dissenting:
The majority characterizes this case as an "attempt to obtain money damages as a result of alleged negligence or 'educational malpractice’ in the Montgomery County school system.” I reject this characterization. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals because the case does not involve educational malpractice. Instead, it involves alleged malpractice by members of a health occupation, a cause of action that has long been cognizable in Maryland courts.1
Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982), was the first case in which this Court considered the matter of educational malpractice. We characterized as educational malpractice a claim, the gravamen of which sounded "in negligence, asserting damages for the alleged failure of the school system to properly educate young Hunter.” 292 Md. at 484 (emphasis added). The Court placed primary reliance on two cases which had earlier dealt with the concept of educational malpractice: Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854 (1976) and Donohue v. Copiague Union Free *81School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
In Peter W., the plaintiff alleged that due to the defendant school district’s negligence he had been inadequately educated. Peter W. graduated from high school without the reading and writing skills of at least an eighth-grader. 131 Cal.Rptr. at 856. The plaintiff in Donohue made similar allegations: "| Notwithstanding [Donohue’s] receipt of a certificate of graduation [from high school] he lack[ed] even the rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to complete applications for employment.” Donohue, supra, 418 N.Y.2d at 376. Donohue attributed this deficiency to a breach by the defendant school district of its duty to educate and to the negligence of his educators. As applied by both the Donohue and Peter W. courts, the concept of educational malpractice signifies a claim in which "a graduate who had enjoyed an otherwise normal education, but despite that had ... graduated as a functional illiterate,. . . now seeks to recover damages in tort from his school district for an alleged failure of its general duty to educate.” Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools — "Educational Malpractice” from Peter W. to Hoffman, 55 Notre Dame Law. 814, 825 (1980). The majority of the Court in Hunter viewed the concept in a similar fashion.
In contrast, the petitioners’ declaration in the instant case alleges professional malpractice on the part of two clinical psychologists acting as agents for the Montgomery County Board of Education. Count III of the petitioners’ declaration alleges, in part, that:
"Ernest G. Stickel was negligent in failing to evaluate, examine, and test the Plaintiff, John Doe, in accordance with proper accepted psychological practice. The Defendant, Ernest G. Stickel, wholly failed to act as a reasonably prudent and competent psychologist in evaluating the Plaintiff; that a reasonably prudent and competent psychologist would have evaluated and diagnosed the Plaintiff, *82John Doe, as having a learning disability; that the Defendant, Ernest G. Stickel, failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and diligence expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the profession generally acting in the same or similar circumstances, in order to properly evaluate the Plaintiff, John Doe; the Defendant, Ernest G. Stickel, was negligent in diagnosing the Plaintiff as having sustained cerebral damage and in recommending placement within a brain injured class.” 2
Count III clearly presents the requisite elements for pleading a claim of professional malpractice: (1) that a specific standard of skill and care exists for clinical psychologists; (2) that Dr. Stickel failed to conform to that standard of care; and (3) that the failure was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. See Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md.App. 360, 363, 306 A.2d 568 (1973). While it is true that petitioners’ declaration appears to allege negligence by the Board of Education and others,3 as well as the two psychologists, in oral argument the petitioners’ attorney conceded that a direct negligence claim against the Board et al. would not be valid in light of Hunter. The petitioners’ attorney went on to stress that the reason for joining the Board et al. as defendants was to "cover all bases” in seeking damages for the psychologists’ negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The policy reasons against recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice, as set forth in Hunter and other cases, do not obtain in the present case.
The first justification for not recognizing an educational malpractice cause of action is the lack of a satisfactory standard of care against which a teacher’s conduct may be *83measured. Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 484; D. S. W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981); Smith v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Serv. Agency, 90 Cal.App.3d 929, 153 Cal.Rptr. 712, 719 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, supra, 131 Cal.Rptr. at 861. But see Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., supra, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377 ("Nor would creation of a standard with which to judge an educator’s performance . .. pose an insurmountable obstacle”). Young Doe and his parents are not asking a judge or a jury to create a standard of care to apply to the psychologists’ conduct. The petitioners seek to refer to an existing standard of care: that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner acting under same or similar circumstances. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975). In fact, at oral argument before us the defendants expressly conceded that if Dr. Stickel and Dr. Johns were private psychologists and not acting as agents of the Board, a cause of action for professional malpractice would be stated by the plaintiffs’ allegations.
The second reason for refusing to recognize a claim of educational malpractice is "the inherent uncertainty in determining the cause and nature of any damages.” 4 Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 484. As the majority of this Court stated in Hunter (id. at 485, quoting Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, supra, 131 Cal.Rptr. at 861):
*84" 'Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, is influenced by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present but not perceived, recognized but not identified.’ ”
Whatever the efficacy of this reason in the context of educational malpractice,5 it is unpersuasive in the instant case. Here, it is agreed that had Dr. Stickel and Dr. Johns not been employed by the Board of Education, this would be a normal case of professional malpractice by health practitioners. We are not concerned with whether Doe was negligently educated but with whether Dr. Stickel’s diagnosis was negligent. Presumably, if Doe had been correctly diagnosed as dyslexic, attempts would have been made to teach him to compensate for his dyslexia, and the outcome of those attempts would be shielded from challenge under the rubric of educational malpractice. Here, however, Doe never had the opportunity to learn to compensate because of a health care professional’s negligent diagnosis.
A third justification which is advanced for refusing to recognize an educational malpractice cause of action is the “extreme burden which would be imposed on the already strained resources of the public school system.” Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 484. Whatever may be the validity of this concern in the context of educational malpractice, it furnishes no reason for immunizing the school system from traditional grounds of tort liability such as involved in the present case. In *85Maryland Code (1978, 1982 Cum. Supp.), § 4-105 of the Education Article, the Legislature limited the availability of the defense of sovereign immunity as follows:
"(d) Defense of sovereign immunity. — (1) a county board of education may raise the defense of sovereign immunity to any amount claimed above the limit of its insurance policy or, if self-insured, above $100,000.
(2) A county board may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity to a claim of $100,000 or less.”
Thus, the Maryland Legislature, as a policy matter, has decided that local school systems should be liable for the traditionally recognized torts of their agents acting within the scope of employment, at least to the extent of $100,000.00.
The next justification given for denying relief to those alleging educational malpractice is the fear of a flood of litigation. Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 486 (quoting Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, supra, 131 Cal.Rptr. at 861). See also D. S. W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. Dist., supra, 628 P.2d at 556. But this "argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself to a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy.” Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688 (1909) (discussing the "flood of litigation” argument in context of recovery for nervous injury caused by fright without physical injury.) "It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,’ and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such grounds.” W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 12 at 51 (4th ed. 1971). Moreover, even if this justification is valid in a case such as Hunter, it has no application to a case such as this. No one has suggested that recognition of a cause of action for the misdiagnosis of a medical condition *86by a health occupation professional employed by a school system will give rise to a flood of litigation.6
A fifth reason given for denying a cause of action for educational malpractice is that "an award of money damages ... represents a singularly inappropriate remedy for asserted errors in the educational process.” Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 487. This statement is often followed by a listing of the administrative remedies available to the parents of a student allegedly receiving an inadequate education. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 488-489; D.S. W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. Dist., supra, 628 P.2d at 557; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., supra, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378. Nevertheless, it is conceded that there is no statutory administrative remedy which can result in an award of damages. Whether or not administrative remedies are useful in the context of educational malpractice, they clearly are not helpful in the context of a misdiagnosis by a health care professional, the cure for which necessitates the expenditure of a large sum of money. Moreover, it is not clear that money damages would be "inappropriate” in the instant case. Taking the petitioners’ allegations as true, Doe is now 23 years old and has completed his education. He has progressed to second grade reading and spelling levels and a third grade arithmetic level. He still has not learned to compensate for his dyslexia, and he has severe emotional problems. Doe is in need of psychological treatment and adequate special education, neither of which is being given by the school system and both of which cost money.
The final reason for not recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice is that recognition "would constitute blatant interference with the responsibility for the administration of the public school system.” Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Disk, supra, 418 N.Y.S.2d at *87378. The Maryland education statutes vest in the state and local boards of education " 'the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education.’ ” Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., supra, 292 Md. at 488, quoting Resetar v. State Bd. of Education, 284 Md. 537, 556, 399 A.2d 225, 235 (1979). Thus, in regard to day-to-day operations and policy determinations, it is believed that courts should not interfere with state and local school board judgments. Permitting a suit by the plaintiffs because of the misdiagnosis of health care professionals, however, would not interfere with such school board judgments. It is a matter which does not involve education policy. A court would not be asked to "evaluate conflicting theories of how best to educate.” Donohue v. Copiague U. Free Sch. Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (1978). A court would merely determine whether the psychologists adhered to that standard of care in diagnosing Doe that the average clinical psychologist would have employed under similar circumstances. This standard is readily ascertainable through expert testimony. Plaintiffs would not be permitted to go beyond the question of the psychologists’ negligence to challenge the school board’s decision in placing Doe in special classes. The majority’s decision in Hunter, therefore, would in no way be undermined by allowing this case to go to trial.
That recognition of a cause of action for professional malpractice would not undermine Hunter is clear from Hunter itself. In footnote four of the majority opinion in Hunter, the Court expressly limited the decision’s application (292 Md. at 487-488 n. 4):
"We do not pass here on the question of whether this case indicates a bar to an action against other professionals, normally subject to suit, merely because they are employed in the educational system. As this is not an issue presented by the allegations here, we leave its resolution to an appropriate case.”
*88Furthermore, the policy reasons underlying Hunterhave no application in the instant case. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with directions that the case be remanded for a trial.
Judge Cole has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views here expressed.
Judge Davidson has authorized me to state that, while she still adheres to the view expressed in the dissent in Hunter, she agrees that the instant case alleges professional, not educational, malpractice and that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. To this extent she concurs in the views expressed herein.
. The alleged malpractice was by two clinical psychologists. Psychologists are licensed and regulated by the State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, an agency of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. See Maryland Code (1981), §§ 16-101 through 16-404 of the Health Occupations Article. See also Pitts v. State Bd. of Examiners, 222 Md. 224, 226-227, 160 A.2d 200 (1960) (likening psychology to the various branches of medicine).
. Count IV contains similar allegations concerning the actions of Dr. H. Bruce Johns, a psychologist employed by the Board of Education of Montgomery County.
. They included the Montgomery County Health Department, Dr. Charles M. Bernardo, Homer O. Elseroad, and Montgomery County.
. A related ’'reason” expressed by the California courts is doubt whether the plaintiff actually suffered injury. See Smith v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Serv. Agency, 90 Cal.App.3d 929, 153 Cal.Rptr. 712, 719 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854, 861 (1976). The New York Court of Appeals correctly perceived this reason to be transparent, stating: "who can in good faith deny that a student who upon graduation from high school cannot comprehend simple English ... has not I sic] in some fashion been 'injured’.” Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979). It is clear that Doe underwent injury through the psychologists’ malpractice. Because Doe was erroneously diagnosed and treated as mentally retarded, he was subjected to "shame, humiliation, and ridicule,” and now suffers "severe and permanent emotional pain, . . . poor self-esteem, depression, and anxiety.”
. The New York Court of Appeals, in declining to permit a suit for educational malpractice to proceed, questioned the validity of this reason. "As for proximate causation, while this element might indeed be difficult, if not impossible, to prove in view of the many collateral factors involved in the learning process, it perhaps assumes too much to conclude that it could never be established.” Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, supra, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
. As previously noted, the defendants conceded that if a private psychologist engaged in the same conduct, the psychologist would be liable. Yet there has been no flood of malpractice cases in Maryland against psychologists. In fact, very few reported psychologist malpractice cases can be found in Maryland.