dissenting.
One need not look beyond the Introduction to appellee’s, Allegheny County’s, “Request for Proposals” to determine the majority’s error in reinstating appellant’s amended complaint in equity.
“I. INTRODUCTION
Allegheny County is seeking Proposals from qualified prospective concessionaires for the operation of the various concessions at Greater Pittsburgh International Airport that will offer high quality service and products for patrons of the Airport. The following instructions are for information and guidance, and relate to the proper form and method of submission of Proposals.
A. Any Proposal submitted as provided herein constitutes a suggestion to negotiate and NOT A BID. Submission of a Proposal as provided herein shall not obligate or entitle a prospective concessionaire to enter into an Agreement with Allegheny County for the operation of any concession.
B. Allegheny County is not obligated to respond to any Proposal submitted or legally bound in any manner whatsoever by the submission of a Proposal.
C. Any and all Proposals submitted as provided herein are subject to negotiation at the option of the County.” [Emphasis added.]
Thus, by its very terms, clearly and unambiguously expressed, the request for proposals merely constituted “. . . instructions . . . for information and guidance . . . ”. Moreover, the submission of a proposal was deemed a “. . . suggestion to negotiate, and NOT A BID . . . ”; it did not obligate the County to enter into any agreement for the operation of a concession; and the County was not legally bound “whatsoever” by the submission. The County was not required to respond to any proposal because it retained the option to negotiate or not to negotiate in its sole discretion.
*445I agree with the majority’s conclusions that appellant did not possess a common-law franchise and that the County was not statutorily obligated under the Second Class County Code1 to utilize competitive bidding when leasing concession space at the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. However, the majority’s recognition of a cause of action, under the guise of a “fairness” or quasi “detrimental reliance” theory, is neither warranted under existing statutory schemes, nor consistent with the case law of this Commonwealth.
This Court, in Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954) stated:
By a host of authorities in our own and other jurisdictions it has been established as an elementary principle of law that courts will not review the actions of governmental bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power: they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the details of the manner adopted to carry them into execution. It is true that the mere possession of discretionary power by an administrative body does not make it wholly immune from judicial review, but the scope of that review is limited to the determination of whether there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency’s duties or functions. That a court might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the agency is not a sufficient ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative discretion. Id., 379 Pa. at 572-73, 109 A.2d at 334-35. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, in the absence of a mandated statutory “competitive bidding” procedure, review of the action of Allegheny County must be limited to whether the County acted fraudulently, capriciously or in bad faith. Blumenschein, supra. In light of the explicit terms of the County’s “Request for *446Proposal,” it is clear that the County may not be charged with fraud, caprice, or bad faith.
The majority expands the holding of American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 489 Pa. 568, 414 A.2d 1037 (1980) (where competitive bidding is elected to be used, the procedure followed must not emasculate the benefits of the bidding) beyond competitive bidding cases to cases where “a particular procedure” has been undertaken. I am not prepared to extend the American Totalisator concept to this case. The possibility of waste of public funds, the foundation of the competitive bidding rule in American Totalisator, is not present here. As the majority aptly points out in Section II of the opinion, the County is receiving money rather than expending money. Thus it is ironic that the majority, citing American Totalisator, now criticizes the County for having based the choice of lessee solely upon financial return to the County.
The broad authority given to the County to enter into such leases is by section 2404 of the Second Class County Code which places the County in the position of any other potential buyer. If that power is to be (1) reduced by the application of a condition precedent of no deviation from outlined procedure and/or (2) modified by conformity to the American Bar Association’s “Model Procurement Code for State and Local Government” (Approved Draft, 1979) (Code) such changes are within the province of the legislature, not the judiciary. The fact that the Code has not been adopted by our legislature and the scope of judicial review long recognized in this jurisdiction is narrow, counter-indicate our intrusion upon the legislature’s province. Moreover, in my view, the majority opinion will open the door to a plethora of suits brought by disgruntled businessmen unhappy at their inability to obtain governmental unit contracts and business.
I therefore dissent and would affirm the Order of the Commonwealth Court which upheld the Court of Common *447Pleas of Allegheny County in sustaining the County’s preliminary objections.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. Act of July 28, 1953, P.L. 723, § 101, et seq., as amended