OPINION
KEITH, Chief Justice.The State of Minnesota requests review of a court of appeals decision upholding a Carver County District Court’s stay of adjudication of criminal charges against Billy Jim Krotzer. Because we agree with Krotzer that the power to stay adjudication of Krot-zer’s case was within the district court’s inherent judicial authority, we affirm. However, we reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ opinion addressing the propriety of Krotzer’s probation order, and hold that the trial court could require Krotzer to serve a term of incarceration as a condition of his probation.
*253I.
The facts of this case are undisputed. On three occasions in December 1993 and January 1994, Billy Jim Krotzer, aged 19 years, and his 14-year-old girlfriend, C.H.M., engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. Krotzer admits that he knew that C.H.M. was approximately 14 or 15 years old, but claims that he was “not sure” whether his actions were illegal. The couple ended their sexual relationship after C.H.M.’s mother, T.J.M., learned of their sexual activities, but they continued a nonsexual relationship with T.J.M.’s approval after she set forth strict dating guidelines.
Despite the parties’ amicable resolution of the situation, an unnamed person notified the Chaska Police Department of the past sexual contact between Krotzer and C.H.M. A Chas-ka police detective interviewed all three individuals in May 1994, and both Krotzer and C.H.M. disclosed the extent of their past sexual relationship to the detective. According to T.J.M., the detective assured them that there was “nothing to worry about.”
Despite this assurance, the Carver County Attorney’s Office charged Krotzer with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (1994). Unable to reach a plea agreement with the county prosecutor, Krotzer entered a guilty plea on July 28, 1994 but requested the court to stay adjudication of his criminal charge. The court did not formally accept Krotzer’s plea, but ordered a presentence investigation, and informed Krotzer that if “this matter does not conclude as we expect it will, then you have a right to withdraw the plea and the State would then have to prove the ease and you would be entitled to a jury trial.” The Department of Corrections performed the presentence investigation, and recommended that Krotzer “be placed on District Court probation for 0 — 5 years with a stay of adjudication. If a stay of imposition of sentence is pronounced, the law would require that this individual be registered as a predatory sex offender. This would not appear to be appropriate in this case because there is no history of aggressiveness, or any aggressiveness in the present offense.”1
At sentencing on September 30, 1994, the Carver County prosecutor voiced his opposition to the district court’s intention to stay adjudication of Krotzer’s charge: “We challenge [Krotzer’s trial attorney] to cite any legal authority to support the Court granting a stay of adjudication over the State’s objection.” The prosecutor urged the court to accept Krotzer’s guilty plea and follow the presumptive sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines: a stay of imposition of Krotzer’s sentence.2 Although entering a guilty plea to third-degree criminal sexual conduct would cause Krotzer to be convicted of a felony, the felony would revert to a misdemeanor under Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1994) if Krotzer successfully served his probationary term. Nevertheless, the court, without accepting Krotzer’s guilty plea, stayed adjudication of his charge and placed Krotzer on probation for 60 months. As conditions of his probation, Krotzer was ordered to serve 60 days in jail, pay $200 to the public defender’s fund and $415 in fines and surcharges, and have no unsupervised contact with any other female adolescents under the age of 16. The district court judge expressed his uncertainty as to the propriety of his sentencing decision, and invited the State to appeal “so maybe we’ll get a decision on this and then we’ll all know where we’re going [but] I believe that in the context of this case, I have the authority to stay adjudication.”
*254The State did appeal the district court’s order, arguing that there is no statutory justification or equal authority for the district court’s action in Krotzer’s case, and that the court violated separation of powers principles by overriding the prosecutor’s charging decision. The State asserted that the district court had exercised exclusively legislative and executive powers by manufacturing a punishment for Krotzer’s crime and by preventing prosecution of the felony charge. The court of appeals disagreed, and held that because a district court has the power to dismiss criminal charges at any time “in furtherance of justice,” the court can also stay the adjudication of a charge, an action less severe than outright dismissal. State v. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn.App.1995). See Minn.Stat. § 631.21 (1994). The court of appeals also rejected the State’s separation of powers argument, stating that the “prosecution can recommend a sentence, but it cannot force the court to impose a sentence from a list the prosecution wants. Trial judges, not the prosecution, pronounce sentences.” Id. at 866 (citing State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn.1982)).
II.
The State argues that the district court violated separation of powers principles. Specifically, the State maintains that the court’s stay of adjudication amounted to the exercise of a power solely reserved to the executive branch under Article III, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution: the power to decide whom to prosecute and what charge to file. See State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n. 3 (Minn.1980). See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (decision whether or not to prosecute generally rests entirely with prosecutor); State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn.1980). Under established separation of powers rules, absent evidence of selective or discriminatory prosecutorial intent, or an abuse of prosecu-torial discretion, the judiciary is powerless to interfere with the prosecutor’s charging authority. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364, 98 S.Ct. at 668-69 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 505-506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).
However, the prosecutor’s power to file charges and prosecute an individual was not infringed upon here. As Krotzer states, the Carver County prosecutor investigated the allegations against Krotzer, filed criminal charges, obtained a guilty plea, and recommended a disposition and sentence to the court. The trial court then postponed acceptance of the plea and placed Krotzer on probation, but this did not affect the prosecutor’s carefully defined role. See Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 18. The final disposition of a criminal case is ultimately a matter for the presiding judge. As we stated in Olson, once the legislature has defined the range of punishments for a particular offense, it cannot “condition the imposition of the sentence by the court upon the prior approval of the prosecutor.” Id. See People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 26, 520 P.2d 405, 410 (1974) (prosecutor may not “veto” trial judge’s decision to divert defendant into pretrial treatment program because “disposition is a function of the judicial power no matter what the outcome”).
We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ decision in this case. The district court’s determination that Krotzer’s situation warranted unusual judicial measures is well-supported by the special circumstances of Krotzer’s case. It appears that the court strongly disagreed with the prosecutor’s decision to file charges against Krotzer, and felt that justice would not be served by giving Krotzer a criminal record as a predatory sex offender. Although the court did not act pursuant to any express Minnesota rule or statute,3 its decision to stay adjudication *255of Krotzer’s charge instead of accepting his guilty plea fell within the “inherent judicial power” we have repeatedly recognized, and was necessary to the furtherance of justice in Krotzer’s case. See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.1981); State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn.1978); Clerk of Court’s Compensation for Lyon County v. Lyon County Comm’rs, 308 Minn. 172, 180, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976); City of St. Paul v. Landreville, 301 Minn. 43, 47, 221 N.W.2d 532, 534 (1974).
In addition, as the court of appeals noted, the action undertaken by the district court in this ease was akin to the dismissal “in furtherance of justice” permitted by Minn.Stat. § 631.21 (1994).4 Under this statute, the power to dismiss criminal charges lies within the judiciary’s authority to control the administration of justice. See, e.g., State v. Fleck, 269 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn.1978) (interests of justice were not served by trial court’s dismissal of incest charges under section 631.21); In re Welfare of J.H.C., 384 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn.App.1986) (trial court order dismissed juvenile court petition “in the furtherance of justice”).
For example, in City of St. Paul v. Landreville, we ruled that a municipal court judge had the discretion to continue a criminal assault complaint for dismissal, despite opposition from the city attorney. 301 Minn. at 44, 221 N.W.2d at 533. On appeal from the municipal court’s order dismissing the complaint, the City of St. Paul asserted that the judge had no such inherent power. Rejecting the city’s argument, this court held: “we cannot agree * * * that the court has no inherent power to dismiss a criminal complaint over the objection of the prosecution except where provided for by statute or to protect specific constitutional rights. Instead, the court has the inherent power to dismiss a case in the interest or furtherance of justice, whether that power is expressly conferred by statute or arises by implication.” 301 Minn. at 47, 221 N.W.2d at 534 (footnote omitted).
Rather than dismiss the charges against Krotzer entirely pursuant to section 631.21, the district court chose a course of action short of dismissal: a stay of adjudication of those charges and the imposition of a probationary period. While dismissing the complaint under section 631.21 might have avoided the need for a stay of adjudication, the prosecutor would have been free to reinstate identical criminal charges against Krotzer. Fleck, 269 N.W.2d at 737 (state cannot appeal from order to dismiss under section 631.21, but can reissue complaint); City of St. Paul v. Halvorson, 301 Minn. 48, 221 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (1974) (dismissal under section 631.21 is not appealable, but is not “with prejudice,” leaving prosecutor free to file new complaint). In order to avoid this dilemma, the district court stayed adjudication of the criminal sexual conduct charge, the only option within its inherent judicial power. Ideally, the judge, prosecutor and defense attorney should have reached some compromise in the form of a plea agreement. But as we stated above, this stay of adjudication was within the court’s power, and was necessary to the “furtherance of justice” under the facts of Krotzer’s case.
III.
However, we disagree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the district court could not require Krotzer to serve a term of incarceration as a condition of his probation. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 866-67. There is no caselaw that directly controls this issue. *256Nonetheless, we note that the only provision that explicitly contemplates a stay of adjudication as a means of deferring further criminal proceedings against a defendant, section 152.18, does permit a district court to “place the person on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may require and for a period, not to exceed the maximum sentence provided for the violation.” Minn.Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1 (1994) (emphasis added). We further note that it is standard practice among judges to order defendants to serve a jail term of less than one year as a “condition” of their probationary term under section 152.18. See e.g., State v. Ender, 467 N.W.2d 39, 40 (Minn.App.1991) (defendant diverted from prosecution pursuant to section 152.18 was ordered to serve 30 days in jail as a condition of his three year probationary term). The district court may have considered the provisions of section 152.18 when it placed Krotzer on probation and ordered several conditions of probation, including a jail term. We therefore hold that it was not improper for the district court in this case to follow the sentencing options permitted by section 152.18, and to order Krotzer to serve 60 days in jail as a condition of his 60 months on probation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
. If Krotzer were convicted of criminal sexual conduct, he would have been required to register with corrections and law enforcement authorities each time he changed residences for ten years, and provide a statement of his offense, a fingerprint card and photograph to those authorities, or face gross misdemeanor charges for failure to register. See Minn.Stat. § 243.166 (1994).
. It is worthwhile to note the opposition of T.J.M. and her mother to Krotzer’s prosecution. In a letter to the court dated July 26, 1994, T.J.M. stated that she did not want Krotzer's case to go forward, and requested that the court "let it end” without further legal action. She also expressed her belief that Krotzer and her daughter were "good kids” who had "made a mistake [and] then learned a lesson.” When T.J.M. and C.H.M. attended Krotzer’s sentencing hearing, T.J.M. told the court that she had "given my blessing to this relationship” in order to preserve her good relationship with her daughter.
. We note that no Minnesota statute or rule of court expressly permits a district court to stay adjudication of criminal charges over the prosecution’s objection in situations like Krotzer's. While Minn.Stat. § 152.18 (1994) permits a court to stay adjudication and place the defendant on probation in certain minor drug offenses, we recognize that this statute does not apply to Krotzer’s criminal sexual conduct charge. Furthermore, a stay of adjudication is not among the available sentences for felony convictions listed in Minn.Stat. § 609.10 (1994). See also Minn. Stat. § 609.095 (1994). Nor is a stay of adjudication provided for under Minn.Stat. § 609.135 *255(1995) which permits a court to stay imposition or execution of a sentence under certain circumstances. However, because the district court in this case never formally accepted Krotzer's guilty plea, these sentencing provisions do not control Krotzer's case, nor has the district court improperly created a new form of postconviction "punishment," as the State claims.
. Section 631.21 states:
The court may order a criminal action, whether prosecuted upon indictment or complaint, to be dismissed. The court may order dismissal of an action either on its own motion or upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and in furtherance of justice. If the court dismisses an action, the reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in the order and entered upon the minutes. The recommendations of the prosecuting officer in reference to dismissal, with reasons for dismissal, must be stated in writing and filed as a public record with the official files of the case.