(dissenting). I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision holding that Judge Giddings should be disqualified from further participation in this case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth following, I respectfully dissent.
I am persuaded that Judge Giddings is unable to impartially decide this case consistently with Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347; 235 NW2d 352 (1975), or MCR 2.003. I believe Judge Giddings should be disqualified under Crampton because he has become “ ‘enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner,’,1 and is “ ‘the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him . . . .’ ”2 Furthermore, Judge Giddings has demonstrated that he is personally biased against the Department of Corrections and should be disqualified pursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(2).3 Accordingly, I am persuaded that Ingham Circuit Court Chief Judge Peter D. Houk abused his discretion in denying defendant’s motion to disqualify Judge Giddings and that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
*525i
The Department of Corrections filed a timely motion to disqualify Judge Giddings on September 26, 1994. Judge Giddings denied defendant’s motion by opinion dated September 30, 1994. Pursuant to MCR 2.003(C)(3)(a), the motion was referred to Chief Judge Houk, who reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed Judge Giddings’ decision.4 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals granted immediate consideration and held that the lower court abused its discretion in denying Judge Giddings’ disqualification.5 I believe the standard of review for this Court is also abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court must defer to findings of fact made by Chief Judge Houk, including his refusal to accept defense counsels’ account of the in-chambers exchange.6 The Court is, therefore, bound to analyze the merits of defendant’s claim on the basis of Judge Giddings’ account of the in-chambers exchange.7
I disagree, however, with the chief judge that acceptance of Judge Giddings’ account of the in-*526chambers exchange is fatal to the Department of Corrections’ motion for disqualification.8 According to Judge Giddings’ September 30, 1994, opinion denying defendant’s motion to disqualify: “This Court has little disagreement with the summary of the in-chambers discussions and other events described” in defendant’s brief in support of the motion to disqualify. The facts of this case, as conceded by Judge Giddings and applied to the law in this state, warrant Judge Giddings’ disqualification.
n
I agree with much of the majority’s conscientious analysis of the law of disqualification. The Court of Appeals has traditionally analyzed judge-disqualification cases separately under the court rule and Crampton. Crampton is broader than the court rule because it specifically obviates the requirement of actual bias in cases in which a litigant’s due process guarantees are violated. I agree with the majority that Crampton is best interpreted as setting forth a nonexhaustive list of situations in which a judge cannot impartially hear a case. This analysis is more appropriately deemed an alternative to, rather than an extension of, the court rule.9 See Wayne Co Prosecutor v Parole Bd, 210 Mich App 148, 155; 532 NW2d 899 (1995).10 Accordingly, defendant’s motion to disqualify Judge Giddings should be analyzed separately under *527the court rule and the Crampton standard of due process.
A
I am persuaded that Judge Giddings should be disqualified on the basis of the due process analysis enunciated in Crampton. Crampton held that a basic requirement of due process is a “hearing before an unbiased and impartial decisionmaker . . . .” Id. at 351. Relying on Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975), the Court held that proof of actual bias is not necessary if “ ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ ” Crampton, supra at 351. Crampton then set forth a nonexclusive list of potential situations in which the probability of actual bias exists sufficient to require the judge’s disqualification. The judge:
(1) has a pecuniary interest in the outcome;
(2) “has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him”;
(3) is “enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner . . .”; or
(4) might have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an accuser, investigator, fact finder or initial decisionmaker. [Id. at 351.]
I believe situations two and three warrant this judge’s disqualification.
I initially note that both of the applicable Cramp-ton situations presuppose the involvement of a “party” or “petitioner.” Id. Although the Governor was not a party to this action, Judge Giddings insisted that *528he was a party. The judge persistently unified the interest of the department and the Governor without a rational basis and over repeated objections of the department’s counsel. The judge continually rejected defense counsel's suggestion that there was no unity of interest between the Department of Corrections and the Governor.11
For purposes of disqualification, the Court must focus on the judge’s perception. Because the judge objectively demonstrated his erroneous belief that the Governor was a party and acted consistently with that belief, it obviously affected the department’s interest.12 My conclusion that the judge determined that the Governor was a party is not merely subjective, but clearly supported by uncontroverted statements on the record. The dissent does not conclude, contrary to the majority’s assertion, that the Governor was a party to this litigation. He was never a litigant. *529It was Judge Giddings who repeatedly stated on the record that the Governor was a party and acted consistently with that belief in his continual pursuit of the Governor. This in no way suggests that the Governor was ever a party in fact. Furthermore, the majority has incorrectly characterized the dissent’s discussion as an attempt to “manipulate” the status of the Governor in this lawsuit. The dissent has only illuminated how Judge Giddings manipulated the Cain litigation to obtain control over the Governor to the prejudice of the department.
In fact, the department was prejudiced by the judge’s determination that Governor Engler was a party because the department then became responsible to “represent” a nonparty.13 At several of the hearings, the department’s attorney was unable to determine what interests he represented, clearly prejudicing the department’s ability to construct its defense. This was complicated by Judge Giddings’ ruling on the morning of September 30, 1994. On that day, Judge Giddings released his opinion on the issue of disqualification, declaring abruptly and without explanation that the Governor was not a party:
At this point, Governor Engler is not a party to these proceedings. Nor is he personally affected by them. The . . . rale [of Clemens v Bruce, 122 Mich App 35; 329 NW2d 522 (1982)] would require disqualification where the Court becomes enmeshed in other matters involving “peti*530tioner” (the Department of Corrections), not some third party such as the Governor.
This unexplained switch at the eleventh hour does not, however, eviscerate Judge Giddings’ previous statements, evidencing his belief that the department and the Governor were the same entity.14 Therefore, I believe that the fact that Judge Giddings perceived the Governor to be a party and conducted the trial accordingly biased the department’s ability to defend sufficiently to permit analysis of the case pursuant to the situations enunciated in Crampton, supra.
1. JUDGE ENMESHED IN OTHER MATTERS
Under situation three in Crampton, Judge Giddings was obligated to disqualify himself if he became “ ‘enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner . . . Crampton, supra at 351, quoting Johnson v Mississippi, 403 US 212, 215; 91 S Ct 1778; 29 L Ed 2d 423 (1971). In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a trial judge should have recused himself because he lost a civil rights action brought by the same petitioner15 facing contempt in a subsequent action. The Court concluded that “[t]rial before ‘an unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” Id. at 216, citing Bloom v Illinois, 391 US 194, 205; 88 S Ct 1477; 20 L Ed 2d 522 (1968), and *531Mayberry v Pennsylvania, 400 US 455, 465; 91 S Ct 499; 27 L Ed 2d 532 (1971).
In isolation, Judge Giddings’ conduct appears somewhat innocuous. However, each incident must not be considered in a vacuum; rather, they should be considered in relation to the judge’s overzealous pursuit of the Governor. I agree with defense counsel that Judge Giddings’ actions over an eleven-month period demonstrate that he became “enmeshed” in matters far beyond the scope of the Cain litigation and resulted in a violation of the department’s due process right to an impartial decisionmaker. This conclusion is first supported by the fact that Judge Giddings recommended substantive changes to plaintiffs’ motion to show cause why Mr. Truscott and Governor Engler should not be held in criminal contempt.16
Initially, Judge Giddings recommended that plaintiffs separate their motion into individual counts. Next, he suggested that plaintiffs should not proceed against John Truscott, suggesting that the motion to show cause be brought only against Governor Engler. Finally, and most egregiously, he advised plaintiffs to “consider including reference to inaccuracies in Governor Engler’s letter of August 12[, 1994,]” to the Attorney General. In doing so, the judge unmistakably *532recommended another ground on which plaintiffs could proceed against the Governor.17
Judge Giddings unified the interest of the Governor and the department for purposes of this litigation and proceeded to assist plaintiffs in drafting a motion to hold the Governor in contempt.18 This illustrates how the judge clearly became “enmeshed” in matters involving the Governor. He, in fact, became so enmeshed that he assisted a party before the court.
Several actions of Judge Giddings before his assistance of plaintiffs further demonstrate that he became “enmeshed” in other matters involving Governor Engler and the department. The judge first filed a letter of complaint against the Governor with the Attorney Grievance Commission on October 21, 1993. Next, in November 1993, Judge Giddings appointed a spokesperson for the male prisoners. His purported basis for the appointment was that “we have only gotten one side on most instances because of the practical problems.” Id. However, after indicating that the Governor had released an untrue statement to the press, he candidly stated:
*533This is a release . . . that went to every newspaper. The more recent one went, as far as I can determine, to every major newspaper in the State. ... I have to be able to respond to all of those. I shouldn’t have to respond to any of them. That’s not my job. I’m not a litigant. It’s not my job. I would like to say to the newspaper person, hey, get your fanny down here. The court file is there. Read the Court file. [Emphasis added.]
This makes it clear that the spokesperson was not only appointed to be the voice of the prisoner litigants, but also to be the voice of Judge Giddings. This was an explicit and improper manipulation of the litigation to respond to the criticism of Governor Engler.
Additionally, Judge Giddings entered media contact orders on June 2 and 30, 1994. In his order dated June 2, 1994, the judge, sua sponte, ordered that any written remarks or press releases made by employees or agents of the state regarding the Cain litigation must be faxed to plaintiffs’ spokesperson, to a member of plaintiffs’ class, and to plaintiffs’ counsel at the same time the remarks are made to the public. The order required the same of plaintiffs in regard to any press releases made by them. This was another attempt to obtain jurisdiction and control over the Governor (a person he perceived to be a party) and to address matters clearly outside the scope of the litigation.
Each of these actions by Judge Giddings had one improper goal: to obtain control of the Governor in such a manner as to control the Governor’s public opinion of the Cain litigation.19 The judge’s efforts unnecessarily consumed considerable time and judi*534cial resources. Irrespective of whether the Governor’s comments may be viewed as improper, the judge was sworn to proceed and remain focused on the merits of the case before him — which he had increasingly become unable to do. Instead, he expended judicial resources to assert jurisdiction over the Governor to the obvious prejudice of the department.
Defendant’s reliance on Clemens, supra, a subsequent decision applying Crampton, is persuasive. Clemens affirms that the present set of facts warrant disqualification of Judge Giddings. In Clemens, the Court of Appeals followed Crampton and held that the risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge required disqualification without a showing of actual prejudice. The record in Clemens reflected a serious dispute between the plaintiffs’ attorney and the trial judge regarding appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. The plaintiffs’ attorney filed a complaint against the judge with the Judicial Tenure Commission. The complaint remained pending at the time of trial. The court held that these facts warranted disqualification of the trial judge because, under Crampton, the judge had been the target of personal abuse or criticism from a party before him, and the judge had become enmeshed in other matters involving the petitioner. Similar to the present case, *535the facts of Clemens “suggested such a risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge that due process required his disqualification . . . Id. at 38.20
2. JUDGE TARGET OF CRITICISM
Crampton states that the risk of an impartial decisionmaker is too great where the judge “ ‘has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him,’ ” id. at 351, quoting Withrow, supra at 47. The Court relied on Mayberry, supra at 465, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a judge who is “vilified . . . necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy,” rendering the judge unlikely to “maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.” Id. at 465. Quoting Cooke v United States, 267 US 517, 539; 45 S Ct 390; 69 L Ed 767 (1925), the Court stated that “ ‘[t]he judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency . . . Mayberry, supra at 464. Additionally, *536I hasten to add, however, that a “judge cannot be driven out of a case.” Mayberry, supra at 463. Accordingly, I do not premise my conclusion that Judge Giddings should be disqualified on the basis of the criticism leveled by the Governor, but rather on the inappropriate means by which Judge Giddings retaliated.
*535“the judge should not himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance. These are subtle matters, for they concern ingredients of what constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” [Id. at 465, quoting Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14; 75 S Ct 11; 99 L Ed 11 (1954).]
*536The public comments Governor Engler made in regard to the Cain litigation and specifically in regard to Judge Giddings quite evidently struck at “ ‘the most vulnerable and human qualities’ ” of the judge’s temperament. Mayberry, supra at 466, quoting Bloom, supra at 202. Such criticism does not itself violate a litigant’s due process rights sufficient to disqualify the judge. However, Judge Giddings’ repeated attempts to respond to the Governor’s comments through plaintiffs did violate defendant’s due process rights. While the comments made by the Governor arguably may have been inappropriate, Judge Giddings was sworn to impartially focus on the issues before the court and bring the litigation to a reasonably swift and completely fair resolution. The facts indicate that Judge Giddings was unable to surmount the public criticism and discharge his obligation by divorcing himself from the acrimonious political climate that had arisen. Accordingly, on these facts, I agree that “it is generally wise where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place.” Mayberry, supra at 464.
*537B
Defendant also brought its motion for disqualification pursuant to two subsections of the court rule.21 The subsection pursued on appeal, MCR 2.003(B)(2), provides that a judge is disqualified if “personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney . . . .” The Court of Appeals has repeatedly construed this phrase to require a showing of actual bias.22
*538This Court, therefore, must decide whether defendant has sufficiently shown that the judge was actually biased. I disagree with the majority because I believe that the lower court abused its discretion in concluding that Judge Giddings was not actually biased under the court rule. The judge assumed a role that exceeded the scope of his role of neutral and impartial decisionmaker. Assisting a party in drafting a motion prejudices the judge’s impartiality and is an instance of personal bias under MCR 2.003(B)(2). Because the judge unified the interest of the Governor and the department, the department was analogously prejudiced by the judge’s assistance.
A judge must not relinquish his role as an impartial decisionmaker by providing inordinate assistance to the parties before the court. In Tretick v Layman, 95 Md App 62, 69; 619 A2d 201 (1993), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland aptly stated:
The court, in our adversarial system, cannot substantially help either party; to lend aid would subvert a necessary part of our adversarial system designed to guarantee just trials, which require the impartiality of the referee — the trial judge.
*539Therefore, the assistance to plaintiffs in their motion to show cause as more fully described in part n(A) by itself rises to the level of actual bias under MCR 2.003(B)(2) and warrants the judge’s disqualification.23
Chief judge Houk reached the opposite conclusion because he misunderstood the definition of actual bias. Close scrutiny of the hearing transcript and the opinion of the chief judge indicate that he erroneously concluded that actual bias may only be demonstrated by a prejudicial ruling of the court:
The Court: Let’s focus back then on how this somewhat tenuous relationship has actually prejudiced your client, the Michigan Department of Corrections. Demonstrate a ruling where it has done that.
Mr Govorchin: Demonstrate a what?
The Court: A ruling. [Emphasis added.]
Chief Judge Houk later insisted: “[Y]ou can’t point me to a single ruling in this case where the Judge has ruled against your client. ”24 Moreover, Chief Judge Houk’s inaccurate determination that actual bias may only be demonstrated by proof of an unfavorable ruling is corroborated in his opinion denying the motion for disqualification: “Both before this Court and in front of Judge Giddings counsel for Defendants were unable to point to a single ruling or event that *540prejudiced the Defendant Michigan Department of Corrections.”25 (Emphasis added.)
In his opinion, Chief Judge Houk stated that “[defendant has failed to discharge its ‘heavy burden’ and demonstrate ‘actual prejudice’ . . . .” He arrived at this conclusion, however, by mistakenly stating that defendant’s counsel acknowledged at the hearing that he was unable to show any actual bias against the department. This is a mischaracterization of defense counsel’s statements. Defense counsel only conceded that there had not been a biased ruling by Judge Giddings.
Although a ruling is one means by which a judge may evidence actual bias, it is certainly not the only means by which a moving party may demonstrate that a judge is actually biased.26 Certainly, a presiding judge’s substantial assistance to a party before the court is sufficient evidence of actual bias. Accordingly, I would hold that Judge Giddings displayed actual bias under MCR 2.003.27
*541C
Finally, the majority acknowledges, but does not address, the significance of the fact that Judge Giddings is the trier of fact in this proceeding. This case has primarily been a court of claims action, and, therefore, the judge rather than a jury will preside as finder of fact. The potential for subtle bias and prejudice is therefore heightened. It is much more difficult, if not impossible, to guard against biased findings of fact.
This Court in People v Ramsey, 385 Mich 221; 187 NW2d 887 (1971), recognized, admittedly under different circumstances, that the Court must proceed cautiously when the trial judge is sitting as trier of fact. The Court held it was error requiring reversal for a judge acting as trier of fact to review and subsequently refer to a transcript not in evidence. The Court held:
This case demonstrates the need for an absolute rule in this situation. There is no way to determine whether or not the trial court was prejudiced by “glancing” at the transcript. In fact, it is difficult to determine precisely how much, if any, of the transcript was read by the court, or for what purpose. Therefore, in order to avoid problems of proof on this issue, we hold that as an absolute rule it is reversible error for the trial court sitting without a jury to refer to the transcript of testimony taken at the preliminary examination except under the exceptions provided by statute. [Id. at 225.]
Ramsey illustrates the precautionary measures that are necessary to guard against judicial bias or prejudice in cases in which the judge sits as the trier of fact. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has noted this danger in the context of judicial disqualification. *542In Burrows v Forrest City, 260 Ark 712, 720; 543 SW2d 488 (1976), the court stated: “[T]he better procedure, where the trial judge sits as a fact finder, would be to resolve the difference in favor of the appearance of fairness and remand this case for hearing . . . before a different judge.”
m
Judge Giddings should be disqualified because he became “ ‘enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner’ ” and became “ ‘the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.’ ” Crampton, supra. Judge Giddings’ persistent pursuit of Governor Engler prejudiced the department by denying it the right to a fair and reasonably timely adjudication of its rights on the underlying claim. Therefore, in order to preserve defendant’s due process right to “an unbiased and impartial decisionmaker,” under Crampton, Judge Giddings should be disqualified.
Additionally, Judge Giddings has demonstrated a personal bias against the department pursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(2). A party moving to disqualify a trial judge pursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(2) is not required to prove actual bias by proof of a court ruling. The substantial assistance given to plaintiffs in this case by Judge Giddings sufficiently demonstrated that he was actually biased.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Weaver, J., took no part in the decision of this case.Id. at 351, quoting Johnson v Mississippi, 403 US 212, 215; 91 S Ct 1778; 29 L Ed 2d 423 (1971).
Id. at 351, quoting Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975).
MCR 2.003(B)(2) was changed to MCR 2.003(B)(1), effective September 1, 1995.
See People v Bero, 168 Mich App 545, 549; 425 NW2d 138 (1988); People v Upshaw, 172 Mich App 386, 389; 431 NW2d 520 (1988).
The Court of Appeals has consistently reviewed such decisions of the lower court for abuse of discretion. See People v Houston, 179 Mich App 753, 755; 446 NW2d 543 (1989); Czuprynski v Bay City Judge, 166 Mich App 118; 420 NW2d 141 (1988), and progeny.
In his opinion, Chief Judge Houk stated:
For this motion to be successful this Court would have to accept Messrs. Govorchin’s and Soros’ recitation of the facts of the September 12, 1994, meeting. The Court does not. They do not comport with the recollections of any other persons present. Judge Giddings, attorney Charlene Snow, and the prisoner litigants who were present all have a markedly different recollection of what occurred. [Emphasis added.]
See Judge Giddings’ account ante at 491.
See n 6.
Crampton does not reference GCR 1963, 912, the rule on which MCR 2.003 is based.
However, [actual prejudice] is not required in situations where experience teaches us that the possibility of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable .... [Id.]
At a hearing on November 23, 1993:
Mr. Govorchin: I wouldn’t think so. That’s why I’m not sure why you’re involved with this and why I’m involved with this. If the Governor’s office decided to say something, they’re not a party to this case. This is the Department of Corrections.
The Court: As a matter of fact, the state is one entity. I was not aware that the Department of Corrections is a separate legal entity from other state agencies.
Judge Giddings even referred to Governor Engler as a party at the November 23, 1993, hearing. “Does this Court have or is this Court restricted from controling [sic] the behavior of a litigant that tells untrue statements about the status of this case.”
The majority misses the point in this regard, asserting that even if Judge Giddings believed that the Governor was a party, he was not in fact a party and the “court rule does not allow for such a loose interpretation of the term ‘party.’ ” Ante at 510, n 46. The majority fails to recognize it is the judge’s perception that Governor Engler is a party that gives rise to the prejudice against the department and, hence, the applicability of the court rule and Crampton.
The concurrence misses the point in this regard. The fact that Judge Giddings conducted the trial as though the Governor were a party by itself prejudiced the department. The issue is, therefore, not a “distraction]” for this Court, but instead is inextricably connected to the issue we must decide. The issue whether the Governor is a party did, however, severely distract and obfuscate the central issue of the underlying claim at the trial level.
The majority recognizes that the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors, similar to Judge Giddings, argued inconsistently on this issue. Ante at 510. Judge Giddings, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs-intervenors argue both ways. For purposes of obtaining control over Governor Engler, they assert that he was a party to the action. In contrast, for purposes of disqualification, they argue that the Governor is not a party. The majority fails to see, however, how this prejudiced the department in its formulation of a defense.
The petitioner was a defendant in a criminal proceeding in the circuit court of Grenada County, Mississippi.
The majority concludes that Judge Giddings’ advice to plaintiffs was appropriate because plaintiffs appeared in propria persona. See ante at 517. It should be noted that the interest of plaintiffs in this litigation is identical to that of plaintiffs-intervenors who did have counsel present. The majority’s analysis enables a litigant to proceed in propria persona and receive with impunity extensive assistance of a trial judge. It is certainly more advantageous to have the assistance of the trial judge than the assistance of counsel.
The majority is similarly concerned about the propriety of Judge Giddings “suggestion.” Ante at 517-518. The majority is somehow able to justify Judge Giddings’ assistance because defense counsel did not object either at the in-chambers discussion or at the following hearing. However, Judge Giddings’ assistance is either proper or improper. The failure of defense counsel to object when he was under no obligation to do so certainly cannot diminish the severity of the judge’s actions. It should be noted that, under the court rule, defense counsel was only obligated to raise a timely motion for the judge’s disqualification within fourteen days of the improper act. Orampton has no such requirement. Defense counsel brought a timely motion and was under no additional obligation to object.
Plaintiffs, in fact, followed the judge’s advice and restructured their pleading into four separate counts, including count II, which incorporated Governor Engler’s August 12, 1994, letter. Moreover, the subsequent motion named Governor John Engler only.
Mr. Govorchin argued:
*534What has happened here that’s different is this gradual refocusing of the attention in favor of the outside, this outside connection, this focus on the contents of the media remarks of somebody not in the case. I think that’s what happened is different. That’s what’s given this color to this perception to this under Clemens demonstration of this personal enmeshing, becoming enmeshed with these outside matters, with other matters involving a person that the Court had viewed as connected with this case. That’s what gives the demonstration of bias.
Although Clemens characterized the situations in Crampton as factors, I agree with the majority that they are better termed examples of those situations in which a judge must be disqualified absent a showing of actual bias.
MCR 2.003(B)(2) and (7)- Subsection 7 was eliminated, effective September 1, 1995. See n 3.
In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151; 486 NW2d 326 (1992); People v Lobsinger, 64 Mich App 284, 285; 235 NW2d 761 (1975); People v Page, 83 Mich App 412, 419; 268 NW2d 666 (1978); MacDonald v Ford Motor Co, 117 Mich App 538, 542; 324 NW2d 489 (1982); Tyrrell v Tyrrell, 107 Mich App 435, 437-438; 309 NW2d 632 (1981).
The court rule is based upon GCR 1963, 912, which was based upon GCR 1963, 405.1:
Grounds for Disqualification. The issue of disqualification of a judge to hear an action may be raised by motion of any party or by the judge upon his own motion. . . . The judge shall be deemed disqualified to hear the action when the judge:
(3) is personally biased or prejudiced for or against any party or attorney;
(8) for any other reason is excluded or disqualified from sitting as a judge at trial.
Accordingly, GCR 1963, 405.1(3) and (8) correspond to MCR 2.003(B)(2) and (7).
Contrary to the majority’s position, the “actual bias” language is not derived from the court rule itself. Ante at 495. Rather, it appears to have originated in Wayne Co Prosecutor v Doerfler, 14 Mich App 428, 441; 165 NW2d 648 (1968). The Court stated that the “language of GCR 1963, 405.1(8) apparently a catch-all phrase, still requires some actual showing of prejudice and it will not encompass the unfounded fears of defendants.” Id.
*538Subsequent Court of Appeals decisions have fairly consistently upheld this requirement although In re Disqualification of 50th District Court Judge (On Remand), 193 Mich App 209, 214; 483 NW2d 676 (1992), the Court of Appeals disqualified a judge because of the “appearance of impropriety arising from the financial ties between [the judge] and [the defendants’ attorney’s] law firm . . . .” The Court held that the appearance of impropriety may be sufficient to disqualify a judge after evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. See also Ireland v Smith, 214 Mich App 235, 251; 542 NW2d 344 (1995), in which the Court of Appeals held: “we conclude that the nature and scope of the media exposure create an appearance of bias in this case.” The majority of cases, however, holds that the court rule requires a showing of actual bias, which is more loyal to the language of the court rule.
Plaintiffs, in fact, followed the judge’s advice and restructured their pleading into four separate counts, including count H, which incorporated Governor Engler’s August 12, 1994, letter. Moreover, the subsequent motion named Governor John Engler only.
Additionally, Chief Judge Houk inquired “[h]ow has that prejudiced your client, not the Governor? How is that reflected in the Judge’s rulings! How can you demonstrate actual bias or prejudice?” (Emphasis added.)
Although the judge mentions the ambiguous term “event,” it is clear from the several unambiguous statements made during the hearing that he equated actual bias with a ruling of the court.
Mr. Govorchin argued at the hearing before Chief Judge Houk that actual bias and prejudice as identified in MCR 2.003 “can be demonstrated a number of ways; any of those ways enumerated which are examples of actual bias and prejudice in the courtroom, or under the Clemens versus Bruce case by a showing of any one of four other factors.”
Similarly, Judge Giddings erroneously insisted that defense counsel present evidence of bias through a court ruling: “Can you point to one, point to one instance, one single ruling with regard to any suggestion, any aspect of this case, not a media thing, that would reflect some prejudgment or bias on this Court’s part?” The majority mistakenly identifies this as defense counsel’s concession that Judge Giddings had not shown actual bias or prejudice. Ante at 504. Mr. Govorchin only agreed that there was no actual bias or prejudice “[u]nder the Court’s rulings.” (Emphasis added.) This fact undermines the majority’s conclusion that there was, in fact, no actual bias. Id., n 40.