to use force, to forestall or prevent the completion of a *229forcible robbery. Not a single Maryland robbery case supports the position the majority takes. All of the cases cited by the majority that facially support its position, are traditional self-defense cases.
Additionally, the majority states that Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 699 A.2d 1170 (1997), Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979), and Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258, 744 A.2d 1 (2000), are really not applicable because they stand for the proposition that a “continuous offense” theory only applies when there is a need for a robbery to be continuing so that there is a felony to support a conviction under the felony-murder rule. In my view, such a proposition is unacceptably inconsistent. As indicated, infra, a robbery is continuous or it is not. To proffer that a robbery is continuous because the commission of a robbery is needed to support a conviction of felony-murder (murder committed in the course of a robbery), but not continuous when it would support an acquittal of a person defending against the same robbery, is simply, in my view, with all due respect to the majority, unacceptable in terms of consistency, intellectual honesty, fairness, and due process. There should not be differing standards supporting the State’s desire for conviction and a defendant’s desire for an acquittal. Both the State and the defendant should be subject to the same rules.
The majority holds that the “continuous offense” theory does not expand or trump the general self-defense rule. No one argues that anything is being “expanded” or “trumped.” The concepts have coexisted for centuries. One concept applies to robberies in progress, and one applies in other circumstances. What the majority is attempting is to swallow the separate and distinct rule relating to robberies in progress, digest it, and, sufficiently muddled, disgorge it as a new self-defense rule applicable to robberies. It is the majority, in essence, that seeks to limit a pre-existing theory, or to trump it, by holding that the general rule controls the specific. Under the guise of asserting that the concept never existed, or never meant what it was asserted to mean, the majority, for the first time in the history of the State, requires victims to sit *230meekly while violent robbers consummate the robbery by carrying away their property. Presumably, businesses, including banks, must, in the future, let robbers walk out the door once they turn away from the cash register or teller’s cages.
With the position taken by the majority in this case, Maryland will find itself in the incongruous position of asserting that force used by a robber after the time of the actual taking is sufficient to sustain that a robbery is continuing, but not sufficient to justify the victim’s use of force at the identical point in time to regain possession of the property before it is carried away. In Ball v. State, supra, Ball, who was in the process of burglarizing a residence when the victim returned home, asserted that he had not committed a robbery because he had already taken the property from the master bedroom when he turned a comer in one of the rooms and ran into the victim, who he then shot and killed. He asserted, therefore, that he had not used force to effectuate the taking of the property, because he killed the victim after he had taken the property. The Court noted that: “Under Appellant’s theory, guilt must be assessed as of the exact point in time at which asportation of the property occurs, without regard to any events thereafter.” Id. at 185, 699 A.2d at 1183. After discussing a case in which the Court of Special Appeals had adopted the “continuing offense” definition of robbery,2 we noted, after discussing a split in authority among the states, that:
Other courts, in contrast, have interpreted robbery as a continuous transaction that is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety----
Another suggested justification for the “continuous offense” approach is that when a thief must use force to retain possession of the property, the thief does not acquire full possession of the property until the force or threat of force *231overcomes the custodian’s resistance to the taking. Stated in other words, a “taking” does not occur until the perpetrator has neutralized any immediate interference with his or her possession. The point of asportation thus is not absolutely determinative.... On the other hand, the crime is continuous and not completed until the parties have reached temporary safety.
Id. at 185-88, 699 A.2d at 1184-85 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). We then adopted the “continuous offense” reasoning, saying, in relevant part: “If, as in the instant case, the use of force enables the accused to retain possession of the property in the face of immediate resistance from the victim, then the taking is properly considered a robbery.” Id. at 188, 699 A.2d at 1185 (emphasis added).
Under the Ball holding, if Mr. Sydnor had not wrestled the gun from Mr. Jackson, but had still run after Mr. Jackson to attempt to regain his property, and had Mr. Jackson then shot Mr. Sydnor, the shooting would have been committed during the robbery. But, under the majority’s reasoning in the instant case, the reverse is not so. According to the majority, Mr. Sydnor’s shooting of Mr. Jackson to stop the robbery is not done in the course of the robbery. Even more incongruous, under the majority’s reasoning, would be the situation that would have existed if Mr. Jackson had been in possession of another gun and if Mr. Jackson had engaged in an exchange of gunfire with Mr. Sydnor when Mr. Sydnor attempted to stop Mr. Jackson from carrying away his property. Mr. Jackson would have been shooting at Mr. Sydnor during the robbery under the Ball holding, but Mr. Sydnor, under the majority’s holding in the instant case, would not have been shooting at Mr. Jackson during the robbery.3 Does this make any sense?
*232Clearly, Mr. Jackson had not reached a place of temporary safety. He was obviously never safe. Within mere seconds he was shot at the scene of the robbery. He is dead. The robbery was never over. Mr. Sydnor was legally justified in shooting Mr. Jackson during the robbery.
Under the majority’s reasoning, a bank robber could rob a bank at gunpoint; walk out of the bank and drop the gun on the sidewalk and the bank’s employees could not forcibly recover the money still being carried from the scene. Under its reasoning, Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow should have died of old age!
The majority fails to realize that there are times when a shooting is appropriate. This was one of those times. Under the circumstances then and there present, a robbery in progress, it can be argued that Mr. Jackson needed to be shot in order for the robbery, then still in progress, to be stopped. With the majority’s position, victims may now be robbed, without the robber having to fear immediate severe resistance, or reprisal. At the same time, the majority is declaring open season on victims.
I dissent. A man or a woman should be permitted to utilize maximum force to resist being forcibly robbed.4 We should not change the law to provide otherwise.
. I believe the majority is mistaken to the extent it is indicating that the shooting took place forty to fifty yards away from where the robbery began. Yvette Kiah testified that she lived at 922 Chester Street. She testified that she heard people scuffling "across the street. That would be between 901 and 903, across the street from me.” She said she then put “stuff” against the window when she heard men running. At that time, she heard gunshots. She then testified that a van was parked in front of her door. She saw the people who had been running. But at that time, the victim was already on the ground. On cross-examination, she again testified that the comer store was "almost immediately across the street.” It was suggested that the distance was "about 40 to 50 yards.” She responded, "Yup. That's right.” In my view, she was testifying, probably erroneously, that the shooting took place forty to fifty yards away, not that the victim ran fifty yards before he was shot, although he may have ran some distance after being shot. A forensic witness for the State, upon prodding, stated that a casing had been found forty yards from the corner store. It is clear, however, that the robbery commenced on the front stoop of a house that defendant was sitting on, not at the corner store, and then moved into or near the street.
Another witness, Ms. Jones, who was actually at the scene of the shooting, described how far the victim ran before he was shot by pointing out a distance in the courtroom. The distance was described by the prosecutor and accepted by the court and the witness, as being fifteen to twenty feet. Ex. Vol. 11, page 88. Later, a crime scene technician testified that clothes and a bullet were found fifty yards from *225the corner store, evidence that the scuffling for the gun moved — started at one place and moved down and/or into the slreet and that the defendant shot the victim as soon as he wrestled the gun from him. Sydnor was asked in his statement to the police where he shot the victim and responded, “Right there at the curb. He ran away across the street.” He subsequently testified that the victim was five feet away when he was shot and that the defendant shot Mr. Jackson immediately after he wrestled the gun from him. His statement was introduced over his objection as evidence for the State.
. Burko v. State, 19 Md.App. 645, 313 A.2d 864 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 2624, 45 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975).
. Presumably, in that circumstance, the majority would hold that Mr. Jackson was shooting during a robbery and Mr. Sydnor was not, but might hold that Mr. Sydnor was acting in self-defense, although the right to self-defense, according to the majority, supposedly would have ceased when Mr. Jackson turned and walked away.
. In footnote 4 of the majority opinion, the Court mischaracterizes the position of the dissent. It is my belief that the law of robbery has always permitted the victims of robbery, unlike the victims in certain other situations, to use not only necessary, but deadly force, to resist a forcible robbery in progress. The Court heretofore has always construed robbery to be a continuing offense, not completed until the robber has reached a place of, or status of, temporary safety. What the majority does in footnote 4, and in the opinion for that matter, is to, for the first time, engraft the general law of self defense onto the law relating to an ongoing robbery offense for which different rules have always applied.
In changing the law, it is retroactively holding the petitioner responsible for a criminal act, which was not a criminal act when committed. In the process, Sydnor will be spending twelve years in prison for an offense that was not an offense at the time it occurred.
While it can be argued that the position of the majority is a proper position to be taken in future instances of resistance to robbery (al*233though I would not make the argument), in my view, it should not be, for obvious reasons, created — after the fact.