(dissenting).
I dissent. The trial judge improperly sent out with the jury, over objections by both the Commonwealth and the defense, written questions with answers. He did so to create a “good test case.” This unusual procedure prejudiced appellant’s right to a fair trial. I also disagree with the majority’s extension of the Clair waiver doctrine. I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.1
I
The trial court’s twenty-six page charge included ten hypothetical questions with answers.2 These amounted to suggested verdicts and were submitted to the jury on the court’s own initiative. After reading the entire *400charge, the court, over objections by both the Commonwealth and the defense, sent out with the jury a single written page with these challenged questions and answers. The trial court attempted to justify this novel procedure by stating: “we may have a good test case.”
There is no authority to support the trial court’s action. Pa.Rule of Criminal Procedure 1114 permits exhibits to be sent out with the jury, but it specifically forbids giving the jury a transcript of any trial testimony, a copy of any confession by the defendant or a copy of the indictment or information. These limitations are designed to ensure that the jury does not. give undue weight to those written materials before them. See Commonwealth v. Russell, 456 Pa. 559, 322 A.2d 127 (1974); Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa. 422, 311 A. 2d 572 (1973).
Perhaps the dangers of misuse of written instructions could be minimized if the entire charge is submitted to the jury. Although the majority addresses this question, it is not at issue here. No jurisdiction has ever allowed a trial court to reduce its charge to a series of simplistic questions complete with mandated verdicts and to submit them in writing to the jury over objections of both the prosecution and defense.3
The majority relies on Copeland v. United States, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 152 F.2d 769 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841, 66 S.Ct. 1010, 90 L.Ed. 1815 (1945). There, the court “quite properly” denied a jury request for submission of instructions after both the defense and prosecution objected. The reviewing court, in dicta, stated that in proper circumstances submission of all written instructions might be appropriate. However, the court specifically noted the very danger present in this case:
“No doubt instructions which he reads and hands over to the jury may make-a stronger impression than oth*401er instructions which are not reduced to writing. This difference may or may not be important. When the judge thinks that it is likely to distort the charge as a whole . . . , he may solve the problem by declining to give or by declining to hand over any written instructions, or by reducing his entire charge to writing and reading it to the jury.”
Id. at 770. Other federal cases have approved a court’s submission of or refusal to submit all instructions to the jury. United States v. Cobb, 397 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 1968); McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 896 (7th Cir. 1963); Carrodo v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 210 F.2d 712, 722-23 (1953); Doane v. Jacobson, 244 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1957). None of these cases considered whether a judge could submit a question and answer summary of its charge.
Finally, the majority relies on ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 5.1 (Approved Draft, 1968). The rule makes no mention whatsoever of submitting written instructions or charge to the jury. The entire text of that standard states:
“(a) The court in its discretion may permit the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room a copy of the charges against the defendant and exhibits and writings which have been received in evidence, except depositions.
“(b) Among the considerations which are appropriate in the exercise of this discretion are:
(i) whether the material will aid the jury in a proper consideration of the case;
(ii) whether any party will be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and
(iii) whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.”
*402Even if the rule were applicable, it would exclude any material which “may be subjected to improper use by the jury,” an issue the majority fails to address.
The court’s procedure in this case could only encourage the jury to ignore the court’s general instructions and to reach a verdict without a complete analysis of the issues . involved. For example, the full legal definitions and implications of such legal concepts as “intent”, “provocation” and “insanity” are left undefined in the challenged hypotheticals set out with the jury. This could have created an impression with the jury that the court considered such definitions unimportant and is similar to an instruction to consider only part of the evidence. Moreover, the jury might have also structured its entire deliberation solely around answering these questions, thus short-circuiting full consideration of all the evidence and the general instructions. These dangers jeopardized defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The trial court, in its sua sponte search for a “test case” involving an essential aspect of a trial for a serious offense, proceeded in the face of objections from both the Commonwealth and the defense. That search created unnecessary burdens and hazards for the Commonwealth, the appellant, and the judicial process itself. A trial court should not be inhibited from clarifying issues, explaining legal precepts to the jury or generally furnishing the jury “guide and compass.” The submission of questions and answers, the procedure followed here, does not serve this purpose. The majority’s mere “suggestion” to abandon this practice in the future is an inadequate disposition. The only proper disposition of this case is to hold that the trial court abused its discretion and to award appellant a new trial.
II
I must also express my disagreement with the majority’s assertion that appellant’s claim concerning the dis*403trict attorney’s allegedly inflammatory closing argument has been waived. The majority reaches this conclusion by a new and unnecessary extension of the Clair waiver doctrine. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). The rationale for requiring timely objections was stated in that opinion:
“ ‘(1) Appellate courts will not be required to expend time and energy where no trial ruling has been made. (2) The trial court may promptly correct the asserted error. With the issue properly presented, the trial court is more likely to reach a satisfactory result thus obviating the need for appellate review on this issue. Or if a new trial is necessary, it may be granted by the trial court without subjecting both the litigants and the courts to the expense and delay inherent in appellate review. (3) Appellate courts will be free to more expeditiously dispose of the issues properly preserved for appeal. Finally, the exception requirement will remove the advantage formerly enjoyed by the unprepared trial lawyer who looked to the appellate court to compensate for his trial omissions.’ ”
Id. at 420, 326 A.2d at 273-74 (quoting from Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 259, 322 A. 2d 114, 117 (1974)).
Here, appellant made specific and general objections immediately following the remarks and the issue was fully argued at post-trial motions. Thus, a “trial ruling has been made.” By objecting immediately following the close of the argument, the trial court could have “promptly correct [ed] the asserted error” by making specific cautionary instructions to the jury or by ordering a mistrial. There is no allegation that appellant’s counsel was “unprepared.” Thus, none of the rationales of Clair are applicable.
The alleged error has been fully argued before both the trial court and this Court and has been “properly preserved for appeal.” There is no reason for this Court *404not to decide whether the inflammatory remarks denied appellant a fair trial. Moreover, the majority’s new Clair rule makes it necessary for defense counsel to object as the district attorney’s prejudicial remarks are being uttered in order to preserve an objection. Such a procedure could seriously disrupt the trial with no gain in either the quality or the effectiveness of the proceeding. Further, the full prejudicial nature of the closing remarks may not be immediately recognizable through no fault of counsel because they may be cumulative in nature.
There is no procedural or policy justification for the majority’s new waiver rule. It is a rule without a reason. Objections raised immediately following a district attorney’s closing argument afford sufficient timely notice for the trial court to rule on and to correct the claimed error. Such objections preclude an imposition of a waiver.
. Because I find that a new trial is required, I need not discuss the other claims raised by appellant and discussed by the majority.
. For full text of the questions and answers, see Majority Opinion at 10, note 11.
. Over one-half the states do not allow any written instructions to be sent out with the jury. (See Appellant’s Supp.Brief at 2).