dissenting. Although I agree with Judge Gladwin that the case should be affirmed, I dissent separately for two reasons. First, appellant could not abandon an argument that he never made. The written motion merely stated that the reliability of the confidential informant had not been determined by the affiant and should not provide a basis for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant. The written motion failed to cite any case law or factors to analyze the facts of the case, and, in fact, failed to cite any facts regarding the affidavit or the circumstances giving rise to its creation. When the trial court announced it was ready to hear appellant’s motion to suppress, appellant responded that he could not proceed. The appellant had the burden of proving the invalidity of the search and the supporting documents. Pritchard v. State, 258 Ark. 151, 523 S.W.2d 194 (1975). He made no argument for the trial court to consider. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion.
Second, the affidavit was sufficient on its face to support the issuance of the warrant. The affidavit sworn by Officer Dixon allowed the trial court to determine that the informant was sufficiently reliable, including the officer’s independent corroboration of the houseboat’s location, specific description, and the appellant’s method of operation. See Weatherford v. State, 93 Ark. App. 30, 216 S.W.3d 150 (2005).
The reliability of informants is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that is based on a three-factored approach the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted in Frette v. City of Springdale, 331 Ark. 103, 959 S.W.2d 734 (1998)(citing State v. Bybee, 884 P.2d 906 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)). The factors are: 1) whether the informant was exposed to possible criminal or civil prosecution if the report is false; 2) whether the report is based on the personal observations of the informant; 3) whether the officer’s personal observations corroborated the informant’s observations. Id. at 118, 959 S.W.2d at 741. The Frette court examined the satisfaction of these factors:
The first factor is satisfied whenever [the informant] gives his or her name to authorities or if the person gives the information to the authorities in person. With regard to the second factor, an officer may infer that the information is based on the informant’s personal observation if the information contains sufficient detail that it [is] apparent that the informant had not been fabricating [the] report out of whole cloth [and] the report [is] of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a rehable way. The third and final element may be satisfied if the officer observes the illegal activity or finds the person, the vehicle, and the location as substantially described by the informant.
Id. at 118, 959 S.W.2d at 741 (quoting Bybee, supra). The Frette court termed this explanation of the satisfaction of the factors a useful analytical framework and applied them to determine that an informants tip carried with it sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop. Frette, 331 Ark. at 118, 959 S.W.2d at 741. Because the informant in Frette was identifiable and thus subject to prosecution for making a false report, he was found to have greater reliability and satisfy the first factor. The informant’s personal observation of the criminal activity gave him a reliable basis of knowledge and satisfied the second factor. The third factor was satisfied when the informant’s information was corroborated by a law enforcement officer. Id. at 121, 959 S.W.2d at 743.
Under the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, and applying the factors to determine sufficient indicia of reliability of an informant, the trial court committed no error in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress. Contrary to the majority’s analysis, there were sufficient facts to support the reliability of the informant. Following the reasoning used in both Weatherford and Frette, the reliability of the informant was established by the fact that he was identifiable and therefore subject to prosecution for making a false report regarding appellant’s illegal activity. Additionally, the informant provided the information regarding appellant in lieu of prosecution for the informant’s own illegal activity. If the information provided proved to be false, the informant was not only subject to prosecution for providing a false report, but also subject to losing any leniency regarding prosecution for his own previous acts. Furthermore, the information was based on personal knowledge and observation of the informant, observation which was verified again by Officer Dixon upon confirming the location of the houseboat and confirming through employees of the dock that appellant and his girlfriend did live on the boat and had been taking the boat out at night.
The majority dismisses the police officer’s confirmation of the informant’s statements that the houseboat was located at a particular place, that appellant and his girlfriend lived on the boat, and that the boat had been going out on the lake at night. Perhaps if the officers had waited to board the boat until the next time that appellant was moving the houseboat out onto the lake at night, the majority would have found sufficient corroboration. However, while accurately predicting future events may bolster reliability, accurate prediction is not required to establish reliability. Neither is it necessary under these facts. The trial court in this case had before it an officer’s confirmation of not only the location and description of the vehicle/houseboat, but also the previous activity of moving the boat onto the lake at night as described by the informant. While none of this confirmed activity is illegal, nothing in our statutory or case law requires corroboration of the illegal activity itself. It only requires that the trial court determine that there are sufficient facts to establish the reliability of the informant which this trial court did.
Another disturbing aspect of the majority’s analysis is its reliance on evidence at the suppression hearing that the informant did not personally observe any of the “methamphetamine cooks” so that the information must have been based on hearsay. The affidavit itself states that methamphetamine was being manufactured on the boat and that while on the houseboat, the informant had observed in plain view a glass jar containing a pill soak. A pill soak is a preparatory step in the manufacture1 of methamphetamine. See Saul v. State, 365 Ark. 77, 225 S.W.3d 373 (2006). This step in the manufacturing process is so critical that it has led to increased regulation and record keeping of the pills purchased by citizens of this State under no suspicion of illegal activity. See Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 256 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Act of Feb. 22, 2005, No. 256, 2005 Ark. Acts 875. It is difficult to see how the observation of set forth in the affidavit could not support the issuance of a warrant. His observation certainly satisfies the second prong of the test discussed in Frette.
Applying the factors used to determine sufficient indicia of reliability of an informant, the trial court did not err in its denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress.
1 “Manufacture” means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirecdy by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-101 (m) (Repl. 1997).