concurring. While I agree with my Rrother Weisberger’s conclusion that as a matter of law DeNardo’s injured biceps qualifies as a compensable injury, I believe there are times when a judging body, be it the commission or this court, when determining whether the particular injury arises out of and during the course of the employment, should remind themselves of the basic concept of the nature and philosophy which led to the enactment of the workers’ compensation law. This appeal presents one such occasion.
Our compensation act has been described as social legislation which is remedial in nature. Perron v. ITT Wire & Cable Div., 103 R.I. 336, 343, 237 A.2d 555, 559 (1968). One of the basic purposes of the Act is to afford a degree of economic relief and rehabilitation to those who are casualties of our industrial world by making compensation payments part of the cost of production. Nardolillo v. Big G Supermarket, Inc., 111 R.I. 751, 755, 306 A.2d 844, 847 (1973); *452Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I. 145, 149, 94 A. 717, 717 (1915). The employer has the burden of caring for the casualties occurring in his employment, thus preventing an injured employee from being a public charge. Guilmette v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 114 R.I. 508, 512, 336 A.2d 553, 555 (1975). This court has long recognized that the Act’s provisions must be given a liberal construction with an eye to effectuating their evident humanitarian purpose. Roy v. Providence Metalizing Co., 119 R.I. 630, 637, 381 A.2d 1051, 1054 (1978); Distante v. United Electric Railways, 53 R.I. 258, 260, 165 A. 772, 772 (1933).
Today, an injured worker’s lot is much better than that of those who labored during the pre-compensation days. One need only look at Baumler v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 23 R.I. 430, 50 A. 841 (1901), where a worker who described himself as “short and stocky in build, deep through the chest and body, and * * * very heavy” sued his employer for negligence, seeking damages for injuries he received on January 30, 1900, when, while cleaning the space underneath the brewery’s vats, he became “wedged and bound” between the floor and the vats. Successive demurrers by the brewery to the original declaration and the amended declaration1 were sustained on the ground that Baumler had assumed the risk, with the apparent result that Baumler was never compensated for his on-the-job injuries.
Workers’ compensation first came on the scene when the General Assembly, at its January 1912 session, enacted P.L. 1912, ch. 831. In upholding an attack on the Act’s constitutionality, Mr. Justice Baker in Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484, 488, 96 A. 340, 342 (1916), first referred to an employee’s common-law action to recover damages as an “imperfect and inadequate remedial instrumentality” and then observed that the “conditions under which great numbers of persons, men, women, and youth of both sexes, largely entirely unacquainted with each other and speaking perhaps different *453languages, are assembled for the performance of their work, often produce a situation which renders some of the recognized defenses of the employer to a common law action unreasonable and unfair to the worker.” Those defenses to which Mr. Justice Baker referred were the doctrines of contributory negligence and, as Baumler discovered, assumption of the risk. They have no place in a workers’ compensation proceeding.
Although we have said that in every compensation proceeding there must be some causal relationship between the injury and the employment, we have taken great pains to point out that in compensation cases “causal connection” is not to be equated with the term “proximate cause” as used in negligence action. Boullier v. Samsan Co., 100 R.I. 676, 680, 219 A.2d 133, 135-36 (1966); Palmer v. Friendly Pharmacy, Inc., 84 R.I. 98, 104, 121 A.2d 665, 668 (1956). That connection, as my Brother Weisberger has pointed out, is established here because DeNardo was injured while at work as he was attempting to purchase his early-morning cup of coffee so that he could return to his “hot box” refreshed and reinvigorated. It is unfortunate that DeNardo’s coin did not complete its journey through the chute, but his response was identical to that exhibited by most individuals who, after depositing the necessary funds, discover to their dismay that the vending machine fails to produce its product, be it telephone service, a newspaper, a beverage, food, candy or tobacco.
This court has repeatedly ruled that compensation is not to be denied merely because an employee’s injury occurred away from the work bench or off the premises or at a time other than the regular working hours, but has stressed that an examination of the facts and circumstances must be made with an eye to ascertaining the presence of a “nexus” between the injury and the employment. Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651, 655, 375 A.2d 920, 922 (1977); Carvalho v. Decorative Fabrics Co., 117 R.I. 231, 236, 366 A.2d 157, 160 (1976); San Antonio v. Al Izzi’s Motor Sales, Inc., 110 R.I. 54, 56, 290 A.2d 59, 60 (1972); *454Montanaro v. Guild Metal Products, Inc., 108 R.I. 362, 364-65, 275 A.2d 634, 635 (1971); Boullier v. Samsan Co., 100 R.I. at 679-80, 219 A.2d at 135. Consequently, compensation has been paid for injuries to an employee injured (a) at a company Christmas party (Beauchesne); (b) during a fellow employee’s horseplay (Carvalho); (c) while repairing a house owned by his employer’s family (San Antonio); (d) coming to work (Montanaro); and (e) while on a mid-morning cigarette break (Boullier). DeNardo’s confrontation with the balky coffee machine qualifies him to join company with Beauchesne, Carvalho, and the others, as occupants in what might be described as the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Hall of Fame.
Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik and Lipsey, Bichard A. Skolnik, Lynette Labinger, for petitioner. Bobert K. Argentieri, for respondent.This court affirmed the sustaining of the second demurrer in Baumler v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 23 R.I. 611, 51 A. 203 (1902).