concurring.
The majority holds that the express language of an oil and gas lease entitles Consol to remove its equipment from a gas well even if the well can still be operated profitably. My review of the lease leads me to conclude that Consol must operate the well until it is no longer profitable to do so. Therefore, as the question of the well’s profitability is a genuine issue of material fact, the grant of Willisons’ motion for summary judgement was improper. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court, which held that Consol had forfeited its rights under the lease, and remand the case for trial on the issue of whether the well can be operated profitably.
The original gas and oil lease gives Consol the privilege of removing all of its machinery and fixtures “at any time”. Although we have never had the opportunity to address directly the question of whether this language allows a lessee to remove its equipment from a profitable well, other jurisdictions have found that despite the inclusion of such language in a lease, the lessee must continue to operate the well as long as it’s profitable to do so. Eg., Wade v. Lillard, 201 Okla. 520, 207 P.2d 771 (1949); Okmulgee Supply Corp. v. Anthis, 189 Okla. 139,114 P.2d 451 (1940); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 P. 834 (1929). Here, the majority rejected the approach followed by our sister jurisdictions, which recognizes the unique character of leases for the extraction of natural resources, choosing instead to give effect to that portion of the lease which allows Consol to remove its equipment at any time. I also believe that the plain language of the lease controls the outcome of this case. Specifically, I find that the 1932 amendment to the lease, which provides *56that a reduced rent will be paid “so long thereafter as the [lessee] shall find it profitable to maintain its equipment at said well and to transport the gas therefrom for the purpose of market or sale off the premises,” requires Consol to operate the well until it is no longer profitable to do so. Thus, I conclude that the case should be remanded for a determination of whether the well is profitable.
Finally, because the express language of the lease requires Consol to operate the well as long as it remains profitable, there is no need for this Court to address the issue of whether the language in an oil and gas lease, which empowers the lessee to remove its equipment at any time, is fettered by an implied covenant to operate the well for as long as it remains profitable to do so. When we are squarely presented with this issue, then it will be time to consider whether leases for the extraction of natural resources are to be interpreted differently from other contracts. See Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385 (1986) (the law will not imply a different contract than that which the parties have expressly adopted); Brown v. Haight, 435 Pa. 12, 255 A.2d 508 (1969) (coal and oil and gas leases are traditionally interpreted differently because of the varied physical characteristics of the minerals involved); Hummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959) (the law wisely implies, even in the absence of any express covenant, a covenant to mine and remove coal with due diligence); Penrose v. Penn Forest Coal Co., 289 Pa. 519,137 A. 670 (1927) (while there was no express covenant as to diligently mining the coal, yet one was implied by the nature of the demise); Hill v. Joy, 149 Pa. 243, 24 A. 293 (1892) (where a right to mine iron ore or other minerals is granted in consideration of the reservation of a certain portion of the product to the grantor, the law implies a covenant on the part of the grantee to work the mine in a proper manner and with reasonable diligence, so that the grantor may receive the compensation or income which both parties must have had in contemplation when the agreement was entered into).
CAPPY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.*57 ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Motion to Quash Appeal denied.