dissenting.
It is with deference that I dissent from the decision of the majority in this case.
The controlling facts are undisputed. We are, therefore, not confronted with the rule that the chancellor’s finding on conflicting evidence will not he disturbed unless manifestly wrong. It is the chancellor’s conclusions of law as drawn from the undisputed facts that appear to me to be in error. These facts may be briefly stated.
In May, 1949, Mrs. Antionette Arnold was living in the Harrison Hotel in Byhalia, Mississippi. The appellant, Mrs. Alice E. Fuqua, and her husband, Fred T. Fuqua, were living in the same hotel. Mrs. Arnold and Mrs. Fuqua were not related. Mrs. Arnold was a widow and about 89 years of age but was physically well and mentally alert. She desired someone to live with her in the same home and care for her and furnish her table board and other incidental comforts and conveniences. She had been discussing such an arrangement with the Fuquas and had proposed that she would purchase a home and deed it to them, and would make a will devising and bequeathing to them her property subject to a life estate in her daughter, who was an inmate of the Mississippi State Insane Hospital, in consideration that all of them would occupy the home together, and that the Fuquas would care for her and furnish her table board and such incidental comforts and conveniences as her needs might require so long as she should live. On May 30, 1949, she entered into an oral agreement with the Fuquas whereby she agreed to purchase a home in By*453kalia and deed it to the Fuquas, and make a will devising and bequeathing her estate to the Fuquas, subject to a life estate in her daughter, in consideration that they would occupy the home together and that the Fuquas would furnish her board and incidental comforts and conveniences so long as she lived. Mr. Fuqua requested that this agreement be reduced to writing. Pursuant to the agreement, Mrs. Arnold purchased the Clyde Neely home in Byhalia and obtained a deed thereto on July 7, 1949. On the same day, she conveyed the home to thé Fuquas, reserving a life estate therein. She then went to Mr. Aubrey French, vice president and cashier of the Citizens Bank of Byhalia, and related the agreement which she had made with the Fuquas and requested him to prepare the papers reflecting the agreement, and told him also that she wanted a will drawn and advised him how she wanted to dispose of her property, and said that of course she could change the will at anytime she saw fit. Mr. French advised her that she should have a lawyer to do this and, after some conversation, suggested Hindman Doxey. Mr. French went with Mr. Fuqua to Mr. Doxey and advised Mr. Doxey of the agreement as related by Mrs. Arnold, and requested him to prepare the necessary papers. Mr. Doxey prepared a contract and a will and returned both papers to Mr. French, and Mr. French then arranged a meeting with Mrs. Arnold and the Fuquas and at this meeting he read the will and contract to them and they approved the same. Both the cotract and the will bore the same date, July 22, 1949, and upon the execution of the same, they were left with Mr. French to be kept at the bank for safekeeping. The will referred to Mrs. Arnold’s conveyance of the home to the Fuquas and confirmed the same, and bequeathed to Mrs. Fuqua all of her personal property remaining undisposed of upon the death of her daughter. The contract provided for the rental of the home to the Fuquas with the right in Mrs. Arnold to *454occupy the same with the Fuquas, and obligated the Fuquas to furnish to Mrs. Arnold table board and also ordinary and incidental comforts and conveniences so long as the said Mrs. Arnold should live. The obligations devolving upon the Fuquas were fully and faithfully performed.
On August 11, 1950, after the agreement had been in effect and complied with by the Fuquas for more than a year, and without the knowledge of the Fuquas, Mrs. Arnold wrote and executed in her own handwriting what purported to be a codicil to her will, whereby she undertook to direct that such of her money as remained undisposed of upon the death of her daughter should go to “The Methodist Church.”
Mrs. Arnold’s daughter died in the month of December, 1951, and Mrs. Arnold died on April 20, 1952. Throughout the period of time prior to the death of Mrs. Arnold, the Fuquas fully performed and complied with the agreement.
The contract and will contained recitals showing their connection and relation with each other and with the deed, and reflected in writing the material terms of the oral agreement.
The following recital appears in the contract:
“For that whereas Mrs. Antionette Arnold is a widow and desires someone to live in her home and be companion to her and to provide her with board and table fare as a member of the family;
“And whereas the said parties of the second part are now living in said home and the relationship between all of said parties have been pleasant and it is expected that the said relationship will continue to be pleasant and the said party of the first part having heretofore conveyed the home owned by her in the Town of Byhalia unto the parties of the second part, reserving unto her*455self the right to the use, control and occupancy of said home for and during the term of her natural lifetime. ...
“And the said parties hereto having fully agreed on all matters: . . . ”
The following appears in the will as a part of Item II thereof: “The said Fred T. Fuqua and wife, Mrs. Alice E. Fuqua, have promised to live with me and I am confident that our relationship will be pleasant and cordial and, therefore, I will, devise and bequeath unto the said Fred T. Fuqua and wife, Mrs. Alice E. Fuqua, the house and lot located in Byhalia, Marshall County, Mississippi, purchased by me from Clyde Neely and conveyed unto the said Fred T. Fuqua and wife, Mrs. Alice E. Fuqua on the..............................day of July, 1949, it being the purpose of this provision to reaffirm my expressed intention and desire for them to have full title, possession and right of possession to said property upon my death. ’ ’
The three instruments, that is to say, the deed, the contract, and the will, when read together, represent in writing and carry into effect the identical terms of the oral agreement.
It is the holding of the majority opinion that the written contract represented the entire agreement between the parties and that it contained no provision to indicate that Mrs. Arnold obligated herself to make a will bequeathing her personal property to Mrs. Fuqua upon the death of Mrs. Arnold’s daughter. It is, therefore, the conclusion of the majority opinion that the admission of oral evidence of such an obligation on the part of Mrs. Arnold would do violence to the rule relating to the admission of parol evidence to add to or contradict a written instrument. This holding and conclusion of the majority are, in my humble opinion, not justified by the undisputed facts of this case. I think the record shows clearly that the written contract did not represent the *456entire agreement between tbe parties. The oral agreement of the parties was represented in writing by the deed, the contract, and the will. Hence there is no occasion to invoke the well recognized parol evidence rule under the facts of this case.
It is my view, stated with deference, that the oral agreement between Mrs. Arnold and the Fuquas, about which there is no dispute, was reduced to writing and incorporated in three instruments, namely, the deed from Mrs. Arnold to the Fuquas, the contract, and the will. The incorporation of the agreement in three instruments was, no doubt, the method adopted by the lawyer to reduce the agreement to writing after he had been advised by Mr. French of the terms of the agreement as related to him by Mrs. Arnold.
The binding effect of the agreement is not diminished by the fact that it is represented by three written instruments.
“A binding agreement may be collected from various different writings provided there is no conflict between such writings in respect of the terms, parties, and the like.” 17 C. J. S., Sec. 58, page 408.
This Court has held that a memorandum to meet the statute of frauds may be in several different writings necessarily connected with each other. Central Shoe Company v. J. P. Conn and Co., et al., 160 Miss. 151, 133 So. 126; Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 Miss. 480.
Tn this case, the three written instruments, namely, the deed, the contract, and the will, were identical as to terms and parties with the oral agreement of the parties and wrere designed to accomplish that which was in contemplation of the parties to the oral agreement. It-was not an accident, nor was it coincidence, that the three written instruments incorporated exactly the terms of the oral agreement. It is manifest from the undisputed facts that this was designedly done for the purpose of reducing to writing that to which the parties had previously agreed orally. The will itself makes particular reference to the *457deed executed by Mrs. Arnold to the Fuquas and to the fact that tbe Fuquas had promised to live with her and the bequeathing of the property to the Fuquas, who were wholly unrelated to Mrs. Arnold, can be explained upon no other reasonable ground than that it was the fulfillment of the agreement as represented by the three instruments.
I attach no importance to Mrs. Arnold’s statement to Mr. French when she directed the will to be drawn that she could change it whenever she saw fit. This statement out of the presence of the Fuquas could not affect her agreement which was reduced to writing and incorporated in the deed, the contract, and the will. It might' well be that she had in mind changing her will if the Fuquas failed to carry out their contract. The Fuquas did not, however, fail to carry out their contract, but faithfully performed and complied with the same.
The case on its undisputed facts is, therefore, one where Mrs. Arnold made an oral agreement with the Fuquas which was subsequently reduced to writing and incorporated in three written instruments, whereby she agreed to will her personal property to the Fuquas upon the death of her daughter in return for care and table board to be furnished her by the Fuquas, which agreement was performed by Mrs. Arnold in making her will accordingly, and by the Fuquas in fully performing their obligation.
It is my view, therefore, that the will was irrevocable and that the so-called codicil was ineffective to change it. It was expressly held by this Court in Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So. 2d 730, that even an oral agreement to make a will covering real and personal property in return for care of the testator, where such agreement has been performed on the part of the promisee, is valid and binding and irrevocable, and that to permit the same to be revoked would constitute a fraud upon the promisee. This case was expressly approved by this Court in the case of Denson, et. al. v. *458Denson, 203 Miss. 146, 33 So. 2d 311, where the Court said of the Tomme case that it was sound and equitable. It is my opinion, therefore, that for the reasons herein-before stated the decree of the court below should be reversed and judgment entered here .for appellant.
There is, however, another reason why I think the decree of the court below should be reversed and judgment entered here for the appellant. The codicil designates as beneficiary “the Methodist Church.” 1 think this designation is so indefinite and uncertain as to render the codicil invalid. In 57 Am. Jur., Sec. 35, page 59, appears the following:
“While it is not necessary that a testamentary beneficiary be named in the will, it is essential to a valid bequest or devise that the person or organization which the testator intends to benefit be clearly and certainly identified by the express language of the will or, at least, be capable of identification from extrinsic circumstances in accordance with the maxim, ‘id certum est quod certum reddi potest,’ since it is clear that, at least at common law, there cannot be a valid bequest to an indefinite person. ’ ’
In 40 Cyc. 1445, it is stated that a beneficiary under a will, in order to take thereunder, must be designated with such certainty that he can be readily identified and distinguished from every other person, otherwise the devise or bequest is void for uncertainty. It cannot be ascertained from the codicil itself what Methodist Church was intended, that is to say, whether it was intended to designate the Methodist Church in Byhalia, or a Methodist Church in some rural section of some county, or the Methodist Church in some neighboring town, city, or community. It cannot be ascertained from the codicil whether there are one or more Methodist Churches in Byhalia, or in the county, or in neighboring communities. It would have been proper for the appellees to offer evidence to render more certain the beneficiary, but this was not done. I do not agree with the majority opinion *459that it was incumbent upon the appellant to show that there was no such organization as “the Methodist Church,” or that there were several organizations to which the name “Methodist Church” might apply, or that the church which the testatrix intended to benefit could not be identified from the language used in the codicil. The uncertainty and indefiniteness in the designation of the beneficiary appear in the codicil. The burden was upon the proponents of the codicil to offer evidence of extrinsic circumstances to identify and render certain the beneficiary intended to be benefitted. This the appellees failed to do and from the codicil itself it cannot be ascertained what Methodist Church was intended to be benefitted by the testatrix. It could be any one of numerous Methodist Churches throughout the state. I am of the opinion that the codicil is void because of uncertainty and indefiniteness in the designation of the beneficiary, and that the validity of the will is unaffected hy the codicil. Hawkins v. Duberry, 101 Miss. 17, 57 So. 919. For this further reason, I think that the decree of the court helow should be reversed and judgment entered here for the appellant.
I am authorized to say that Justice Roberds joins in this dissent in so far as it expresses the view that the codicil is invalid because of uncertainty and indefiniteness in the designation of the beneficiary.