DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.For the first time, this Court, in the majority opinion in this case, interprets Section 306(c)(23) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1 to allow a bilateral loss claimant to continue to receive total disability benefits, even though he has returned to work and is receiving wages.2 See generally Torrey & Greenberg, Workers’ Compensation: Law and Practice § 5:142 (West, 2002) (Torrey & Green-berg) (“No appellate authority exists which would permit a claimant to return to work, and have earning power, yet continue to receive temporary total disability payments under the presumption of [Section 306(c)(23)].”) Because I believe that the majority misinterprets Section 306(c)(23) of the Act and gives the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) unbridled discretion, which raises the strong possibility of similarly situated persons being treated differently, I must respectfully dissent.
Initially, however, I wish to state that this opinion is in no way intended to diminish the significance of the tragic injury that Claimant sustained while working for Employer. Claimant is certainly entitled to be compensated for his injury in a manner that is consistent with the Act, and I commend Claimant for his desire to work and contribute to the workforce, despite his unfortunate injury.
Employer’s main contention on appeal is that the WCAB erred in interpreting Section 306(e)(23) of the Act as mandating an award of total disability benefits without considering Claimant’s post-injury earning power. Section 306(c)(23) of the Act provides that “[ujnless the [WCAB] shall otherwise determine, the loss of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or both eyes shall constitute total disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of [Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511].”3 77 P.S. § 513(23).
*704The majority rejects Employer’s contention and adopts the WCAB’s interpretation of Section 306(c)(23) of the Act, concluding that “the WCAB had the discretionary authority to determine that Claimant is totally disabled, without regard to, or in spite of, his earning capacity.”4 Allegheny Power v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Cockroft), 954 A.2d 692, 702-03 (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 242 C.D. 2007, filed July 22, 2008). In reaching this conclusion, the majority opines that the General Assembly did not intend the reference to Section 306(a) of the Act, which is contained in Section 306(c)(23), to place a limitation on the benefits available to claimants who sustain bilateral losses.5 Id. at 700-01. Ac*705cording to the majority, this interpretation is supported by Reed v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 499 Pa. 177, 452 A.2d 997 (1981); Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 479 Pa. 618, 389 A.2d 42 (1978); Lente v. Luci, 275 Pa. 217, 119 A. 132 (1922); Estate of Harris v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Sunoco, Inc.), 845 A.2d 239 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004); Faulkner Cadillac v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Tinari), 831 A.2d 1248 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003); Acme Markets, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hopiak), 127 Pa.Cmwlth.553, 562 A.2d 419 (Pa.Cmwlth.1989); Shoop v. Chambersburg Baking, 189 Pa.Super. 20, 149 A.2d 179 (Pa.Super.1959); and Rutledge v. Daley’s Blue Line Transfer Co., 152 Pa.Super. 118, 31 A.2d 366 (Pa.Super.1943).
However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Section 306(c)(23) of the Act because it fails to account for the express language of Section 306(a). In 1996, the General Assembly amended Section 306(a) of the Act to state that “[njothing in this act shall require payment of total disability compensation benefíts under this clause for any period during which the employe is employed or receiving wages.” Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, § 4, amending 77 P.S. § 511(2) (emphasis added). Through this amendment, the General Assembly made it clear that no provision of the Act, including Section 306(c) (23), is intended to provide total disability benefits to a claimant for a period of time during which he is employed or receiving wages. Because Reed, Turner, Lente, Acme Markets, Inc., Shoop, and Rutledge were decided prior to the 1996 amendment to Section 306(a), the majority’s reliance on those cases is misplaced. Additionally, while Estate of Harris and Faulkner Cadillac were decided after the 1996 amendment to Section 306(a), those cases did not address whether Section 306(a) of the Act applies in this situation and, therefore, are not relevant to this inquiry.
When the limiting language contained in Section 306(a) of the Act is taken into consideration, the legal significance of Section 306(c)(23) becomes evident. Section 306(c)(23) of the Act creates a statutory presumption that a claimant who sustains “the loss of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or both eyes” is temporarily totally disabled; it does not automatically entitle a bilateral loss claimant to lifelong total disability benefits. See 77 P.S. § 513(23); see also Torrey & Greenberg § 5:13 (Section 306(c)(23) “does not presume lifelong permanent disability. Instead, the total disability is presumed to be temporary and is to be paid unless the [WCAB] shall otherwise determine.”) An employer may rebut the presumption of total disability that Section 306(c)(23) of the Act creates by proving that the bilateral loss claimant is once again employed or receiving wages following his injury. See 77 P.S. 513(23); 77 P.S. § 511(2); see also Torrey & Greenberg § 5.142 (“[A] [modification or suspension] petition would presumably be filed if the claimant effected a return to work and had earning power.”) Thus, where a bilateral loss claimant is employed and receiving wages following his injury, the WCAB’s discretion must be exercised consistent with Section 306(a). See 77 P.S. § 513(23); 77 P.S. § 511(2).
Applying these principles to the present case, Claimant was initially entitled to the presumption of temporary total disability provided for under Section 306(e)(23) because he sustained a bilateral loss of his hands. However, Employer successfully rebutted that presumption by presenting *706evidence that Claimant has returned to work and is receiving wages. Therefore, I believe that the WCAB committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by-concluding that Claimant remains totally disabled, even though he has returned to work and is earning wages.
Moreover, I believe that the majority’s interpretation is incorrect because it gives the WCAB unbridled discretion. In Symons v. National Electric Products, Inc., 414 Pa. 505, 512-14, 200 A.2d 871, 875-76 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld the WCAB’s decision finding that a claimant who had sustained a bilateral- loss was no longer totally disabled after he returned to work and was earning more than his pre-injury wages. Given the WCAB’s prior willingness to consider a claimant’s post-injury earning power under Section 306(e)(23) in Symons, it is very troubling that the WCAB, in this case, has determined earning power to be entirely irrelevant. If the WCAB is permitted to change its interpretation of Section 306(c)(23) in each case without any explanation as to why it is departing from its prior interpretation, the result will be that similarly situated individuals will be treated differently. Perhaps the best example of this can be seen by comparing Symons, where it was determined that a claimant who had sustained a bilateral loss was no longer totally disabled in light of his post-injury earnings, with the present case, where it was determined that Claimant continues to be totally disabled even though he is now employed and receiving wages. Clearly, no administrative agency or branch thereof should be afforded such unfettered discretion. If, as the majority opinion implies, there are no limits on the WCAB’s discretion under Section 306(c)(23), then this Court’s review in such cases is illusory.
For the reasons discussed above, I would reverse the WCAB’s decision and remand the matter to the WCAB to assign to the WCJ to hold a hearing and make findings as to the amount of Claimant’s post-injury earnings and . to determine whether Claimant is now entitled to partial disability benefits or specific loss benefits.6 Accordingly, I must dissent.
President Judge LEADBETTER and Judge LEAVITT join in this dissenting opinion.. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 513(23).
. After thoroughly reviewing our prior case law, I believe that there is no authority that currently allows a bilateral loss claimant who has returned to work and is earning wages following an injury to continue receiving total disability benefits under Section 306(c)(23).
. Section 306(a) of the Act provides as follows:
The following schedule of compensation is hereby established:
(1) For total disability, sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the wages of the injured employe as defined in section 309 beginning after the seventh day of total disability, and payable for the duration of total disability, but the compensation shall not be more than the maximum compensation payable as defined in section 105.2. Nothing in this clause shall require payment of compensation after disability shall cease. If the benefit so calculated is less than fifty per centum of the Statewide average weekly wage, then the benefit payable shall be the lower of fifty per centum of the Statewide average weekly wage or ninety per centum of the worker’s average weekly wage.
*704(2) Nothing in this act shall require payment of total disability compensation benefits under this clause for any period during which the employe is employed or receiving wages.
77P.S. § 511.
. In its opinion, the majority notes that, before the WCAB, "Employer asserted that Claimant’s specific losses are compensable exclusively under Sections 306(c)(1) (hand) and 306(c)(2) (forearm) of the Act, 77 P.S. §§ 513(c)(1) and (c)(2), so that Claimant is entitled to an aggregate of 705 weeks of total disability compensation.” Allegheny Power v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Cockroft), 954 A.2d 692, 695 (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 242 C.D. 2007, filed July 22, 2008). The majority then states that, "[a]lthough Employer continues this assertion on appeal, we note that Employer has waived this issue by stipulating that Claimant’s injuries fall within Section 306(c)(23) of the Act.” Id. at 695 n. 3. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s assessment. While Employer may have stipulated that Claimant’s injuries initially fell within Section 306(c)(23) of the Act, which entitled Claimant to a presumption that he was totally disabled, Employer is not foreclosed from now arguing that Claimant's total disability has resolved into specific losses compensable exclusively under Section 306(c)(1) and 306(c)(2) of the Act.
. According to the majority, to interpret the reference that is made to Section 306(a) in Section 306(c)(23) as requiring consideration of a claimant’s earning power would ignore and render meaningless the prefatory language in Section 306(c), which provides that awards under that section are the exclusive remedy for the specified permanent injuries. Allegheny Power v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Cockroft), 954 A.2d 692, 700 (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 242 C.D. 2007, filed July 22, 2008). However, the majority fails to recognize that Section 306(c)(23) is unlike any other provision in Section 306(c). That is, while Section 306(c) generally provides for the payment of specific loss benefits for a particular number of weeks without regard to earning capacity, Section 306(c)(23) allows a claimant who sustains a bilateral loss to receive total disability benefits in accordance with Section 306(a). Thus, the specific loss benefits provided for in Section 306(c)(l)-(22) are not the exclusive remedy available to a bilateral loss claimant. Instead, a bilateral loss claimant has the option of electing to receive disability benefits in accordance with Section 306(a) or receiving specific loss benefits for the loss of each body part in accordance with Section 306(c)(l)-(22). See Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618, 627, 389 A.2d 42, 46 (1978).
The majority further opines that the interpretation advanced by Employer would require a suspension of the principles applicable .to all claims under Section 306(c) and would require the payment of partial disability benefits, thus blurring the distinctions that the General Assembly established by setting forth three separate schedules of compensation. Allegheny Power v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Cockroft), 954 A.2d 692 (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 242 C.D. 2007, filed July 22, 2008). However, I disagree.
There is no reason why the principles that have traditionally been held to be applicable under Section 306(c) would not continue to apply to Section 306(c)(l)-(22). As previously mentioned, Section 306(c)(23) is a unique provision, which specifically provides for total disability benefits to be paid in accordance with Section 306(a). It is this express reference which provides the justification for treating Section 306(c)(23) differently than the other portions of Section 306(c). Additionally, by using the language "disability” in Section 306(c)(23), the General Assembly expressed its intent to blur the general distinctions between the different schedules of *705compensation as applied to bilateral loss claimants.
. Generally, an employee, who, following an injury, returns to work at wages less than his pre-injury wages is entitled to partial disability benefits for a period of up to five-hundred weeks. Section 306(b)(1), 77 P.S. § 512(1). However, under Section 306(c)(23), the WCAB has the discretion to determine that a bilateral loss claimant is entitled tq .specific loss benefits where those benefits prove to be more advantageous. Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618, 627, 389 A.2d 42, 46 (1978); see also Torrey & Green-berg § 5.142 (“The employee, however, can elect to receive two specific loss payments, and thus, he or she may receive continuing benefits even though such employee has returned to work.”).