concurring.
I concur in Justice Coleman’s opinion for the Court. I write only to add the following.
As adopted in New Jersey, Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.3 imposes on attorneys a “stringent” burden of disclosure. In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428, 434, 730 A.2d 340 (1999); see also Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437, 464, 713 A.2d 411 (1998) (Pollock, J., concurring)(observing that “in New Jersey, RPC 3.3 *577exceeds the requirements of disclosure imposed by the ABA version”). RPC 3.3(a)(5) requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly “fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure.” The duty to disclose material facts applies with equal force to matters relating to the substance of the underlying claim as well as to those that relate to procedural issues affecting management of the case. As the original comment to subparagraph (a)(5) stated,
subparagraph (a)(5) has been added, which provides that attorneys shall not fail to disclose material facts that are likely to mislead the tribunal if counsel were to remain silent. This applies both to facts that are at issue in the case as well as facts relating to the management of the ease.
Thus, this Court has held that failure to disclose facts relating to the procedural handling of an action can merit ethical sanctions. In both In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520, 608 A.2d 328 (1992), and In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472, 569 A.2d 252 (1990), for example, violations of RPC 3.3(a)(5) were found when municipal prosecutors did not inform the trial court that the police officers in their respective cases had improper motives for not appearing to testify against DWI defendants, resulting in improper dismissal of the charges. Furthermore, in Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. at 459, 713 A.2d 411, Justice Pollock, in a concurring opinion, noted that an attorney’s silence in respect of his defendant client’s bankruptcy constituted a violation of the duty of disclosure required by RPC 3.3 because the attorney’s failure to disclose tended to mislead the adversary and the court.
A misrepresentation to a tribunal “is a most serious breach of ethics because it affects directly the administration of justice.” In re Johnson, 102 N.J. 504, 510, 509 A.2d 171 (1986). Although the trial court in this matter has chosen not to pursue disciplinary charges in connection with the attorney’s conduct, it clearly should be understood that a referral to disciplinary authorities is within the panoply of tools available to a trial court that is misled by an attorney’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure in connection with management of a case. As a general matter, the attorney, not the client, should bear the brunt of a sanction for unethical conduct. *578See In re Forrest, supra, 158 N.J. at 437, 730 A.2d 340 (observing that purpose of Rules of Professional Conduct is to “protect the public from an attorney who does not meet the high standards of professional responsibility”).
For modification and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN — 6. Justice LONG did not participate.Opposed — None.