dissenting.
In reaching the merits of appellant’s allegation that the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning the second rape, this Court once again condones defense counsel’s flagrant noncompliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1123(a) and Commonwealth v, Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975), which when read together, should mean that issues not specifically raised in written post-trial motions will not be considered by the trial court or by this Court on appeal. By perpetuating in the instant case the exception purportedly created, by Commonwealth v. Grace, 473 Pa. 542, 375 A.2d 721 (1977) and Commonwealth v. Perillo, 474 Pa. 63, 376 A.2d 635 (1977), the majority creates yet another precedent which I fear will ultimately lead to wholesale disregard of Rule 1123 and Blair by bench and bar. This concern, among others, prompted me to dissent on this same point in Commonwealth v. Pugh, 476 Pa. 445, 453, 383 A.2d 183, 187 (1978) (Nix, J., dissenting). See also *383Commonwealth v. Waters, All Pa. 429, 384 A.2d 234 (1978). Once again I must dissent.