dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot join the majority as I believe that its constitutional analysis is contrary to the plain language of Article XI, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the purpose of that constitutional provision, and this court’s unmistakable position that the procedures to amend our state’s organic law must be strictly and literally followed.
Our Commonwealth’s Constitution, our fundamental law, may be altered only pursuant to a convention duly assembled or in the manner set forth in the Constitution. Article XI, § 1 of the Constitution sets forth a “complete and detailed process for the amendment of that document.... ” Kremer v. Grant, 529 Pa. 602, 608, 606 A.2d 433, 436 (1992). Pursuant to Article XI, § 1, the General Assembly proposes amendments to the Constitution, which are then submitted to the people for approval or rejection. With respect to submissions to the electorate, Article XI, § 1 requires that:
When two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted on separately.
Thus, the plain language of the Constitution requires separate ballot questions for separate amendments.
At issue in this appeal is a dispute over the constitutionality of an amendment to Article IV, § 9 of the Constitution which speaks to the Board of Pardons. The majority determines that in attempting to alter the Constitution, two amendments were presented in a single ballot question contrary to the separate vote requirement of Article XI, § l.1 Yet, instead of terminating its inquiry and declaring the ballot question to be constitutionally infirm, the majority engages in an additional inquiry; it reviews the second amendment which concerns Senate confirmation of Board of Parole appointees, to determine if that amendment constitutes a substantive change in the law. The majority delves into a review of the language of *550Article IV, § 9 regarding appointee confirmation prior to the proposed amendment, as well as the language of the proposed amendment. After a detailed analysis of the history of similar language used in another provision of the Constitution, Article IV, § 8, the majority ultimately concludes that this second amendment does not effect a substantive change to the Senate confirmation process. Thus, according to the majority, although there were two amendments placed before the voters in a single ballot question, there is no reason to declare the ballot question null and void; the failure to offer separate ballot questions to the electorate was, in essence, harmless error.
First, I cannot agree with the majority that the second amendment does not constitute a substantive change to the law. Article IV, § 9 currently states that appointees to the Board of Pardons be confirmed “with the consent of two-thirds or a majority of the members elected to the Senate as is specified by law for terms of six years.” Pa. Const, art. IV, § 9. The proposed amendment would have appointments being confirmed “with the consent of a majority of the members elected to the Senate for terms of six years.” While the majority contends that the elimination of the language “two-thirds or a majority” does not restrict or expand the Senate’s power to confirm appointees to the Board of Pardons by a majority, I believe that the amendment eliminates the legislature’s ability to set confirmation criteria, and thus, substantively alters the law.
As noted by the majority, the language regarding consent of “two-thirds or a majority” of the Senate “as specified by law” is also found in Article IV, § 8(a) which deals with the Governor’s appointing power. The “as is specified by law” refers to the Administration Code of 1929, 71 P.S. § 67.1, which sets forth the appointments which the Governor may make without submission to the Senate for confirmation, the appointments which require a two-thirds vote of the Senate, and those offices requiring approval by only a majority of the *551Senators.2 71 P.S. § 67.1; Woodside, Pennsylvania Constitutional Law 385 (1985).
The alternative language, “two-thirds or a majority,” for Senate confirmation makes perfect sense in the context of Article IV, § 8(a) which grants authority to the Governor to make appointments of a Secretary of Education and such other officers as may be specified by law. Since there are multiple appointments to be made by the Governor, some will require two-thirds confirmation and others will require only majority confirmation. 71 P.S. § 67.1. However, in the context of Article IV, § 9(b), where there is only one position to be confirmed, membership to the Board of Pardons, the. reason for the alternative language, at first blush, is unclear. To the majority, this alternative language is superfluous and devoid of meaning. Similarly, appointees to the Board of Pardons currently require confirmation by only a majority of the Senate. 71 P.S. § 67.1(d)(2). Thus, on the surface, it appears that the proposed amendment to eliminate the “two-thirds” confirmation language has effected no substantive change to the confirmation process.
Yet viewed in a different manner, it becomes apparent that the language “two-thirds or a majority” has significance in the context of Article IV, § 9 and that the amendment of the language from “two-thirds or a majority” to “a majority” works a substantive change in the law. Under the current language, confirmation by “two-thirds or a majority” of the Senate “as specified by law,” the legislature has the ability to amend the Administration Code, which now requires majority approval for appointments to the Board of Pardons, to require *552confirmation of such appointees by two-thirds of the Senate. Under the proposed amendment, the legislature could no longer alter the percentage of Senate members needed for confirmation to two-thirds; confirmation will be constitutionally cast, requiring only the approval of a majority of the Senators. The amendment strips the legislature of its power, i.e., its “option,” to alter confirmation “as specified by law.”3 Therefore, the proposed amendment clearly constitutes a substantive change in the law that under the majority’s analysis requires a separate ballot question.
Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the Senate’s power was unchanged by the proposed amendment, I still cannot agree that the ballot question should not be declared null and void. As noted above, Article XI, § 1 requires separate ballot questions for separate amendments to our state’s Constitution. This requirement acts as a safeguard to ensure that our citizenry is fully informed of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in a manner that the amendments be easily understood. It guarantees that the voters may express their desires as to each constitutional amendment separately. Bergdoll v. Kane, 557 Pa. 72, 731 A.2d 1261, 1270 (1999) (when a ballot question encompasses multiple amendments, it does “not permit the electorate to vote separately upon each of the amendments in violation of Article XI, § 1.”).
Thus, the focus of Article XI, § 1 is clearly upon the voter. That being the case, the nature of our inquiry must not concentrate on determining whether a proposed amendment constitutes a substantive change in the law. Rather, the appropriate inquiry must center on the impact of multiple amendments on the electorate when reviewing a challenge to a ballot question under Article XI, § 1.
*553The fundamental flaw in the' majority’s analysis is that it presumes that the electorate suffered no injury because there was no substantive change in law. To the contrary, we have no way of knowing how the inclusion of two amendments in a single ballot question impacted the voters. We do not know whether the voters may have voted in favor of the amendment, in toto, only because oí' an understanding, even if erroneous, that the Senate confirmation process was being altered. We do not know whether combining multiple amendments in a single ballot question led voters to abstain from voting on the amendment. As the impact upon the electorate is fraught with uncertainty, we should not dismiss a violation of the required amendment procedure as mere harmless error. In other contexts, engrafting a harmless error analysis onto the court’s review might be entirely reasonable and appropriate. However, such an approach is untenable when the damage wrought is unknown and it is our organic law that is at issue.
Finally, such a strict approach to compliance with the requirements of our state’s constitution is entirely in accord with this court’s prior case law:
It is undoubtedly true that in matters relating to the alteration or amendment or change or abolition of the Constitution, which is the fundamental Law of our Commonwealth, all the clear and mandated provisions of the Constitution must be strictly followed and obeyed and no departures from or circumventions or violations of existing mandatory constitutional amendment requirements will be permitted.
Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 416, 250 A.2d 474, 479 (1969)(emphasis supplied). Here, the majority allows a circumvention of the constitutional amendment requirement regarding separate ballot questions. The requirements to amend the Constitution as set forth in Article XI, § 1 are clear. “Nothing short of a literal compliance with this mandate will suffice.” Kremer v. Grant, 529 Pa. at 611, 606 A.2d at 436, quoting, Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 413-14, 197 *554A. 235, 238 (1938); Bergdoll, 731 A.2d at 1270.4 Having found a violation of Article XI, § 1, this court is constrained to declare the ballot question null and void.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Appellees assert that there were six changes to the Constitution. The Commonwealth Court found there to be five such changes. The majority concludes that there are two amendments at issue. For purposes of this dissent I assume, arguendo, that the majority properly considered the ballot question to constitute only two amendments.
. Whether by importance, tradition or practice, certain appointments require the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. These include, inter alia, vacancies in the offices of the Auditor General and State Treasurer and appointment of members of the Pennsylvania Fish Commission, Pennsylvania Game Commission, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission. 71 P.S. § 67.1(c)(1) and (2). Alternatively, only majority confirmation is required for appointments to, inter alia, the position of Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Banking, membership on the Board of Pardons, the State Civil Service Commission, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. 71 P.S. § 67.1(d)(1) and (2).
. Indeed, contrary to the majority’s conclusion that there is no substantive change to the confirmation process, I note that the Attorney General, in his statement explaining the proposed amendment, also believes there to be a substantive change in the law:
The proposed amendment would eliminate the option of requiring the Governor’s appointments to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate, thus requiring appointments to be approved by only a majority of the Senate.
. See Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 515, 164 A. 615 (1932)("The Constitution is the fundamental law of our Commonwealth, and in matters relating to alterations or changes in its provisions, the; courts must exercise the most rigid care to preserve to the people the right assured to them by that instrument.”). Accord Kremer v. Grant, 529 Pa. at 613, 606 A.2d at 439. ("Additionally, since the duty to advertise is mandatory, the failure to accomplish what is prescribed in Article XI infects the amendment process with an incurable defect and under such circumstances further proceedings in this matter will be unnecessary.”).