(dissenting). Disorderly conduct under § 947.01, Stats., is a victimless crime against society. 1953 Wis. Bill No. 100, A., Comment to proposed § 347.01, Stats, (now § 947.01, Stats.). *106Therefore, defendant's conviction for violating the intimidation of a victim statute, § 940.44, Stats., must be reversed.
The introductory paragraph of the latter statute provides: "[W]hoever knowingly and maliciously prevents or dissuades, or who attempts to so prevent or dissuade, another person who has been the victim of any crime ... from ...." (Emphasis added.)
Section 947.01, STATS., provides:
Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
A person may be found guilty of disorderly conduct even if the conduct is not directed at any specific individual or individuals. All that is required is that the conduct "tends to cause or provoke a disturbance." The "victim" is the public peace and good order. See Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 440, 444, 41 N.W.2d 642, 644 (1950).
The Criminal Code was substantially revised in 1953-55. The Comment to the disorderly conduct statute states in part:
Only such conduct as unreasonably offends the sense of decency or propriety of the community is included. This is implicit in the phrase "tends to disturb or annoy others." The question is not whether a particular person was disturbed or annoyed but whether the conduct was of a kind which tends to disturb or annoy others. The section does not protect the hypersensitive from conduct which generally is tolerated by the community at large.
*1071953 Wis. Bill No. 100, A, Comment (emphasis added).
Vinje calls our attention to a provision of the California penal code, § 415, which penalizes a person who "maliciously and willfully disturbs another person by loud and unreasonable noise." 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, Wharton's Criminal Law § 524, at 180-81 (14th ed. 1981) (emphasis added). Disorderly conduct is recognized as a "victimless crime." See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform; Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 317, 320-21 (1995); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 567-68 (1990).
Vinje also argues, correctly I believe, that an interpretation which would find every person disturbed by disorderly conduct to be a victim of that conduct would lead to unreasonable results. Each person of the general population theoretically affected by defendant's conduct could claim "victim's" rights under § 950.045, STATS. In State v. Elson, 60 Wis. 2d 54, 61-63, 208 N.W.2d 363, 367-68 (1973), the court relied on the fact that there were ten to fifteen visitors and five to six patients who observed the conduct of an attorney who refused to leave a ward at Mendota State Hospital and commented adversely about the hospital's visiting policy. According to the State's construction of the disorderly conduct statute, each of these persons would have been a victim of the conduct and entitled to notice of the release of a person imprisoned for violating § 947.01, Stats.
The State could have charged Vinje with an offense insofar as his conduct was directed at his wife. Section 947.013(lm)(a), Stats., provides:
*108Whoever, with intent to harass or intimidate another person, does any of the following is subject to a Class B forfeiture:
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the person to physical contact or attempts or threatens to do the same.
When the legislature has made conduct against a specific person or persons an offense, it has said so. For example, ch. 940, Stats., enumerates crimes against the life and security of other persons and ch. 948, Stats., lists crimes against children. I do not believe that the legislature intended that crimes against public peace and good order should have as victims all members of the public affected by the offense. The State's suggested construction of the disorderly conduct statute could plunge the State into the morass of determining awards for all persons affected by a defendant's conduct. See ch. 949, Stats., AWAEDS FOR THE VICTIMS OF CRIMES.
I would therefore reverse Vinje's conviction for violating § 940.44(1), Stats.